

American SOCIOLOGICAL Review

December
1949

The Official Journal of the American Sociological Society

Volume 14
Number 6

EDITORIAL BOARD

Editor

MAURICE R. DAVIE

Managing Editor

JOHN W. RILEY, JR.

President

TALCOTT PARSONS

Assistant Editors

FRANK LORIMER

IRA DE A. REID

GORDON W. BLACKWELL

PAUL H. LANDIS

HARRY ALPERT

WILLIAM H. SEWELL

Book Review Editor

STEPHEN W. REED

Editorial Staff

JOHN S. ELLSWORTH, JR.

A. B. HOLLINGSHEAD

L. W. SIMMONS

JOHN SIRJAMAKI

Contents

An Analysis of Conflicting Social Norms . . . SAMUEL A. STOFFER	707
Field Techniques in Social Psychological Study in a Rural Community . . . WILLIAM H. SEWELL	718
First Marriages and Remarriages . . . PAUL C. GLICK	726
Cohort Analysis of Fertility . . . P. K. WHELPON	735
Structure, Function, and Folk Society . . . ALVIN BOSKOFF	749
Are Ideas Social Forces? . . . STANISLAW ANDRZEJEWSKI	758
Social Mobility in China . . . FRANCIS L. K. HSU	764
Cultural and Economic Factors in Panamanian Race Relations . . . JOHN BIESANZ	772
Social Adjustment Among Wisconsin Norwegians . . . PETER A. MUNCH	780
Some Social Functions of Ignorance . . . WILBERT E. MOORE AND MELVIN M. TUMIN	787

CURRENT ITEMS

Communications and Opinion

Some Comments on Jessie Bernard's "The Power of Science" . . . GEORGE A. LUNDBERG	796
Reply to Lundberg's Comments . . . JESSIE BERNARD	798
Report on the Anthropological-Sociological Conference at the University of Mainz . . . KURT GLASER	801
News and Announcements . . .	802
John Stewart Burgess, 1883-1949 . . .	809
John Morris Gillette, 1866-1949 . . .	809

BOOK REVIEWS

Warner and Associates: <i>Democracy in Jonesville</i> . Paul K. Hatt	811
Lindblom: <i>Unions and Capitalism</i> . Robert Dubin	812
Frazier: <i>The Negro in the United States</i> . Edgar T. Thompson	813
Stouffer et al.: <i>The American Soldier</i> . George Peter Murdock	814
Bloom and Riemer: <i>Removal and Return, The Socio-Economic Effects of the War on Japanese Americans</i> . S. Frank Miyamoto	815

THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW is published at 450 Ahnaip Street, Menasha, Wisconsin, bi-monthly in February, April, June, August, October and December. Copyright 1949 by the American Sociological Society. Membership dues of the Society, including subscription, are \$6.00 per year. Subscription rate: \$4.50. Single issues, \$1.00. Postage is paid by the publishers in the United States, Canada, and other countries in the Pan-American Union; other countries in the Postal Union, fifty cents.

Address all business communications to the Managing Editor, AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, 427 W. 117th Street, New York 27, N.Y. Changes of address must be requested at least one month in advance.

Address all editorial communications to the Editor, Maurice R. Davie, 133 Hall of Graduate Studies, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut. All unsolicited manuscripts must enclose return postage.

Address all matters pertaining to book reviews to the Book Review Editor, Stephen W. Reed, 133 Hall of Graduate Studies, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut.

Entered as second-class matter at the post office at Menasha, Wisconsin, under the Act of March 3, 1879. Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in the Act of February 23, 1925, embodied in paragraph 4, section 598, P. L. and R., authorized June 4, 1936.

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

OFFICERS FOR THE YEAR 1949

President, TALCOTT PARSONS, Harvard University

First Vice-President, DOROTHY S. THOMAS, University of Pennsylvania

Second Vice-President, PHILIP M. HAUSER, University of Chicago

Secretary-Treasurer, JOHN W. RILEY, JR., Rutgers University

COMMITTEES

EXECUTIVE

TALCOTT PARSONS
DOROTHY S. THOMAS
PHILIP M. HAUSER

Former Presidents

RUPERT B. VANCE
KIMBALL YOUNG
CARL C. TAYLOR
LOUIS WIRTH
E. FRANKLIN FRAZIER

Elected at Large

KATHARINE JOCHER
SAMUEL A. STOUFFER
MARGARET J. HAGOOD
DONALD R. YOUNG
IRA DE A. REID
CONRAD TAEUBER

Elected from Affiliated Societies

RAYMOND V. BOWERS
EDMUND DE S. BRUNNER
ROBERT K. MERTON
HARRINGTON C. BREARLEY
ALVIN GOOD
NORMAN HAYNER
JAMES M. REINHARDT
CECIL C. NORTH

ADMINISTRATION

TALCOTT PARSONS
IRENE R. TAEUBER
MAURICE R. DAVIE

Elected by the Executive Committee

RUPERT B. VANCE
LOUIS WIRTH
CARL C. TAYLOR

Bogue: <i>The Structure of the Metropolitan Community</i> . Noel P. Gist	816
The National Health Assembly: <i>America's Health</i> . Harold F. Dorn	817
Gagliardo: <i>American Social Insurance</i> . Erle Fiske Young. . .	818
Burns: <i>The American Social Security System</i> . Earl Fiske Young	818
<i>Report of the Royal Commission on Population</i> . T. J. Woofster	818
<i>Yearbook on Human Rights for 1947</i> . Milton R. Konvitz . . .	820
Branham and Kutash: <i>Encyclopedia of Criminology</i> . Thorsten Sellin	820
Shils and Finch: <i>Max Weber on the Methodology of the Social Sciences</i> . Richard O. Nahrendorf	821
Zipf: <i>Human Behavior and the Principle of Least Effort</i> . August B. Hollingshead	822
Warner, Meeker, and Eells: <i>Social Class in America</i> . G. E. Swanson	823

BOOK NOTES

Dublin, Lotka, and Spiegelman: <i>Length of Life</i>	824
MacIver and Page: <i>Society</i>	824
Young: <i>Sociology</i>	824
Selznick: <i>T. V. A. and the Grass Roots</i>	824
Hoffsommer: <i>Regional Research Co-operation</i>	825
Stendler: <i>Children of Brasstown</i>	825
<i>The Family in a Democratic Society</i>	825
May: <i>Protestant Churches and Industrial America</i>	825
Leighton, Leighton and Opler: <i>Gregorio, The Hand-Trembler</i>	826
Cavan, Burgess, Havighurst and Goldhamer: <i>Personal Adjustment in Old Age</i>	826
Schramm: <i>Mass Communications</i>	826
Taylor: <i>Urban Geography</i>	826
Frankel: <i>The Concept of Colonization</i>	827
Borrie: <i>Population Trends and Policies</i>	827
Yanaga: <i>Japan Since Perry</i>	827
Cohen: <i>Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction</i>	828
<i>L'Année Sociologique</i>	828
<i>Yearbook of the United Nations, 1947-48</i>	828
PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED	829
Index to Volume XIV	i

American SOCIOLOGICAL Review

December
1949

Volume 14
Number 6

The Official Journal of the American Sociological Society



AN ANALYSIS OF CONFLICTING SOCIAL NORMS*

SAMUEL A. STOFFER†

Harvard University

THIS PAPER illustrates an empirical procedure for studying role obligations, with particular reference to simultaneous role obligations which conflict.

The writer became especially interested in the problem when considering the strains to which the non-commissioned officer in the Army was subjected. On the one hand, the non-com had the role of agent of the command and in case the orders from above conflicted with what his men thought were right and necessary he was expected by his superiors to carry out the orders. But he also was an enlisted man, sharing enlisted men's attitudes, often hostile attitudes, toward the commissioned ranks. Consequently, the system of informal controls was such as to reward him for siding with the men in a conflict situation and punish him if he did not. There was some evidence that unless his men had confidence that he could see their point of view, he was an ineffective leader; on the other hand, open and flagrant disobedience by him of an order from above could not be tolerated by the command.¹

* Manuscript received September 30, 1949.

† This study was made at the Harvard Laboratory of Social Relations, in connection with research sponsored by the RAND Corporation under Air-Force Project RAND.

¹ Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Star, Williams, *The American Soldier*, Vol. I, Chapter 8.

The general theoretical viewpoint behind this paper involves several propositions:

1. In any social group there exist norms and a strain for conformity to these norms.
2. Ordinarily, if the norms are clear and unambiguous the individual has no choice but to conform or take the consequences in group resentment.
3. If a person has simultaneous roles in two or more groups such that simultaneous conformity to the norms of each of the groups is incompatible, he can take one of only a limited number of actions, for example:

- (1) He can conform to one set of role expectations and take the consequences of non-conformity to other sets.
- (2) He can seek a compromise position by which he attempts to conform in part, though not wholly, to one or more sets of role expectations, in the hope that the sanctions applied will be minimal.

It need hardly be pointed out that conflicts of role obligations are a common experience of all people, especially in our complex Western society. The foreman in industry, like the non-com in the Army, is an obvious example; the "marginal man,"

as represented by the second-generation foreign born, for example, has been much studied. But role conflicts are not limited to such situations. Every adolescent is certain to experience situations in which his family and his peer group are in conflict, such that conformity to the norms of the one is incompatible with conformity to the norms of the other. Most adults are subject to strains to conformity to norms incompatible from one group to another; although, often enough to make life tolerable, either the conflicts do not arise simultaneously or there is a broad enough range of tolerated behavior to provide some flexibility.

In any authoritarian situation, it is axiomatic that adherence to the rules prescribed by the authority depends to no small extent on the compatibility of the rules with dominant values of those who must obey them. It is likely, in most social situations, that the compatibility is not absolute but a matter of degree. There may be variability among members of the group in the extent to which a given value is held in common. The existence of such variability is a factor which should weaken the sanctions against any particular act and facilitate compromise solutions.

With respect to any social value, there are at least two classes of variability which need to be distinguished:

- (1) Each individual may perceive a narrow range of behavior as permissible, but for different individuals the ranges, though small, may constitute different segments of a continuum.
- (2) Each individual may perceive a rather wide range of behavior as permissible, even though there is considerable consensus as to the termini of this range.

It is the viewpoint of this paper that the range of approved or permissible behavior as perceived by a given individual is an important datum for the analysis of what constitutes a social norm in any group, and especially for the analysis of conflicting norms.

In order to illustrate some of these con-

cepts and to make some preliminary attempts to define them such that statistical operations could be performed with them, an empirical study was made of conflicting role expectations in a sample of 196 Harvard and Radcliffe students, mostly undergraduates. Since the concern was wholly methodological, no effort was made to obtain a random or representative sample of the student body, and the data here reported can not necessarily be regarded as typical of how a properly drawn sample would respond. The students were all taking the same course, Social Relations 116. The data were collected on the first day of the course, without any explicit prior discussion of the theoretical problems involved.

Each student filled out a brief questionnaire, anonymously. He was told first:

Imagine that you are proctoring an examination in a middle-group course. About half way through the exam you see a fellow student openly cheating. The student is copying his answers from previously prepared notes. When he sees that you have seen the notes as you walked down the aisle and stopped near his seat, he whispers quietly to you, "O. K., I'm caught. That's all there is to it."

You do not know the student. What would you as proctor do:

If you knew that, *except for your action*, there could be very little chance that either the authorities or your student friends would hear about your part in the incident, which of the following actions (see Table A) would you as proctor be most likely to take? Next most likely? Least likely? Next least likely?

After he had finished checking these questions he was presented with a new complication, as follows:

Now, assume that *except for your action*, there could be very little chance that your student friends would hear about your part in the incident. But assume that, for some reason, there is a good chance, whatever you do, of the authorities finding out about it. Which of the following actions would you as proctor be most likely to take? Next most likely? Least likely? Next least likely?²

²The questionnaire also contained a parallel set of answer categories for the situation where he was asked:

TABLE A

	Check One in Each Vertical Column			
	My Most Likely Action (Check One)	My Next Most Likely Action (Check One)	My Least Likely Action (Check One)	My Next Least Likely Action (Check One)
A. Take away his notes and exam book, dismiss him and report him for cheating.....	—	—	—	—
B. Take away his notes, let him finish the exam, but report him for cheating.....	—	—	—	—
C. If he can be led to withdraw from the exam on some excuse, do <i>not</i> report him for cheating; otherwise report him.....	—	—	—	—
D. Take away his notes, but let him finish the exam, and <i>not</i> report him for cheating.....	—	—	—	—
E. Act as if nothing had happened and <i>not</i> report him for cheating.....	—	—	—	—

This was followed by exactly the same check list as before.

Next the respondent was asked to fill out the following check list:

- A. Suppose now that a proctor's action would be: *Take away his notes and exam book, dismiss him, and report him for cheating.*

How would the university authorities feel if they knew you as proctor did this?
(check one)

- Would expect one to do something like this
- Would not necessarily expect one to do this, but would not disapprove
- Would disapprove
- Would not tolerate it

How would your friends in the student body feel if they knew you did this?
(check one)

- Would expect one to do something like this

Now assume that, *except for your action*, there could be very little chance that the authorities would hear about your part in the incident. But also assume that there is a good chance that whatever you do your student friends would hear of it. Which of the following actions would you as proctor be most likely to take? Next most likely? Least likely? Next least likely?

However, only the situations indicated above will be used in the present paper.

- Would not necessarily expect one to do this, but would not disapprove
- Would disapprove
- Would not tolerate it

- B. Suppose that a proctor's action would be: *Take away his notes, let him finish the exam, but report him for cheating.*

- C. Suppose now that a proctor's action would be: *If he can be led to withdraw from the exam on some excuse, do not report him for cheating; otherwise report him.*

- D. Suppose now that a proctor's action would be: *Take away his notes, but let him finish the exam, and not report him for cheating.*

- E. Suppose now that a proctor's action would be: *Act as if nothing had happened and not report him for cheating.*

(For B, C, D, and E, the same check lists were used as for A, but are here omitted to save space.)

Next the respondent was confronted with what it was hoped, for the methodological purposes of this illustrative study, would be more of a dilemma. He was told:

Now suppose the facts in the case in which you as proctor see a fellow student are exactly the same as in the first case, except for one difference. The student you as proctor see cheating is *your own roommate and close friend*. You know that your roommate is a hard work-

ing, though not a brilliant, student and desperately needs a good grade in this course.

If you knew that, *except for your action*, there could be very little chance that either the authorities or your student friends would know about your part in the incident, which of the following actions would you as proctor be most likely to take? Next most likely? Least likely? Next least likely?

The check list was the same as in the ordinary case presented first. This was followed by:

Now assume that *except for your action*, there could be very little chance that your student friends would hear about your part in the incident. But assume that, for some reason, there is a good chance, whatever you do, of the authorities finding out about it. Which of the following actions would you as proctor be most likely to take? Next most likely? Least likely? Next least likely?

Again the check list was the same.

Finally, the identical series of questions about expectations on the part of authorities and students was repeated for this roommate-friend situation.

The five actions described were designed to constitute, from A to E, an ordered sequence along a dimension of *degree of punitiveness*. That they were so perceived generally by the respondents can be shown easily. To illustrate: If a person said that the authorities, for example, would expect or approve more than one act, it is necessary for unidimensionality that the two or more acts be contiguous (for example, A and B, or B and C, or A, B, and C, but not A and C only). Actually, as we shall see, most students reported at least two acts which would be either expected or approved by the authorities; likewise most reported at least two acts which would be either expected or approved by their friends in the student body. In all, there were 4 chances for each respondent to designate such ranges. Of the 744 responses designating ranges of two or more, the acts checked were entirely contiguous in all but 41; in other words, 95 per cent of the responses were consistent with the perception of the sequence of acts as a continuum.⁸

Attention should be called to the likelihood that the responses as to the approval or disapproval of the authorities or of one's friends in the student body to a given act have an intrinsic merit which for our purposes could be superior to the merit of the estimates of one's own probable action in a hypothetical case. In any social situation, we have some kind of awareness of the group expectations as to an act affecting the group. We can verbalize those, and these responses when tabulated are *primary data* as to the agreement among group members concerning such expectations. On the other hand, a guess as to what one would do one's self in a particular hypothetical conflict situation has a more "iffy" quality which, though possibly quite highly correlated with actual behavior, need not necessarily be so correlated. The main stress in the present paper, it will be seen, is on the reported *role expectations*. The hypothetical personal action is introduced mainly to suggest how concepts like role expectations, when adequately measured, can be applied in the study of an individual's behavior in that role. Ideally, in place of the individual's hypothetical behavior we would like to substitute actual behavior, either in a natural or experimental situation, or reported past behavior. Studies may be devised in the future with such improvements, but in any case the basic sorting variables would be the reported role expectations as perceived by different group members.

Chart I is a picture of social norms, as perceived and reported by the respondents in this study. At the left, we see (heavy line) that almost all of the respondents thought the authorities would approve acts A and B, about a fifth thought the authori-

⁸ To simplify the subsequent presentation the inconsistencies are here treated as checking errors, although in some cases the respondent may actually have perceived an act as not fitting into an ordered sequence (for example, when he said A and C would be approved, but B would be disapproved, he may really have viewed B in a different way from other respondents). Fortunately, the inconsistencies were so few that it is possible to edit them without appreciable effect one way or another, except to simplify the ensuing presentation materially.

ties would approve act C, and almost nobody thought the authorities would approve acts D and E.* Also at the left we see (dotted line) that the majority of the respondents felt that their friends in the student body would approve the most punitive

The left diagram in Chart I portrayed the estimate of the situation where the offender was an ordinary student. By contrast, the right-hand diagram shows far less overlap in expectations imputed to authorities and students respectively. The offender in this





CHART I. Percentage Saying that a Specific Action as Proctor Would be Approved by Authorities and by Fellow Students, Respectively

acts, namely, A and B. But, in addition we see that three-fourths of the respondents thought act C would be approved and a bare majority said the same for act D. Only a few felt E would meet student approval. In other words, if a proctor took action consistent with the authorities' expectations he would not be in conflict with student expectations, although the range of expectations is wider for students than for the authorities.

*To simplify the presentation, "approval" is here taken to mean that the respondent checked either of the following categories:

- Would expect one to do something like this
- Would not necessarily expect one to do this, but would not disapprove

case was one's roommate and friend. Feelings that the proctor in punishing an ordinary offender was behaving consistently with the long-range interest of the students are now overshadowed by the obligations involved in codes of personal friendship: "You can't rat on a friend; you can't let a friend down."

In the case of the friend, the respondents perceived the authorities' position to be about the same as in the case of the ordinary student, except that about a third now thought the authorities might let the proctor get away with C in view of the proctor's personal dilemma. But only a third of the respondents thought the students would approve act A. The modal acts are C and D.

About half believed that the least punitive of all, E, would be approved by most of the students.

In Table 1 each act (separately for the case of the ordinary student and the friend, respectively) is broken down according to the percentage who think it would be approved by (a) the authorities only, (b) both the authorities and students, (c) students only, and (d) by neither the authorities nor students.

he would be *most* likely to choose in the given situation. In the case of the ordinary student, as Table 2 shows, the majority of respondents say they would be most likely to employ acts A or B, the most punitive. There is not a large difference between the hypothetical behavior in private or in public (public only in the restricted sense that the authorities would hear about it in any case, though students need not). The main difference is a small increase, from a private 21

TABLE 1. PERCENTAGE WHO ATTRIBUTE GIVEN ROLE EXPECTATIONS ON THE PART OF AUTHORITIES AND/OR STUDENTS WITH RESPECT TO EACH SPECIFIC ACT

	Percentage Distribution for Each Specific Action					
	A	B	C	D	E	All Actions
Case of Ordinary Student						
Think given action would be approved by:						
Authorities only.....	28	12	3	—	—	9
Both authorities and students.....	68	81	19	4	2	35
Students only.....	1	6	55	48	24	27
Neither authorities nor students.....	3	1	23	48	74	29
	100	100	100	100	100	100
Case of Roommate-Friend						
Think given action would be approved by:						
Authorities only.....	63	44	9	1	—	24
Both authorities and students.....	33	53	25	6	4	24
Students only.....	—	—	49	66	48	33
Neither authorities nor students.....	4	3	17	27	48	19
	100	100	100	100	100	100

N=196

Let us now examine the relationship between these role expectations and the respondent's own hypothetical behavior as proctor. It will be recalled that in both the case of the ordinary student and the roommate-friend, the respondent was asked what he personally would do under two hypothetical conditions: (1) if neither the authorities nor his student friends would hear about his part in the incident; and (2) if there could be very little chance that the authorities would hear about his part in the incident.

In Table 2 we have a percentage distribution of the acts which each student said

per cent to a public 30 per cent, in first choices for the most severe act A. However, the hypothetical behavior in the roommate-friend case shows a very different pattern. As can be seen in Table 2, nearly two-thirds of the respondents elect acts D or E as their first preferences in private action, and only 16 per cent say they would employ as first choice punitive acts A or B. But if the authorities were sure to find out about it, the picture changes. Less than a third would elect D or E as first choice and 40 per cent would prefer A or B. Yet this is still only about half as large as the proportion who would prefer A or B in comparable circum-

TABLE 2. PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF HYPOTHETICAL ACTIONS WHICH THE RESPONDENTS SAY THEY WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO TAKE AS PROCTOR

Action	In Case of Ordinary Student		In Case of Roommate-Friend	
	Private*	Public†	Private	Public
A	21	30	4	6
B	47	48	12	34
C	16	13	18	31
D	15	7	38	18
E	1	2	28	11
	100	100	100	100

N=196

* "If you knew that, *except for your action* there could be very little chance that either the authorities or your student friends would hear about your part in the incident."

† "If you knew that, *except for your action* there could be very little chance that your student friends would hear about your part in the incident, but that there is a good chance, whatever you do, of the authorities finding out about it."

TABLE 3. RESPONDENTS WHOSE OWN MOST LIKELY HYPOTHETICAL ACTION AS PROCTOR IS AS INDICATED, BROKEN DOWN BY EXPECTATIONS ATTRIBUTED TO AUTHORITIES AND/OR STUDENTS

		Would Be Approved by			
		Authorities Only	Both Authorities and Students	Students Only	Neither
Case of Ordinary Student					
(Private Act)	A	6	35	—	—
	B	3	86	3	—
	C	—	13	17	1
	D	—	5	21	4
	E	—	—	2	—
		9	139	43	5
(Public Act)	A	9	50	—	—
	B	5	87	3	—
	C	—	13	13	—
	D	—	4	9	1
	E	—	—	2	—
		14	154	27	1
Case of Roommate-Friend					
(Private Act)	A	1	7	—	—
	B	2	20	—	1
	C	—	14	17	5
	D	—	4	62	9
	E	—	3	39	12
		3	48	118	27
(Public Act)	A	2	10	—	—
	B	14	50	—	2
	C	4	21	30	5
	D	—	4	29	3
	E	—	4	15	3
		20	89	74	13

stances in the case of the ordinary student.

Table 2, while of a good deal of interest in itself, is subject to the caveats entered earlier in this paper against taking reports on such hypothetical behavior too literally. But the main purpose for introducing the material in Table 2 is to enable us to see how such hypothetical behavior is related to

authorities and students would approve. But that tended to be true of several of the respondents who would take less punitive action—they had a different perception of expectations and thus thought they were avoiding conflict. In the case of the ordinary student, only 43 of the 196 respondents indicated a private action which was per-

TABLE 4. FREQUENCY WITH WHICH VARIOUS RANGES OF ACTS ARE PERCEIVED AS APPROVED BY AUTHORITIES AND STUDENTS, RESPECTIVELY

Range	Case of Ordinary Student Acts Approved by		Case of Roommate-Friend Acts Approved by	
	Authorities	Students	Authorities	Students
1 { A B C D E	13	4	4	3
	5	1	4	3
	—	—	—	2
	—	3	—	2
	—	—	—	4
<hr/>				
2 { AB BC CD DE	18	8	8	14
	134	37	120	12
	3	10	2	10
	—	7	—	14
	—	5	—	26
<hr/>				
3 { ABC BCD CDE	137	59	122	62
	33	42	52	20
	—	14	—	18
	—	7	1	42
	33	63	53	80
<hr/>				
4 { ABCD BCDE	5	27	8	11
	—	14	1	11
	5	41	9	22
<hr/>				
5 ABCDE	3	25	4	18
<hr/>				
Total	196	196	196	196

the reported perceptions of authorities' and students' expectations, respectively, of proper behavior from a proctor. The data in Table 2 are, therefore, next broken down according to the categories used in Table 1. Here we see in Table 3, as we doubtless would expect to see, that most students who chose acts A or B as their first preference if they themselves were proctors, also tended to perceive such acts as one which *both* the

authorities and students would approve, and only 27 a public action. Contrast this with their hypothetical behavior when the offender was a roommate-friend. Of the 196 respondents, 118 preferred a private action tolerated by the students only. This number was reduced to 74, who would still stick by their friend even if they knew the authorities would find out about their action, or rather, inaction.

Chart I, it will be recalled, indicated quite a marked range of tolerance in imputed student expectations, especially in the roommate-friend situation. But it is not possible to tell directly from Chart I the extent to which this is due to (a) different respondents visualizing different role expectations,

remainder checked A, B, C, in both cases.

Far different is the picture from Table 4 in the case of imputed student expectations. The majority settled for a range of either two or three acts in both of the situations, but within a given range there were all possible variations. For example, in the room-

TABLE 5. AN ILLUSTRATION OF HYPOTHETICAL ACTIONS OF RESPONDENT AS PROCTOR, AS RELATED TO SPECIFIC RANGES OF STUDENT APPROVAL IN CASE OF ROOMMATE-FRIEND

(These data are for 120 respondents who said the authorities would approve the range AB only)

Range of Student Approval	Private Behavior							Public Behavior						
	A	B	C	D	E	Total Frequency	Average Rank*	A	B	C	D	E	Total Frequency	Average Rank
A	1	—	—	—	—	1	1.0	1	—	—	—	—	1	1.0
AB	2	3	2	2	2	11	2.9	2	6	2	—	1	11	2.3
B	—	—	1	—	1	2	4.0	—	1	—	—	1	2	3.5
ABC	2	5	4	2	2	15	2.7	5	4	4	1	1	15	2.3
BC	—	—	3	2	—	5	3.4	—	3	2	—	—	5	2.4
ABCD	—	1	3	3	1	8	3.5	1	3	4	—	—	8	2.4
C	—	—	2	—	—	2	3.0	—	2	—	—	—	2	2.0
BCD	—	4	1	8	—	13	3.3	—	9	3	1	—	13	2.4
ABCDE	—	3	1	7	3	14	3.7	—	9	2	1	2	14	2.7
CD	1	—	1	4	2	8	3.8	1	—	4	3	—	8	3.1
BCDE	—	1	1	3	1	6	3.7	—	3	1	1	1	6	3.0
CDE	—	1	1	10	9	21	4.3	—	6	9	4	2	21	3.1
DE	—	—	—	6	7	13	4.5	—	2	2	4	5	13	4.0
E	—	—	—	—	1	1	5.0	—	—	—	—	1	1	5.0
Total	120							120						

* A, B, C, D, E ranked 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, respectively.

or to (b) respondents generally agreeing that a wide range of role expectations existed. Let us now look at Table 4, where the frequency with which each range of expectations was indicated is shown. We see here quite clearly the degree of consensus among respondents as to what the authorities would approve. Among the 196 respondents, 134, or two-thirds, checked A, B identically for the case of the ordinary student; 120 checked A, B, for the case of the roommate-friend. The majority of the

mate-friend situation there were 80 who indicated a range of student approval covering 3 acts, but of these, 20 perceived the range as A, B, C; 18 perceived it as B, C, D; and 42 as C, D, E. Clearly there is an absence of consensus here, and it is not a mere uniform coverage of the whole range of possibilities by all individuals.

If we take, for illustration, the 120 respondents who perceived the range of acts approved by the authorities in the case of the roommate-friend as A, B, and order the

ranges approved by students, according to these same respondents, we see in Table 5 the ways in which these different specific ranges are related to one's personal hypothetical behavior as proctor. Here we show for *each pattern* of role expectation the hypothetical private and public behavior respectively. For convenience, these hypothetical acts A, B, C, D, E have been ranked 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, respectively, and average ranks computed.

As we move from role expectations A to E we see how the average ranks of the students' hypothetical behavior increase. It is interesting to note that, at least in the present example, this progressive increase seems to depend more on the midpoint of the range than on the termini. For example, if the expectation is BC the average rank of the hypothetical behavior is just about the same as when the expectation is A, B, C, D. In some cases the pattern with the longer range has higher average rank than its counterpart with the same midpoint but shorter range; in other cases the reverse is true. The number of cases available in the present data is, however, exceedingly small for this kind of comparison.

While the average rank of hypothetical acts did not tend to differ consistently when

we compared two or more ranges with the same midpoint in Table 5, there is a hint that differences in the *range* of hypothetical acts vary with the *range* of role expectations which have the same midpoint. It doubtless would be expected that if a respondent perceived the range of approved behavior to be B, C, D, he would be more likely to choose *either* B or D for his own act than if he perceived the range to be only C. Take the following from Table 5:

	A	B	C	D	E	
C	—	—	2	—	—	2
BCD	—	4	1	8	—	13
ABCDE	—	3	1	7	3	14

Most of the other examples in Table 5 are less neat than this and the number of cases is distressingly few, but if we form other tables like Table 5 for other values of the range of expected approval by the authorities and take all possible matched comparisons thus available (for example, authorities ABC; students BC vs. ABCD) we obtain a rather convincing overall result, in the roommate-friend situation:

The same tendency is also seen, though somewhat less strikingly, in the case of the ordinary student.

While interpretation of such a finding

	Student Expectations Which Have Identical Midpoints But Different Ranges	
	Those With Minimum Range	Those With Greater Than Minimum Range
<i>Private Act</i>		
Own behavior more severe than any act within the <i>minimum</i> range of student expectation.....	2	12
Own behavior within <i>minimum</i> range.....	31	20
Own behavior less severe than any act within <i>minimum</i> range....	8	34
	41	66
<i>Public Act</i>		
Own behavior more severe than any act within the <i>minimum</i> range of student expectation.....	5	29
Own behavior within <i>minimum</i> range.....	32	21
Own behavior less severe than any act within <i>minimum</i> range....	4	16
	41	66

should be indulged in only with caution, the results are sufficient to suggest the importance of taking into account not only the midpoints of a given range of role expectations, but the magnitude of the range as well.

We have now completed the analysis of the present data except for one further observation which has implications for further research.

In such a study as this, it would be interesting first to differentiate individuals into types according to the way they perceive conflicting role expectations and then to ask how these different types of persons vary according to other social and psychological characteristics. Information of the latter type was not collected in the present study. However, the foregoing analysis has suggested how typologies could be set up and related to such outside variables. To take a simple illustration from the roommate-friend situation:

One could classify most of our respondents into three main types according as they perceived the role conflict.

Type I—Those who thought the range of approved acts identical from the point of view of authorities and students. (21 cases) For such respondents the problem of conformity in their own hypothetical acts could not have been difficult.

Type II—Those who thought the range of acts approved by the authorities did not overlap in any way with the range of acts approved by the students. (56 cases) For them simultaneous conformity to both was impossible. It is noteworthy, parenthetically, that 51 of the 56 said their own private act

would be one conforming to student expectation, though 16 of these 51 shifted their act to a non-student position in the public situation.

Type III—Those who perceived a difference in the range of authorities' and students' expectations but who found at least one act which would be tolerated by both. (119 cases) Privately, only 36 of these individuals would take an action satisfactory to both. Publicly, however, 73 out of the 119 were able to find in an act perceived to be mutually acceptable the basis for their own hypothetical solution.

Why did these three types differ so markedly in their definition of the situation? Why, within these types did different subtypes prefer different solutions? These are the kinds of questions which subsequent research can explore. But first we must have a way of defining and classifying the role expectations relevant to our problem and the purpose of the present study is to illustrate a technique for accomplishing this first step.

From the theoretical standpoint, the most important implication of this paper may stem from its stress on variability. In essay writing in this field it is common and convenient to think of a social norm as a point, or at least as a very narrow band on either side of a point. This probably is quite unrealistic as to most of our social behavior. And it may be precisely the ranges of permissible behavior which most need examination, if we are to make progress in this realm which is so central in social science. For it may be the very existence of some flexibility or social slippage—but not too much—which makes behavior in groups possible.

FIELD TECHNIQUES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY IN A RURAL COMMUNITY*

WILLIAM H. SEWELL

University of Wisconsin

IN RECENT years sociologists and anthropologists have become increasingly interested in those aspects of social behavior which have been commonly accepted in our culture as the personal and private concern of the individual. Traditionally in our society, the individual's family life, sentiments and values, dreams, aspirations and motivations have been held to be inviolable. Social scientists have respected this tradition and have either avoided these areas or have assessed them indirectly and inadequately by means of introspection, observations of intimates, autobiographical materials and questionnaires. Some students of social behavior, however, have not been content with the limited and otherwise unsatisfactory data available from these sources and consequently have been attempting to perfect field techniques which will enable them to obtain adequate personal data on representative samples of individuals drawn from neighborhoods, communities and larger social groups.

Unfortunately there has been little discussion in the professional journals of the basic field techniques currently being used in the study of social-psychological behavior.¹ Actually, these techniques for the most part are not new and differ from traditional field techniques mainly in the care with which they are planned and applied. The writer is engaged in a study of child training and personality development in a

rural community in which most of the problems encountered in social psychological field studies were met and feels that a brief discussion of the techniques used in dealing with these problems will reveal some of the possibilities of existing field techniques and may stimulate their further development.

The central problems in a study of this type are those of obtaining acceptance in the community and of establishing and maintaining a high level of rapport between the interviewer and the person interviewed. In the present study these problems were especially difficult for several reasons. The intimate aspects of child training and family relationships are not commonly discussed with strangers in our rural society; consequently, not only may the mothers, who were the principal source of information, be reticent about discussing such facts but also the community may disapprove such inquiry. Another complicating factor is that the mother is asked to recall these experiences and to verbalize them. Because this is not a common demand of her every-day life she may find it a difficult task. The matter is further complicated because the mother is likely to be quite conscious of her lack of knowledge concerning "proper" methods of child training and consequently is likely to feel self-conscious about her own "inferior" methods. The obvious differences in the educational and status levels of the mother and the interviewer also complicate the rapport problem. Another difficulty is that the cooperation of the father as well as the mother must be obtained because his hostility may cause the mother to refuse the interview or make her unwilling to talk freely, although she might be otherwise willing to cooperate. Finally, the rapport and community acceptance problems are further complicated because the news of an unfavorable interviewing experience spreads rapidly in a rural community and may result in refusals or

* Based on a paper read at the annual meeting of the Midwest Sociological Society, Minneapolis, April, 1948.

¹ A notable exception is the work of Robert K. Merton; see his "Selected Problems of Field Work in the Planned Community," *American Sociological Review*, XII (June, 1947), 304-312; *Mass Persuasion: The Social Psychology of a War Bond Drive*, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1946; and (with Patricia L. Kendall) "The Focused Interview," *American Journal of Sociology*, LI (May, 1946), 541-577.

reduced cooperation throughout the community.

Considerable attention was given to overcoming these problems in the present study. Although the techniques employed fit into a pattern in which there is considerable overlapping, they will be discussed in relation to the two central problems of community acceptance and the establishment and maintenance of rapport.

COMMUNITY ACCEPTANCE

The success or failure of field studies often depends upon the community's acceptance of the study, its personnel and its purposes. Community acceptance is dependent to a considerable degree upon the prestige of local and outside sponsors. All too often researchers have assumed tacitly that because they are sponsored by an agricultural college, a university, a government agency, or a research foundation, they will be accepted with open arms by local people. Unfortunately this is not always true. The government agency, agricultural college or university may in fact be looked upon with considerable disdain or the prestige of a research foundation may not be recognized in the community.

Also, researchers have been aware of the importance of local sponsorship in gaining entrée into the rural community and consequently have sought the sponsorship or direct assistance of local persons having high status, authority and prestige in the community. Too frequently, however, it has been assumed that the persons who occupy certain official positions in the community are actually the persons with high status and prestige. Unfortunately such individuals may not be the key persons because of facts known only locally. Equally important, they may not be the individuals who have high prestige, status and authority in the particular group or groups with which one wishes to work.

Choice of Sponsorship. Because of the importance of local acceptance in a study of this kind, considerable attention was devoted to the choice of both outside and local

sponsors. The outside sponsor was the University of Wisconsin. The only question here was which of its various colleges, divisions or departments was most favorably known locally. Reconnaissance in the community soon indicated that the College of Agriculture was well thought of in the community but that rural people did not distinguish between its branches such as the Experiment Station, Extension Service or its departments. Consequently the decision was made to emphasize the sponsorship of the College of Agriculture.

The choice of local sponsorship was far more difficult. There was no existing organization in the community which concerned itself primarily with child welfare or child training. Homemakers Clubs and the Parent Teachers Association were inactive in more rural parts of the country.² Consequently the choice narrowed down to two officials whose offices carried considerable prestige in the county; these were the County Agent and the County Superintendent of Schools. Both had been residents of the community for many years, had held their offices for long periods of time, were highly respected persons, and were well known to the farm families. However, reconnaissance indicated that the prestige of the County Agent with the women of the community was not as great as that of the County Superintendent who had always taken an active part in community affairs, especially in educational, child welfare and community improvement programs. Moreover, the County Superintendent was intensely interested in the study and was quite willing to sponsor it locally, to help in making local contacts with school board members, to enlist the cooperation of rural school teachers, and to turn over his records to the project. Consequently he was selected as the local sponsor.

² Another possibility would have been the formation of a local committee to sponsor the study. However, the problems of finding the persons for this committee would have been essentially the same. Had an action program been contemplated after the completion of the research, this technique would have been followed.

The Use of Sponsorship. Having determined the choice of sponsorship the next problem was to decide how best to make use of it. One possibility was to make the study the subject of a feature story to be carried in the local county weekly papers. This was rejected because it was felt best not to risk the chance that the newspapers would want to slant the story in order to arouse reader interest. Also, the type of selection of families being used might well cause local animosity if it were publicized. Consequently, only a brief announcement was given the papers stating that a study of child training and development was being made in the community under the sponsorship of the College of Agriculture and the County Superintendent, and that approximately 160 farm families would be interviewed. It further listed the names of the interviewers and the study director.

After considering various possibilities it was decided that the best use of sponsorship would be in the more personal contacts with the rural people involved in the study. Consequently, before approaching local school board clerks to gain their assistance in locating eligible families, a personal letter was written to each clerk informing him that the County Superintendent and the College of Agriculture were sponsoring a study of personality development, and that the County Superintendent had suggested him as the ideal person to assist in locating the eligible families in his school district. A few days later a personal call was made in which the sponsorship of the study was further emphasized, its general purposes explained in greater detail, and the help of the clerk was sought in locating the eligible families. Every clerk cooperated and in effect became an informal local sponsor. Favorable word of this visit spread rapidly to the eligible families in the neighborhood and there was considerable evidence that our local *entrée* was greatly facilitated by this contact.

However, the principal use of sponsorship was directly with sample families. It was obvious from the beginning that the time-honored technique of appearing at the door of a prospective respondent and talking

one's way in, both literally and figuratively, would not do in a study of this type. Consequently, the cooperation of the mothers was sought by means of a carefully written personal letter which not only emphasized the sponsorship but also attempted to make the question of the mother's cooperation a foregone conclusion by interesting her in the general purposes of the study, by assuring her that her neighbors were cooperating, by setting an approximate date for the interview, by introducing the interviewer, and finally by thanking the mother in advance for her help. In addition, the letter attempted to set the stage for the interview without in any way structuring it beyond stating that it would be concerned with her child's development, emphasizing that the interview would be a pleasant experience for the mother, and that she should respond freely and fully because what she had to say was of great importance and because anonymity would be strictly maintained. The letter was pretested several times and revised extensively on the basis of the results of the pretests.

ESTABLISHMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF RAPPORT

Closely related to the problem of the use of sponsorship as a means of gaining *entrée* into the community is that of the establishment and maintenance of a high level of rapport between the interviewer and the interviewee. Actually this problem is by far the more difficult of solution because it depends not alone on the direct interaction of the personalities involved in the interview situation but also on many other factors which set the limits within which rapport can be established and maintained. These factors include, in addition to the matter of community and family *entrée* already discussed, the following: (1) the interview schedule, which not only involves such structural consideration as the arrangement of sections and questions into a form which makes possible easy transitions but also the type of questions which must be employed to obtain data of proper range, depth and specificity for the purposes of the study, (2)

the interviewer factor, which includes the selection, training, supervision and morale of the field interviewers, and (3) the interview situation, which includes the place, time, and conditions under which the interview is conducted as well as the skills and techniques employed in the interviewing process.

The Interview Schedule. The interview schedule itself is a major factor in the establishment and maintenance of rapport. Not only are the matters to be covered in the interview important, but the types of questions, the wording of the questions, the relation of the questions to each other, the amount of direction and channeling which the interview demands, the length of the interview schedule, and similar matters probably set the limits within which rapport may be achieved. In social psychological field studies the challenge is to sacrifice as little coverage of intimate detail as possible and at the same time to obtain data which can be treated quantitatively. This can be done only by giving very careful attention to the planning of the schedule.

Question Type and Rapport. Not only does the statement of a question have considerable bearing on the response given to it but also there is a close relationship between the respondent's freedom to respond and his interest in and identification with the interviewing situation.³ Thus, it would be expected that the respondent, in an interview situation in which the questions were of the directive type, i.e., questions which definitely focus attention on a specific factor and limit or prescribe the responses which may be made, would find the experience somewhat frustrating, tiring and boring, and consequently a low degree of rapport would be obtained. On the other hand, in completely non-directive interview in which the respondent is free to talk about anything he wishes, and in which the role of the interviewer is

only to show interest and keep him talking without directive questions, it would be expected that the respondent would become identified with the interview, and would enjoy the process. Consequently rapport would be easily maintained. To the writer's knowledge there is no direct scientific evidence on this point although it seems psychologically sound and certain advocates of non-directive interviewing technique have presented indirect and inferential evidence in support of this claim.⁴ The difficulty is that a completely non-directive interview demands great interviewing skill, requires a great deal of time, runs the risk of never focusing on the specific aspects of the problem in which the researcher is interested, and faces the frequent possibility that different respondents will not focus on the same factors. Hence it is difficult if not impossible to use the results of such interviews quantitatively even if the time and skill required for non-directive interviewing is available. In addition, it is a very laborious process for finding out answers to the many non-emotionally charged questions which are often necessary in social psychological research. To overcome this difficulty in lack of specificity without too great sacrifice in depth and range of response, social psychologists have hit upon the compromise of semi-directive or, in Merton's language, semi-structured questions.⁵ These questions actually vary widely in degree of directiveness, all the way from those which merely focus the respondent's attention on a general subject for discussion to those which either focus his attention on specific and limited areas of experience but do not prescribe the form or manner of the response expected. With questions of this type it is possible to establish a high level of

⁴ See Rogers, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

⁵ See Merton & Kendall, *op. cit.*, pp. 545-577. Several research agencies have been using such questions for some time. Rensis Likert, when in charge of the Division of Program Surveys of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, was the first to use them in large-scale opinion studies and has done a great deal of work to perfect them for use in opinion surveys at the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan. Unfortunately little of this work has been published.

³ Merton has given careful attention to the influence of question type on response. See Merton and Kendall, *op. cit.*, 545-577. See also Carl R. Rogers, *Counseling and Psychotherapy*, New York: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1942, and F. J. Roethlisberger and W. J. Dickson, *Management and the Worker*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938, Chap. XIII.

interest and identification on the part of the respondent and consequently to maintain a high level of rapport throughout the interviewing process and at the same time to obtain satisfactory depth, breadth, and specificity of response.

The present study included quite directive questions dealing with such matter-of-fact information as the age and sex composition of the family, the educational level of the parents and children, etc., semi-directive questions dealing with the manner in which children were weaned, toilet trained, and disciplined, and still less directive questions concerning sibling rivalries, parent-child conflicts, and parent-parent relationships. Actually in the more personal areas the technique used was to get the respondent talking on the subject and through non-directive questions to keep her talking until the essential facts in the situation were covered, using the actual interview schedule only for recording the responses. In the event that the significant points were not covered in this manner, more directive questions were resorted to but even then directive questioning was held to a minimum.

Sequence of Sections and Questions. The order in which topics, areas of inquiry or questions are taken up has considerable influence on the degree of rapport achieved in an interview. This is because abrupt transitions break psychological sets which have been established in the respondent's mind and force him to make shifts to other areas before he is ready to move on. Another factor is that the transition called for may be to an area which does not seem to the respondent to follow naturally the previous area of inquiry. Thus, a question which is a "rapport breaker" at one point in the interview may cause no break in rapport if introduced at another point. Because individuals respond differently and because interviewers differ in skill, some researchers have allowed their interviewers to vary the order of questions and areas of inquiry according to their appraisal of the interview situation. Others have insisted that the stimulus should be more constant and have required their interviewers to follow the precise order of the

interview schedule and even to word the questions exactly as they appear on the schedule. The position taken by the writer is that preliminary tests should be made to determine the sequence of topics and questions which produces the smoothest transitions and that once this sequence is established it should be followed except in those few cases where the respondent insists on directing the interview into another sequence.

Because many areas of child training and development were to be covered in the interview, the schedule was divided into specific sections each covering an area of inquiry such as feeding, toilet training, sleep habits, emotional behavior, and responsibility training. These sections were then arranged in the schedule in such a manner that the transition from section to section would seem natural and logical to the mothers, in that the preceding section would introduce the next section or would at least require its inclusion for the sake of a complete consideration of the child's development. This was done on the basis of comments from mothers interviewed on early trial runs before the schedule was finally organized for a formal pretest. Actually the results of the formal pretest did not indicate that the order should be changed. In general the final arrangement of sections was in accordance with their priority in child training. Thus, feeding came before toilet training and both appeared early in the schedule, while discipline and responsibility training came late in the schedule. If there seemed to be a choice within the developmental sequence, the sections requiring greater rapport came later in the schedule. In addition to this arrangement, standard transitions were developed and used where necessary to facilitate the shift into a new area of inquiry.

Within the various sections of the interview schedule the arrangement of the questions followed the same general principles. They were asked in developmental order, with those aspects of behavior and training which occur earliest in the child's life coming early in the section and those dealing with present factors late in the section. Again,

whenever a choice was possible the more difficult questions came after the easier or "ice-breaker" questions. Thus, the mother was asked first such questions as how she fed the child during early infancy, and how old the child was when weaning was begun before she was asked about difficulties or problems in weaning the child and her interpretation of these problems.

Pretesting the Interview Schedule. The necessity of pretesting interview schedules is now generally recognized but is especially important in social psychological field studies because the pretest not only makes possible the testing of the mechanics of the interview schedule but also provides an opportunity to observe the response to key questions, which questions make and break rapport, and the respondent's reaction to the schedule as a whole.

In the present study the pretest actually consisted of two tests. The first was a very informal test conducted with a small number of mothers. Its purpose was to determine what questions the mothers could answer in terms of memory and which ones they objected to or felt might be objected to by other mothers. The essential feature of this test was that the mothers were asked to discuss the interview and the individual questions informally after the interview was completed. On the basis of this trial test the formal pretest schedule was developed. The second or formal pretest was conducted with a sample of mothers similar in all characteristics to those to be included in the final survey. The same letter as the survey mothers were to receive was sent to these mothers. The approach and the interviewing techniques were identical. Each interviewer conducted ten pretest interviews. The results were then examined to determine whether the arrangement of sections and questions might be improved, which questions were redundant, difficult to answer or produced poor yields, and areas which were inadequately covered. In addition, the interviewers compared notes on interviewing experiences and further standardized their interviewing techniques. Actually, the resulting changes in the final form of the inter-

view schedule consisted mainly of minor revisions and deletions. This was probably due to the fact that the informal pretest had eliminated most of the potential "bugs."

The Interviewer Factor. The interviewer himself is one of the most important factors in the establishment and maintenance of rapport. It is generally recognized that certain interviewers are much more successful in gaining the confidence of the respondent than others, but little attention is given to the factors which produce a high level of interviewing success. All of the effort to insure community acceptance and entree into the family, and to perfect the interview schedule are of little value unless interviewers are carefully selected, trained and supervised.

Selection of Interviewers. The basic requirement for an interviewer in this type of study is a high degree of interest born out of a general understanding of the theoretical and research issues involved in the study. Otherwise the interview might well seem unworthy of his best efforts. For this reason only graduate students well grounded in social psychology were considered for interviewer positions. A second requirement was that the interviewers be women because of the reticence of mothers in general and farm mothers in particular to talk about child training to men, and because men too share these inhibitions. The third requirement was that the interviewers be well trained in research techniques and preferably have had interviewing experience so that they would fully appreciate the need for careful attention to interviewing technique. The fourth requirement was that the interviewers have some knowledge and experience in rural situations so that their attitudes toward rural people would neither endanger the objectivity of the study nor make difficult the rapport problem. In other words, interviewers were wanted who could accept and understand rural people and at the same time observe them objectively. The fifth requirement was that the interviewers possess personality characteristics acceptable to farm women. Thus, emphasis was on obtaining mature women who dressed simply, were

unaffected in their manners, and not too different in race and nationality from the women to be interviewed. Finally, interviewers were sought who possessed personality characteristics acceptable to each other so that they might work as a research team on a difficult job requiring a high degree of esprit de corps for its successful completion. After considerable screening and searching, four interviewers meeting these requirements were found and the training process begun.

Interviewer Training. The matter of interviewer training demands considerably more attention than it ordinarily receives. If a skillful job of interviewing is to be done, the interviewers must be carefully trained to do the particular interviewing job demanded by the study. In the present instance this problem was simplified by the fact that the interviewers all had previous training and some experience in the interviewing techniques to be used. However, several steps were taken to equip them better for the interviewing job to be done in this study.

First, the interviewers were given a complete explanation of the study's theoretical basis, its hypotheses, its methodological assumptions, its practical implications and its limitations. Every opportunity was given the interviewers to raise questions about any aspect of the proposed project which they did not understand and to criticize its methodological and theoretical assumptions. Second, since the interview schedule was not completely developed by the time the interviewers were selected, they were given an opportunity to assist in the formulation of the questions and sections which comprised the preliminary form. This made them well acquainted with the interview schedule and the reasons for asking each question, but even more important, gave them a feeling of identity with it. Third, the interviewers were then taken to the field in the final pretest and were given actual field experience, using the schedule in interviewing situations closely similar to those to be encountered in the final field study. Fourth, several meetings were held in which the field staff participated in the analysis of the pretest, worked

on the revision of the schedule, and compared notes on interviewing experiences.

Field Supervision and Interviewer Morale. Recently sociologists and social psychologists have become quite concerned with the morale of the worker, especially other people's workers. But few have given thought to the morale of their own workers. It seems obvious that lack of morale on the part of an interviewer may lead to a poor job of interviewing, especially in social psychological studies, just as it may lead to a poor job of condenser-winding on the part of an electrical employee. For this reason every precaution was taken to preserve the high level of morale with which the interview team began its work.

This demanded that the study director be in the field with the interview team at all times, not only to give general supervision to the staff but also to observe sagging morale and attempt to remedy it. Once the field staff went into the field there were no formal conferences of the group because it was believed that the interviewers were now as well trained as could reasonably be expected and because such conferences are often embarrassing to individual interviewers and at least take a great deal of the interviewer's free time. If the interviewers saw fit to bring up matters of mutual concern informally at mealtime or on trips to the field, the group discussed them and arrived informally at consensus. Under no circumstances was there ever any criticism of any interviewer's work, either expressed or implied, once the team had taken to the field. Rather, the role of the supervisor was to keep the group feeling that it was doing excellent work—which indeed it was—on an important project. There was no slave-driving and every effort was made to place emphasis on a good interview rather than on quantity production. The interviewers were provided with the best the community had to offer in the way of accommodations and meals, worked five days a week, were transported home each week-end, and in general were treated as professionals worthy of their hire.

The Interview Situation. The interview situation was planned to make easy the gaining and maintenance of rapport.⁶ The interview was held in the home of the mother so that she would feel at ease. While the time was not exactly scheduled, every attempt was made to avoid conflict with the mother's work schedule. Whenever possible the mother and the interviewer were alone throughout the interview. The interviewer, who had already been partially introduced by the letter, introduced herself personally, again explaining the reason for the interview. She was instructed not to rush the mother into the interview proper but to put her at ease before beginning. The mother was told that what she had to say was so important that notes must be taken. She was again assured that what transpired in the interview would not be repeated to anyone and would be used only for research purposes.

The interviewer was fully conscious of the fact that her role in the interview was to create a comfortable, easy relationship between herself and the mother, to open up areas of discussion, to show interest in anything the mother said but not to show her approval or disapproval of anything she might say, to avoid expressing her own opinions, to draw out the mother non-directively in those areas where emotional factors were present rather than to probe, to avoid any suggestion of cross-examination or need for speed, to listen attentively and to record faithfully the mother's response to direct questions, as well as her free responses. Finally she was instructed in techniques for obtaining smooth transitions, greater depth and breadth of response by means of non-directive cues, and re-establishing rapport if it were broken during the interview.

⁶The interview situation will be discussed only briefly because several good references are available on this subject. See especially: Pauline V. Young, *Scientific Social Surveys and Social Research*, New York: Prentice-Hall, 1939, Chap. 8; N.O.R.C. Staff, *Interviewing for N.O.R.C.*, Denver, 1945; Roethlisberger and Dickson, *op. cit.*, and Carl R. Rogers, "The Non-Directive Method as a Technique for Social Research," *American Journal of Sociology*, L (January, 1945), 279-283.

RESULTS AND PROBLEMS FOR FURTHER STUDY

Unfortunately there is not space to discuss in any detail the results of all of the techniques used in the study. This is the subject of another paper. Nor is there any objective way to appraise the individual contributions of the various techniques to the attainment of full information because the study was not designed to test the comparative effectiveness of these techniques. However, the fact that only one of 162 eligible mothers in our sample refused to be interviewed, gives some indication of the degree of community acceptance that was achieved. No respondent asked that the interview be terminated and practically all of them said they enjoyed the experience. Further evidence of community acceptance comes from the fact that during the past two years every mother, teacher, and child has cooperated fully in our follow-up testing program which has involved several objective and projective tests.

The level of rapport achieved can be crudely judged by the fact that 70 per cent of the mothers were rated as very cooperative by the interviewers, 29 per cent generally cooperative and only one per cent uncooperative. The ratings made by the interviewers of the degree of rapport reached were as follows: very high rapport throughout interview, 67 per cent; high rapport in general but with somewhat less rapport on some questions, 22 per cent; moderate rapport throughout the interview, 9 per cent; low rapport throughout, 2 per cent. More specific evidence that rapport was high may be gained from the fact that the mothers freely gave information in over 95 per cent of the cases on such matters as masturbation, level of parental affection, parental agreement on punishment, mother's handling of sex curiosity, satisfaction with family size, and rating of family happiness. Since these questions were distributed throughout the schedule in the order given above, it may be inferred that a high level of rapport was maintained throughout the interview.

However, it must be pointed out that there are many further tests which must be

made concerning the depth, range and specificity of response to various sections and questions before a completely satisfactory judgment can be arrived at concerning the level of rapport reached and maintained in the interview. But without equivocation it

may be claimed that all of the evidence thus far available indicates that the attention given to techniques designed to make for acceptance into the community and rapport with the respondents paid handsome dividends in terms of response.

FIRST MARRIAGES AND REMARRIAGES*

PAUL C. GLICK

Bureau of the Census

THIS PAPER sets forth some of the differences between the social and economic characteristics of persons in the United States who are in their first marriages and those of persons who have remarried. The subject is timely because of the unprecedented number of persons who have been divorced and remarried during recent years. Furthermore, there is evidence that remarriage rates among widowed persons have been high during the current decade when the employment level has been high. The results presented here should be of interest to students of such fields as family adjustment, welfare, dependency, insurance, and marketing.

Most of the statistics presented in this paper were collected in April, 1948, in connection with the Census Bureau's monthly sample survey of population.¹ The sample consists of approximately 25,000 households (90,000 persons) located in 68 areas in 42 States and the District of Columbia. Since the statistics are estimates based on a sample, it must be recognized that they are subject to sampling variability. In addition, like data based on complete returns, the estimates are subject to certain biases due to errors of response and to nonreporting.

There is evidence, for example, that the number of persons reported as having married during the two years previous to the survey date was less than the expected number. Nevertheless, the relationships revealed by the data should be useful for analytical purposes.

Although the figures discussed deal largely with married persons living with their spouse at the time of the survey, similar but less detailed data were also collected for widowed and divorced persons and for married persons living apart from their spouse.² Since married couples living together represent 5 out of every 6 persons who have ever been married, the results for them are more reliable than those for other persons ever married. The characteristics of married couples differ, however, in important respects from others in the adult population who have ever been married. They have a broader age distribution; married men have more favorable distributions by educational attainment, occupational class, and income than other ever-married men; married women include a smaller proportion who are participants in the labor force than other

* Adapted from a paper read at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Society held in Chicago, December 28-30, 1948.

¹ The author wishes to acknowledge the valuable assistance of Emanuel Landau in preparing the statistical tables and in conducting the research on important parts of this paper.

² Several reports of the Bureau of the Census contain data on persons married once or more than once and on duration of present marital status from the 1948 survey: Series P-20, No. 21, "Characteristics of Households, Families, and Individuals: April, 1948"; Series P-20, No. 22, "Internal Migration in the United States: April, 1947, to April, 1948"; and Series P-20, No. 23, "Marital Status, Number of Times Married, and Duration of Present Marital Status: April, 1948."

FIRST MARRIAGES AND REMARRIAGES

727

TABLE 1. SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF HUSBANDS AND WIVES LIVING TOGETHER, BY NUMBER OF TIMES MARRIED, FOR THE UNITED STATES: APRIL, 1948

Subject	Total	Married Once	Married More than Once	
			Number	Per Cent of Total
HUSBANDS				
Total	34,289,000	29,769,000	4,520,000	13.2
Spouse married once.....	29,991,000	27,924,000	2,067,000	6.9
Spouse married more than once	4,298,000	1,845,000	2,453,000	57.1
Under 35 years old.....	10,681,000	10,066,000	615,000	5.8
35 to 54 years old.....	15,292,000	13,071,000	2,220,000	14.5
55 years old and over.....	8,316,000	6,656,000	1,661,000	20.0
Years in present marriage:				
Less than 1 year.....	1,212,000	906,000	306,000	25.2
1 year.....	1,484,000	1,216,000	269,000	18.1
2 to 4 years.....	4,270,000	3,420,000	850,000	19.9
5 to 9 years.....	6,174,000	5,209,000	966,000	15.6
10 to 14 years.....	4,777,000	4,085,000	692,000	14.5
15 years and over.....	16,371,000	14,957,000	1,414,000	8.6
WIVES				
Total.....	34,289,000	29,991,000	4,298,000	12.5
Spouse married once.....	29,769,000	27,924,000	1,845,000	6.2
Spouse married more than once.....	4,520,000	2,067,000	2,453,000	54.3
Under 35 years old.....	14,112,000	12,862,000	1,250,000	8.9
35 to 54 years old.....	14,447,000	12,366,000	2,081,000	14.4
55 years old and over.....	5,731,000	4,758,000	972,000	17.0
Years in present marriage:				
Less than 1 year.....	1,200,000	901,000	299,000	24.9
1 year.....	1,465,000	1,183,000	282,000	19.2
2 to 4 years.....	4,201,000	3,250,000	950,000	22.6
5 to 9 years.....	6,244,000	5,301,000	944,000	15.1
10 to 14 years.....	4,865,000	4,223,000	642,000	13.2
15 years and over.....	16,313,000	15,128,000	1,185,000	7.3

Source: Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-20, No. 21 and No. 23.

ever-married women; and married couples also are most likely to have young children in their homes.³ In the following pages married persons living with their spouse will generally be referred to, for simplicity, as "married" persons.

Age and Sex. The survey showed that 87 per cent of the men and women who were married at the time of the survey had been married only once and that 13 per cent had

been married more than once. It also showed that among 81 per cent of the married couples in the United States, both the husband and the wife had been married only once. Among 11 per cent, either the husband or the wife, but not both, had been married more than once; and among the remaining 7 per cent, both the husband and the wife had been married more than once.

These, of course, are over-all figures, without regard to differences according to age and, as would have been expected, those differences are noteworthy. As age increases,

³ See the writer's paper, "Family Life and Full Employment," *American Journal of Sociology*, LIV (May 1949), 520-529.

there is a steady rise in the proportion of married couples with one or both members remarried. Let us consider the results for three broad age groups. Among younger couples, where the husband was under 35, only about 12 per cent included a spouse (husband, wife, or both) who had been married more than once. Among couples in the middle years, with the husband 35 to 54, the corresponding figure was 20 per cent; and among those in the older years, where the husband was 55 and over, 24 per cent. Thus, in one out of every four married couples, where the husband was 55 years old or older, either the husband or his wife, or both, had been married at least twice.

A pronounced tendency was found, moreover, for persons who remarry to select a person who had also been previously married. This tendency can be seen from an analysis of the statistics for married couples with the husband 35 years old and over. Among these couples, only 7 per cent of the husbands or wives who had been married just once had a spouse who had married before. On the other hand, 60 per cent of the husbands or wives who had been married more than once had a spouse who had also been married before. Persons seeking a marital partner in the same age range include an increasing proportion of previously married persons as their ages advance.

The median ages at marriage and remarriage were calculated for those married at the time of the survey. The figures presented here for men, incidentally, are the first direct results on age of men at marriage or remarriage that the Bureau of the Census has ever collected in a census-type of survey.⁴ The median age of men at the time of their first marriage, for those still married to their first

wife, was 24.7 years, and the corresponding median age for women was 21.4 years.⁵ Furthermore, the median age of men at the time of remarriage was 37.0 years, and that of women was 31.3 years. Thus, the difference between the median age of men and women at first marriage (about 3 years) was only one-half that between the median age of men and women at remarriage (about 6 years). Differences of this type should not be interpreted as median differences between the ages of husbands and wives; special tabulations of the 1948 survey returns will be available later that will show the latter type of differences directly. These special tabulations will also throw light on differences between the prospects of remarriage among men and women as the age at which they lose their spouse advances beyond the middle years.

The median age at the survey date of married and remarried persons living with their spouse was also obtained. About one-half of the men married only once were under 41 years old, and one-half of the women married only once were under 38. Naturally, those married more than once were older on the average at the time of the survey than those who had married only once; one-half of the remarried men were under 50 years old, and one-half of the remarried women under 42. A comparison of the median ages at first marriage, or at remarriage, with corresponding median ages as of the time of the survey gives a rough indication of the average length of time the current marriages had lasted. More precise information on this subject has been obtained, however, from direct tabulations of data by duration of marriage and is presented in Table I above. Thus, the median duration of marriage for persons living with their first spouse was 15 years. The median duration of remarriage was 9 years for men and 8 years for women who were married when the survey was made.

Color. The only nation-wide data avail-

⁴The Census Bureau did publish statistics for selected States on age of bride and groom at marriage based on data from marriage records for 1940 but such figures have not been tabulated for a more recent date. The National Office of Vital Statistics in the Public Health Service now has the responsibility for collecting data from marriage and divorce records.

⁵Unless otherwise indicated, the discussion in this section is based on all married persons, including those not living with their spouse.

able, to the author's knowledge, for the analysis of color differences in remarriage are those published in the special reports on differential fertility, that were based on the censuses of 1940 and 1910.⁶ These statistics were presented only for native white and Negro married women living with their husbands, where the woman was 15 to 74 years of age. Data for both census dates show a far higher proportion of Negroes than of native whites remarried. Thus, in 1940, 18.6 per cent of the Negro women, as compared with 9.3 per cent of the white women, had been married more than once; in every age group, the Negro women had a substantially higher proportion remarried than the native white. The same differential held true but on an even more exaggerated scale in 1910, when 17.2 per cent of the Negro women, and 6.8 per cent of the native white women, were reported as having been married more than once.

One factor bearing on the relatively high remarriage rates among Negro women is the higher mortality rates among Negroes, and consequently, the higher rates of widowhood to which they have been exposed. It is also possible that a substantial number of remarriages reported in the 1910 census represented changes in common-law marriages; such marriages tend to be relatively impermanent. In addition, the color differences in remarriage may well be, in part, a reflection of the well-known differences in occupational and income levels of the two color groups. Findings for 1948 with regard to remarriage and economic level presented in a later section are consistent with this hypothesis.

Duration of marriage. Closely related to differences in remarriage by age are differences in remarriage by duration of marriage. Those who have married for the first time in recent years are, of course, predominantly young persons. Moreover, there was a relatively large number of divorced persons who

remarried during the current decade. Thus, 21 per cent of those who married during the 5 years preceding the survey were marrying for the second or subsequent time, according to the survey figures. The corresponding proportion was found to decline as the duration of marriage increased beyond 5 years; it was about 15 per cent for those married 5 to 14 years and 8 per cent for those married 15 years or more. The mere fact that a marriage had remained intact for a longer period was in itself an indication of relative stability of the marriage relationship. Other things being equal, a person who has remarried will have a shorter length of current marriage than one who has married only once. Furthermore, those who first married some time ago have been subject for a longer time, than those who first married more recently, to mores that were more stringent with regard to the breaking of marriages by divorce.

In this context, the data on remarriage obtained from the Census Bureau's 1948 survey may be compared with figures on remarriage obtained from a special tabulation the Bureau made of marriage records for 1940. The 1948 survey data for the group married 5 to 9 years should include those persons who obtained marriage certificates in 1940. Fifteen per cent of those married 5 to 9 years reported that they had been married more than once. By comparison, the marriage records for 1940 showed that, of the brides and grooms for whom previous marital status was reported, about 13 per cent had been married before. The fairly close agreement between the two figures, however, should be regarded with some caution. On the one hand, those persons reported in the survey as having been married and living with their present spouse for 5 to 9 years should have already withstood many of the trials of marital adjustment; on the other hand, the data on number of former marriages obtained from marriage records were of varying degrees of reliability when reported; furthermore, the percentage of persons not reporting on number of former marriages in the marriage record study was several times as high as

⁶ Special report of 1940 census, *Differential Fertility, 1940 and 1910—Women by Number of Children Even Born*, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1945.

that in the 1948 cross-section sample survey.⁷

A comparison of the survey data with vital statistics data on divorces was also made in order to estimate approximately what proportion of the persons divorced for a given length of time had remarried. This study involved the use of survey figures on duration of divorce, for divorced persons, and statistics on the number of divorces and deaths by calendar years that have been published by the National Office of Vital Statistics. The results served as the basis for deducing that all but about one-fourth of the persons obtaining a divorce in the 5 years prior to the survey date had meantime remarried. For the period 5 to 14 years, the corresponding proportion still divorced was about one-seventh. It was not feasible to make a similar estimate for those divorced 15 years or more. These estimates are undoubtedly affected to some extent by biases in the data. The estimates are low to the extent that divorced persons failed to report themselves as divorced. They may be low also because divorced persons may have been underrepresented in the survey; "unattached" adults are more often missed in enumeration.

A companion analysis was also made of widowed persons—to see what proportion of those widowed for a given number of years had remarried. It was found that approximately one-half of the men and three-fourths of the women who had lost their spouse by death during the five years preceding the survey had not remarried. Of those losing their spouse by death between 5 and 14 years before the survey, about one-third of the men and two-thirds of the women had not remarried. These estimates should be regarded as approximate, pending more detailed analysis of the basic data.⁸

⁷ See the discussion of marriage and divorce in Chapter 1 of *The American Family—A Factual Background*, prepared for the National Conference on Family Life and published by the Government Printing Office in Washington, D.C., 1949.

⁸ A study by Paul H. Jacobson of the relative importance of mortality and divorce in total marital dissolutions in the United States will appear in the

Social and economic characteristics. In the discussion which follows, several social and economic characteristics of remarried persons will be analyzed. In this discussion, attention will be focused mainly on those persons whose remarriage took place during the two years prior to the 1948 survey date.⁹ Figures for the first and second years of the current marriage are available separately; but, in most cases, data for the first two years combined are used because their reliability is thereby increased. Even so, the number of persons reported as married less than two years was somewhat below the expected number. Those not counted in the survey probably tended to be persons sharing homes, persons with no children, persons in the labor force, and persons in the lower or middle economic levels with nonfarm residence.

Dealing with those married within the last few years gives the study current interest; more significant, however, is the fact that this approach provides an approximation to the type of nation-wide data one would expect from marriage records themselves, if such data were available for the country as a whole. It should be noted, however, that some of the items covered by the survey, such as farm or nonfarm residence and income level, are ordinarily not available from marriage certificates; census material must be relied upon for such items. On the other hand, it is feasible to collect certain types of information only from the marriage certificates themselves, such as occupation of the groom as of the time when the marriage certificate was issued, type of ceremony, actual number of former marriages, and previous marital status of the bride and groom.

Maintenance of a home. The first char-

Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Population Association of America held in May, 1949.

⁹ Studies could be made from data published in Census Bureau reports Series P-20, No. 21 and No. 23, cited above, of the characteristics of persons widowed or divorced less than 5 years. Statistics were not tabulated for widowed and divorced persons married once and married more than once, separately, for the subjects which are treated in the following sections.

FIRST MARRIAGES AND REMARRIAGES

731

TABLE 2. PER CENT OF HUSBANDS AND WIVES LIVING TOGETHER WHO HAD MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, BY DURATION OF PRESENT MARRIAGE AND SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS, FOR THE UNITED STATES: APRIL, 1948

Subject	Husbands		Wives	
	Per Cent Remarried Regardless of Duration of Present Marriage	Per Cent Remarried Among Those in Present Marriage Less Than 2 Years	Per Cent Remarried Regardless of Duration of Present Marriage	Per Cent Remarried Among Those in Present Marriage Less Than 2 Years
Total.....	13.1	21.3	12.5	21.8
Under 35 years old.....	5.8	10.6	8.9	14.8
35 to 54 years old.....	14.5	60.2	14.4	65.2
55 years old and over.....	20.0	92.9	17.0	93.2
Maintaining a home.....	13.5	25.6	12.7	25.8
Sharing a home.....	8.2	9.5	10.3	10.7
With no own children under 18.....	16.6	20.2	16.6	17.5
With own children under 18.....	10.3	24.0	9.2	31.6
In labor force.....	12.7	21.3	14.1	18.7
Not in labor force.....	18.4	22.0	12.1	23.5
With no own children under 6.....	1	1	14.8	26.6
With own children under 6.....	1	1	7.6	18.1
Professional workers.....	7.2	18.2	7.7	2
Farmers.....	12.9	25.0	14.7	2
Proprietors, managers, and officials.....	12.0	28.0	18.0	2
Clerical workers.....	8.5	15.2	10.1	2
Sales workers.....	11.9	14.7	13.2	2
Craftsmen and foremen.....	12.8	27.1	17.3 ¹	2
Operatives.....	12.6	14.9	11.8	2
Service workers.....	17.8	26.4	26.2	2
Farm laborers and foremen.....	17.7	22.2 ¹	7.9	2
Other laborers.....	17.1	28.0	24.0 ²	2
Urban and rural-nonfarm.....	13.1	21.0	13.0	22.4
Rural-farm.....	13.0	23.8	10.5	17.3
Income under \$1,000.....	21.3	24.2	18.4	2
\$1,000 to \$1,999.....	16.4	22.5	13.3	2
\$2,000 to \$2,999.....	12.2	17.3	12.9	2
\$3,000 to \$3,999.....	10.7	15.3	14.3	2
\$4,000 and over.....	10.9	43.2 ³	8.9	2

¹ Not available.

² Not shown because base for several categories in the distribution is small.

³ Fewer than 100,000 persons in base, after adjusting sample figures to control totals.

Source: Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-20, No. 21 and No. 23, and records.

acteristic to be treated is the extent to which recently married or remarried persons had established homes of their own. The survey indicated that a man marrying for the first time and living with his spouse is more likely to double up with relatives or

others during the initial two years of his marriage than a man marrying for the second or subsequent time is to double up during the corresponding period of his remarriage. More specifically, the report showed that 32 per cent of the men married once,

as compared with only 11 per cent of those married more than once, had failed to establish a home during the first two years of marriage, or remarriage, respectively. Doubling is always more common among younger couples and those married for the first time have already been shown to have a comparatively low median age. In addition, many whose first marriages had been disrupted through family discord occasioned by living with relatives or in-laws may have made a special effort to live in independent households after remarriage.

✓ *Presence of children.* Young children were less often found in the homes of persons who recently married for the first time than in those of persons who recently remarried. Only about 25 percent of the women who married for the first time during the two years preceding the survey had children under 18 years of age in the home, as compared with about 56 per cent of those remarried. A likely reason for the difference is the fact that a large proportion of the children of remarried women were children of a previous marriage. In fact, it is possible that there is a selective tendency for widowed or divorced women with children to remarry more quickly or not at all than those with no children.¹⁰

As a by-product of the remarriage study, statistics were obtained on the number of children living with their parents, classified according to whether the father and mother had been married more than once. In making this analysis, stepchildren and adopted children, as well as own sons and daughters of the husband or wife, were included. The figures show that the parents of 85 per cent of the children were still living together, that only one parent of 10 per cent had remarried, and that both parents of 5 per cent had been married more than once.

Labor force status. The data on labor

force participation in relation to number of times the person has married are useful particularly for women. In general, women married once and living with their husbands were less likely to be in the labor force than women who had remarried—about 20 per cent compared with 30 per cent. The rate of labor force participation was especially high for those who had recently entered their first marriage. Specifically, the proportion in the labor force dropped from about one-half for those married less than one year to only one-fifth for those married 5 to 9 years. By contrast, there was little difference between the labor force participation rates for the several durations of marriage up to 10 years for those living with their second or subsequent husband. The proportion varied around 30 per cent for the various duration classes.

Furthermore, there was evidence of a closer relationship between labor force participation and the presence of preschool-age children in the home for women married once and living with their husbands than for women who had remarried. To illustrate, among those who had lived with their first husband 5 to 9 years, 80 per cent were not in the labor force; and of those not in the labor force, the great majority, about 6 out of every 7, had young children (under 6 years old) in the home; but among the corresponding group of women married twice or more often, only a minority, about one-third, had small children.

Major occupation group. A brief summary of the statistics on occupational class may be made most profitably by dealing with the figures for husbands. There was a general pattern of improvement in occupational level during the first 10 years of marriage for those still living with their first wife, but very little regularity in occupational shifts during the corresponding time for those married more than once. Thus, the proportion of those married once who were in occupations that require training and financial resources which usually take a number of years to acquire (such as professional workers, proprietors, managers, and craftsmen) tended to increase with length of mar-

¹⁰ According to an article entitled, "The Frequency of Remarriage," *Statistical Bulletin*, Vol. 30, No. 1, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, January, 1949, "... the presence of dependent children reduces by more than one-eighth the chances of remarriage for women past the reproductive ages."

riage up to 10 years. The proportion of husbands who had remarried was lowest among professional workers and clerical workers. Standardizing the figures for age at time of the survey did not change this conclusion.¹¹

Farm and nonfarm residence. Remarriage was more common among men than among women recently married and living on farms. Thus, about 24 per cent of the rural-farm men who had been living with their wife less than 2 years had been married more than once; the comparable figure for rural-farm women was only 17 per cent. These figures support the hypothesis that farm women are more likely than farm men to migrate to a village, town, or city when their marriage has been broken. However, if the women remarry after such a move, their remarriages are counted among those for nonfarm women. Perhaps partly because of this fact, the proportion remarried in nonfarm areas is no greater for men than for women.

Money income level. The tabulation of total money income level by number of times married was restricted to persons with money income who were living in nonfarm areas. In terms of medians, the results indicate a slightly higher money income level during 1947 for married men living with their first wife than for those living with their second or subsequent wife (\$2,700 as compared with \$2,400). Analysis of the income distributions, moreover, reveals a distinct tendency for the percentage remarried to decline as money income level rises. Like the data on occupation groups, the income figures by duration of marriage demonstrate a gradual improvement in the economic well-being of men during the initial 10 years of their first marriage. The median money income level rose from about \$2,100 for husbands married less than one year to \$2,900 for those men married 5 to 9 years.

¹¹ The results on money income (shown in another section) were also standardized by age, based on the rough age groups for which the data had been tabulated, namely, under 35, 35 to 54, and 55 years and over. As in the case of occupation, the other results were not greatly affected by standardization. Consequently, the data presented herein are in terms of the unstandardized results.

Similarly, there was an increase for men married more than once from \$2,100 during the first year of remarriage to \$2,600 during the fifth to ninth years, but it will be noted that the rise for remarried men was less appreciable than that for once-married men. The statistics on income of husbands suggest a positive relationship between stability of family life and amount of earnings, although some of the measures of this relationship give more clear-cut and reliable evidence than others do. The findings are also consistent with the hypothesis that the interval between divorce or widowerhood and remarriage tends to be greater among those in the lower economic classes.

Among married women with money income, there was no marked difference between the median money income level of those married once and those married more often.

Summary. The main findings of this study may be summarized as follows:

1. In 1948 about the same proportion of married men as of married women of all ages (13 per cent) had been married more than once. A pronounced tendency was found for persons who remarry to select a person who had also been previously married.

2. Among married women in 1940, Negroes had about twice as large a proportion remarried as native white women. The difference by color was even greater in 1910.

3. About one-fifth of those who married in the five years preceding the 1948 survey reported that they had been married before. Among those married for successively longer periods, there was a tendency for the percentage reporting that they had been married more than once to be successively smaller. These facts reflect, in part, the longtime decline in the stability of family life.

4. Only about one-fourth of those who obtained a divorce in the five years prior to the survey date had not remarried during the period, according to a comparison of the survey data with statistics based on divorce records. About one-half of the men and

three-fourths of the women whose spouse died in the five years before the survey date had not remarried.

5. Persons who had married for the first time during the previous two years were very much more likely to have doubled up with relatives or others than were persons who had remarried during those two years. This difference is probably explainable largely by the fact that doubling is more prevalent among younger couples and persons marrying for the first time had a median age about 10 to 12 years lower than that of persons remarrying.

6. Women married only once who had lived with their husband less than two years were only one-half as likely to have dependent children in the home as women who had remarried during that time. Many of the children of remarried women were sons or daughters by a previous marriage.

7. Nearly one-half of the married women who were in their first year of marriage were in the labor force, but the corresponding proportion was only one-fifth for those married 5 to 9 years. Most of those married 5 to 9 years and not in the labor force had preschool-age children in the home. Among women who had been remarried less than 10 years, about one-third were in the labor force, regardless of the duration of their remarriage.

8. A general pattern of improvement in occupational level was discernible for men during their initial 10 years of married

life, but no such pattern was discernible for men during their first 10 years of remarried life.

9. Probably because of selective migration, there was a larger proportion of recently remarried men than remarried women living on farms. Farm women whose marriages have been broken probably are more likely to move to villages, towns, or cities, and if they remarry there, they are counted among remarried women in nonfarm areas.

10. The money income level of men in nonfarm areas who had married only once was somewhat higher, on the average, than that of men who had remarried. The median money income of men married for successively longer periods up to 10 years tended to rise appreciably. These facts are consistent with the hypothesis that family stability has a positive relationship with economic well-being; another element in this situation, however, is the tendency for earnings to increase as experience in one's job or profession increases during the first several years that he works.

Finally, in interpreting the results of this study, it must be kept in mind that the tendency toward remarriage is highly correlated with age. It is anticipated that socioeconomic data by number of times married and duration of marriage, widowhood, and divorce will be available for more detailed age groups from the 1950 census in order that the disturbing influence of differences by age can be explored more fully.

COHORT ANALYSIS OF FERTILITY*

P. K. WHELPTON

*Scripps Foundation
Miami University, Oxford, Ohio*

IN 1933 there were 2,312,000 births in the United States and the crude birth rate was 18.4. In 1947 there were 3,876,000 births and the crude birth rate was 27.0. In other words the number of births in 1947 was 68 per cent larger than it was 14 years earlier, and the crude birth rate 47 per cent higher. Since 1947 there have been only small declines. In 1948 the number of births was approximately 3,715,000 and the crude birth rate 25.4. Present indications are that in 1949 the number of births will be about 3,750,000 and the crude birth rate 25.2. It is generally agreed that the much higher fertility of 1947-49 than of 1933 is due primarily to conditions associated with the great depression of the early 1930's and with postwar demobilization and prosperity. Opinions differ widely, however, as to the extent to which the 1947-49 boom in babies represents (a) a reversal of the long-time downward trend in average family size, and (b) an unusual concentration in a few years of the births occurring with the continuance of the downward trend.

The cohort material to be presented here in an attempt to evaluate the importance of these two explanations relates to native white women. The foreign-born contingent is omitted because it has decreased rapidly in recent years and now constitutes less than 5 per cent of the women in the reproductive ages.¹ The nonwhite group is omitted partly because it also is relatively small (about 11 per cent) and partly because the data for it are substantially less reliable than those for native whites. But since native white women have composed over 75 per cent of all women aged 15-44 since 1920 and since the relative rise in the number of births and the

crude birth rate since 1933 has been somewhat greater for native white women than for all women, the conclusions to be drawn from a discussion of this group should apply almost equally well to the total population.

The results obtained by utilizing the methodology involved in computing gross and net reproduction rates would seem at first glance to show that the long-time decline in average number of children per family has been reversed. The conventional gross reproduction rate of native white women is 104 for 1933 and 152 for 1947. If male births are included in the computations, these figures are raised to 214 and 313, respectively. This means that in a hypothetical cohort of women living through the reproductive period under the age-specific birth rates of 1933 there would be 214 births per 100 women reaching age 50. And in a hypothetical cohort exposed to the 1947 rates there would be 313 births per 100 women—almost one and one half times as many as in 1933.

This type of analysis may be carried a step farther by subdividing births by order of birth and observing the extent to which the reproduction rate is composed of first births, second births, etc. In doing so, however, it is important also to subdivide women by parity. The conventional procedure ignores parity and gives impossible results for certain hypothetical cohorts, the most fantastic being the computed occurrence of 138 first births per 100 women in the hypothetical cohort living to age 50 under 1947 conditions!² Obviously there cannot be more than 100 first births per 100 women, even theoretically.³ Actually

*The reasons are explained in P. K. Whelpton: "Reproduction Rates Adjusted for Age, Parity, Fecundity, and Marriage," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, Vol. 41, December 1946, pp. 501-516.

²The bearing of twins does not affect this upper

* Expanded version of paper read at the annual meeting of The American Sociological Society held in Chicago, December 28-30, 1948.

¹4.6 per cent at ages 15-44 in 1945.

there are reasons for believing that the upper limit may be below 85, namely, (a) in past decades approximately 10 per cent of the women living to age 45 have never married, (b) very few of these women have borne a child, and (c) at least 5 per cent of the women who have married under 45 have been members of couples that were physiologically incapable of reproduction.⁴ Utilizing age-parity specific birth rates and

The parity distributions of the hypothetical cohorts living under conditions of 1933 and 1947 differ widely. The 1947 hypothetical cohort would have substantially fewer women with no child or only one, and substantially more with three, four, five, etc. (See Table 1.) Specifically, changing from 1933 to 1947 conditions would reduce the proportion of childless women by about 40 per cent and that of one-child women by

TABLE 1. PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION BY PARITY OF A HYPOTHETICAL COHORT OF 100 NATIVE WHITE WOMEN LIVING TO AGE 50 SUBJECT TO THE AGE-PARITY SPECIFIC BIRTH RATES OF 1933, 1946, AND 1947, WITH AND WITHOUT AN ALLOWANCE FOR SPINSTERHOOD AND STERILITY

Birth Rates of	Parity								
	Total	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7+
No allowance for spinsterhood and sterility									
1933	100	30	21	20	12	7	4	2	4
1946	100	9	11	25	23	14	8	5	5
1947	100	2	7	25	27	17	10	6	6
Assuming that 10 per cent remain spinsters and 5 per cent are sterile									
1933	100	26	23	21	12	7	4	3	4
1946	100	17	8	23	21	14	8	4	5
1947	100	15	6	21	22	16	9	5	6
Assuming that 10 per cent remain spinsters and 10 per cent are sterile									
1933	100	25	24	21	13	7	4	2	4
1946	100	19	7	22	21	14	8	4	5
1947	100	19	5	19	21	16	9	5	6

allowing for spinsterhood and sterility gives for most years more accurate gross reproduction rates, as well as distributions of women by number of children borne. The gross reproduction rates for the hypothetical cohorts of 1933 and 1947 computed on this basis are 96 and 144, and are about 8 points below the conventional rates.^{4a}

limit, for one of each pair of twins is born after the other, even in a Caesarean delivery.

⁴ Detailed information obtained for 1,977 native white, Protestant couples with at least an 8th grade education and married 12 to 15 years indicates that between 10 and 13 per cent could not have even one live birth. P. K. Whelpton and Clyde V. Kiser: "Social and Psychological Factors Affecting Fertility. VIII. The Comparative Influence on Fertility of Contraception and Impairments of Fecundity," *The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, Vol. XXVI, April 1948, p. 215 (reprint p. 336).

^{4a} In computing these rates it was assumed that 10 per cent of the women living to age 45 would not have married by that age, and that 10 per cent of those who married would have been unable to bear a child.

about 70 per cent. In contrast, it would almost double the proportions with three, four, or five children, and make large (but diminishing) increases for those with six, seven, and each larger number. Two-child families would be the only important group with little change.

Although such comparisons might be thought to prove that there has been a reversal of the long-time tendency to reduce family size, they actually have little bearing on the question. A gross reproduction rate is a convenient summary of annual specific birth rates; such rates are of value in comparing the fertility pattern of different years. They must be used with great care, however, in drawing conclusions as to situations like family size which develop over a series of years, because in computing them it is assumed that the specific birth rates of the base period will continue for about 30 years (i.e., the length of the normal reproductive period of women). We know that this as-

sumption has not been true in the past; on the contrary, there have been important fluctuations in specific birth rates from year to year, and large cumulative changes during several decades. Although it is theoretically possible that no changes will occur in the future, it is much more probable that annual fluctuations and long-time trends will continue. Moreover, there are reasons for believing that variations from year to year may be larger in the future than in the past.⁵

A second approach to the problem utilizes the experience of actual cohorts of native white women rather than that of hypothetical cohorts. Each of these actual cohorts consists of the women born in a given year; for example, the women born from July 1, 1899, through June 30, 1900, constitute the cohort of 1900.⁶ In order to ascertain the birth performance of various actual cohorts age by age it is necessary to distribute among the appropriate cohorts the births of each order which occur in each year. This

⁵ The foregoing weakness of the gross reproduction rate methodology in this connection may be reduced to some extent by lengthening the base period, for example, by comparing the rates for 1941-47 and 1930-36 instead of those for the single years 1947 and 1933. Since the gross reproduction rate for 1930-36 is 103 (7 points above 1933) and that for 1941-47 is 124 (20 points below 1947), this change in the base period reduces the relative increase from 50 per cent to 20 per cent. Similarly, a comparison of the parity distributions that would result according to the longer base periods shows smaller decreases in the proportions of women bearing no child or only one, and smaller increases in the proportions bearing three, four, five, and larger numbers of children. Unfortunately, conclusions regarding trends in family size which are based on comparisons of seven year periods also are subject to the weakness of the assumption of unchanged conditions. Although fertility conditions during 25 to 30 years have been, in general, more like those of a base period consisting of 5 to 10 years than of a single year, there still have been important differences. Similar differences rather than a static condition are to be expected in the future.

⁶ Hypothetical cohorts are identified in this discussion by the year (or years) whose rates are assumed to continue indefinitely. Actual cohorts are identified by the year of birth of the women who compose them.

has been done for the 1915-47 period in tables which it is hoped can be published shortly.⁷ Although the official birth statistics had to be adjusted to allow for (a) the incomplete recording of births in the Registration Area, (b) births in states not in the Area, and (c) errors in the reporting of order of birth, it is believed that the results are close enough to the truth to be useful.⁸

If the information now available regarding the behavior of actual cohorts were free from the minor flaws just mentioned, it still would not provide an ideal basis for answering the questions under consideration. One obvious reason is that as yet it covers the complete reproductive period of too few cohorts. Another and equally obvious reason is that for the cohorts which are now only part way through the childbearing period it can show conclusively only the performance to date and not what will occur in the future. A third reason is that data on age at first marriage during past years are so inadequate that the childless women in each cohort cannot be subdivided into those single and those ever married.⁹ In spite of these shortcomings, however, it is believed that a study of the past performance of various cohorts along the lines to be indicated can help greatly in evaluating the events of recent years and judging what is likely to happen in years to come. Attention will be concentrated on two topics: (a) fluctuations in fertility prior to the younger

⁷ The preparation of these tables has been assisted greatly by grants from the Rockefeller Foundation. Of the births occurring in 1915-19 only those to women aged 15-19 have been distributed by cohorts. The birth performance to the end of the childbearing period for the cohorts of 1875 to 1889 is based on the data in the 1910 and 1940 censuses for women by number of children ever borne, adjusted for the under-reporting of births.

⁸ Each of these adjustments was made because the bias to which it relates is not compensating. In contrast, no adjustment was made for the apparent tendency to misreport age of mother, for it was believed that the births a cohort lost at certain ages were balanced approximately by those it gained at other ages.

⁹ Nearly all of the women with one or more children have been married.

TABLE 2. CUMULATIVE BIRTH RATES (NUMBER OF CHILDREN BORNE) PER 1,000 NATIVE WHITE WOMEN IN SELECTED COHORTS LIVING TO THE AGE SPECIFIED, BY AGE OF MOTHER AND ORDER OF BIRTH OF CHILD¹

Cohort of ²	Births per 1,000 Women Prior to Exact Age									
	20	22	25	30	40	20	22	25	30	40
	Total Births					First Births				
1900	244	560	1,067	1,796	2,526	184	362	536	695	771
1901	258	565	1,065	1,737	2,415	195	364	537	687	761
1905	287	568	1,017	1,624	2,274	215	363	523	672	763
1906	284	562	998	1,589	2,255	213	359	516	664	765
1907	282	553	977	1,556	2,232	211	355	510	660	766
1908	280	543	963	1,542	2,237	210	349	504	661	776
1909	270	524	912	1,481		203	339	482	644	
1913	237	460	845	1,467		179	303	463	666	
1914	223	451	843	1,489		169	300	464	676	
1915	214	441	830	1,491		163	296	459	674	
1916	215	445	842	1,531		166	299	466	685	
1917	215	451	870	1,601		166	303	484	712	
	Second Births					Third and Later Births				
1900	48	144	309	487	601	12	54	222	614	1,154
1901	49	147	308	473	583	13	54	220	576	1,072
1905	59	151	292	445	570	13	54	202	507	942
1906	58	149	285	437	571	13	53	196	487	919
1907	58	146	279	430	573	13	51	188	466	893
1908	58	144	276	428	582	12	50	183	453	880
1909	56	137	259	409		12	47	171	428	
1913	48	118	235	411		10	39	147	390	
1914	44	113	233	421		10	38	145	392	
1915	42	109	230	426		9	36	141	391	
1916	41	110	234	443		9	35	143	403	
1917	41	112	238	468		9	36	147	421	

¹ From unpublished tables prepared for the cohorts of 1875 to 1932.

² Cohorts are identified by date of birth. Thus, the cohort of 1905 consists of women born between July 1, 1904 and June 30, 1905, all of whom are assumed to have been born on January 1, 1905.

childbearing ages (under 30), confined almost exclusively to the lower order births, and (b) long-time trends of rates for the higher order births, which affect especially the cumulative fertility of women of the older childbearing ages (40 and over).

One fact which is established clearly from an examination of the data for actual cohorts is that an important proportion of the births which normally would occur at the younger childbearing ages may be prevented for several months or even years by a depression, a war, or other unusual conditions, but may then occur at a later date. Conversely,

if times are good when a cohort is living through the younger childbearing ages it may have an unusually high birth rate during those ages. A few years later, however, its cumulative birth rate may be only about average, perhaps because prosperity was followed by depression, or perhaps because most of the children that were wanted had been borne during the earlier period. For example, the women in the 1900 and 1901 cohorts reached age 20 at the beginning of 1920 and 1921, respectively; their total birth rate up to this age (244 and 258 per 1,000) presumably was reduced by World

War I. In contrast, the cohorts, of 1905 to 1909 reached age 20 in 1925 to 1929; their fertility prior to this age (270 to 287 per 1,000) presumably was stimulated by the prosperous conditions of the 1920's. But by age 30, when the 1900 and 1901 cohorts had had several years for childbearing under these conditions and after demobilization, and the 1905 to 1909 cohorts had been affected by the depression of the 1930's, the situation was reversed. There had been 1,796 and 1,737 births per 1,000 women in the 1900 and 1901 cohorts compared with 1,481 to 1,624 for the 1905 to 1909 cohorts. (See the upper left section of Table 2.) The former had jumped from the last two to the first two places in this array.

Similar reversals of ranking in arrays are found by comparing the cohorts of 1905 to 1909 and 1913 to 1917. The former reached age 20 in 1925 to 1929; the latter in 1933 to 1937. The fertility of the former up to age 20 presumably was stimulated by prosperity—there had been 270 to 287 births per 1,000 women. That of the latter presumably was reduced by the depression—there had been 214 to 237 births per 1,000 women. Ten years later, by age 30, the situations were almost reversed, for the 1905 to 1909 cohorts had lived only to 1935-39 and had not had time to recover from the depression, whereas the 1913 to 1917 cohorts had lived to 1943-47. Births per 1,000 women prior to age 30 averaged 1,516 for the 1913 to 1917 cohorts and 1,558 for those of 1905 to 1909; the former had almost caught up with the latter.

The foregoing variations begin with first births, for almost three-fourths of the births prior to age 20 in recent decades have been first births. The variations in first births are followed by similar variations in second births, third births, etc., with an appropriate lag, and on a scale which diminishes from one birth order to the next. As the cohorts become older the differences in the cumulative rate for first births tend to disappear, and, subsequently, the differences for second births and for third births tend to become smaller. Thus, the high cumulative rate for first births to a cohort is 40.5 per cent above

the low at age 20 (229 and 163 for the cohorts of 1928 and 1915), but only 12.3 per cent above it at age 30 (721 and 642 for the cohorts of 1918 and 1911). And the high cumulative rate for second births is 37.7 per cent above the low at age 24 (263 and 191 for the cohorts of 1903 and 1915), but only 18.0 per cent above it at age 34 (590 and 500 for the cohorts of 1886 and 1909).

The relationships mentioned above mean that the differences in total fertility up to age 20 reflect differences in first births primarily, whereas those up to age 30 reflect differences in rates for second, third, and even higher order births. Thus, the higher fertility prior to age 30 of the 1900 and 1901 than of the 1905 to 1909 cohorts (the averages being 1,766 and 1,558 births per 1,000 women) is due more to differences for third and later births (595 and 468) than for first and second births (1,172 and 1,090). (Based on Table 2.) Likewise, the lower fertility prior to age 30 of the 1913 to 1917 than of the 1905 to 1909 cohorts (1,516 and 1,558) is due entirely to fewer third and later births (399 and 468), for the former had slightly more first and second births than the latter (1,117 and 1,090).

The next topic on which attention will be concentrated briefly is the large drop from cohort to cohort in the rates for sixth and higher order births. The number of eighth and subsequent births per 1,000 women prior to age 40 fell almost without interruption from 228 for the cohorts of 1880 to 1884 as a group, to 83 for those of 1905 to 1907, a drop of about 64 per cent. Similar reductions are found among older women, e.g., from 348 prior to age 45 for the cohorts of 1875 to 1879 as a group, to 137 for those of 1900 to 1902. There were downward trends for sixth and seventh births also, but the steepness of the decline diminishes from order to order. Thus, comparing the cumulative birth rates prior to age 45 of the 1875 to 1879 and the 1900 to 1902 cohorts shows drops of about 61 per cent for eighth and subsequent births, 55 per cent for seventh births (170 to 77) and 50 per cent for sixth births (232 to 116). These reductions are

much larger than those for first and second births.

There is nothing in the cohort tables which shows how and why the rapid downward trends of the rates for high order births have been brought about. Information from other sources points to the increasing use of contraceptives as the means, and to a desire for a higher level of living—including more education and better medical and dental care for children—as the motivation. So much has been written and said elsewhere on these topics that no more is needed here.

The foregoing discussion has shown (a) the wide variations in rates for first, second, and third births during the younger childbearing ages and their relation to war and economic conditions, and (b) the rapid downward trend in rates for sixth and higher order births. Lack of space prevents a detailed discussion of the patterns of change for fourth and fifth births. In brief, they occupy intermediate positions between those for third and sixth births, for there is a gradual transition from one pattern to another as age of woman and order of birth rise.

With these trends and relationships established, let us see how the fertility of various cohorts up to the age reached on January 1, 1948, compares with that of earlier cohorts up to the same age. In the latest cohort to reach age 18 on January 1, 1948 (that of 1930), there had been approximately 80 births per 1,000 women. This exceeds the previous record by 7 per cent, is 38 per cent above the corresponding figures for the cohorts reaching age 18 during the great depression (e.g., 57 to 58 for the cohorts of 1916 to 1918), and is somewhat above the rates for the cohorts becoming 18 two or three years after the end of World War I, or during the later years of prosperity in the 1920's (e.g., 70 to 75 for the cohorts of 1904 to 1911). Similarly, in the 1928 cohort, which was 20 on January 1, 1948, there had been 292 births per 1,000 women, which sets a new record, is far above the rates for the cohorts of 1927 back to 1911 (214 low and 254 high), and

is well above those for most of the cohorts of 1910 back to 1902 (262 low and 287 high). The comparative standing of the 1926 cohort, which became 22 in 1948, is much the same. Its cumulative rate to that time was 581—much larger than the rates for most of the cohorts of 1925 back to 1909 (441 low and 537 high) and somewhat larger than those for most of the cohorts of 1908 back to 1898 (543 low and 583 high).¹⁰ Certainly the women in these younger cohorts are starting childbearing relatively early.

Although statements for ages from 23 to 30 would resemble the foregoing rather closely there is a tendency for the cumulative fertility of the latest cohort to compare less favorably with that of earlier cohorts as age rises above 25. Up to that age the 1923 cohort had been more fertile than any of the preceding 28 cohorts—all those for which we have data. It had surpassed the 1900 to 1903 cohorts by small margins (around 2 per cent), the 1913 to 1916 cohorts by large margins (around 30 per cent), and the 1904 to 1912 cohorts by intermediate amounts. If the comparison is based on experience to age 30, however, only the 13 immediately preceding cohorts (1917 to 1905) had had a lower birth rate than the 1918 cohort. Each of the 15 earlier cohorts (1904 to 1890) had had a higher rate, several being more than 10 per cent above 1918. Similarly, the fertility rate prior to age 35 of the 1913 cohort (which reached 35 on January 1, 1948) exceeded those of only the 6 preceding cohorts, and was more than 20 per cent below those of the 1885 to 1887 cohorts. Moreover, the cohort reaching age 40 on January 1, 1948, (that of 1908) had a slightly higher cumulative birth rate up to 40 than the 1907 cohort, but a lower rate than any of the others—more than 25 per cent below those of any of the 1880 to 1886 cohorts. Comparisons for the last cohorts to reach ages 41 to 47 show still larger declines.

¹⁰ Only four of the eleven cohorts from 1898 to 1908 exceeded 570, and only the cohort of 1903 exceeded 578.

Why do the cohorts that have recently reached ages 18-25 outrank so many of the immediately preceding cohorts with respect to fertility prior to the age in question, and in general equal those of earlier years? The primary reasons undoubtedly are (a) demobilization,²¹ and (b) the stimulating effect of favorable economic conditions, which was shown to have been important in the past. Certainly the cohorts reaching ages 18 to 25 at the beginning of 1947 and 1948 had been living under conditions more favorable to marrying and having the first child or adding another child than the cohorts reaching the same ages at the beginning of 1935 to 1940. And certainly the cohorts reaching ages 18 to 25 at the beginning of 1925 to 1930 had been as fortunate as the first group, if not more so.

Why has the fertility of cohorts now in the last years of the childbearing period been so much below that of most preceding cohorts? What undoubtedly is the main reason was pointed out earlier, namely, the steep downward trend in rates for eighth and higher order births, and the important declines—becoming smaller from order to order—for seventh, sixth, fifth, fourth, and third births. Contraception has made these trends possible; a desire to live better and to have more freedom presumably has provided much of the motivation.

It is easier to account for the comparative standing of the cohorts reaching ages 18 to 25 and 40 to 47 in 1947 and 1948 than of those reaching the intermediate ages of 26 to 39, for one set of factors seems primarily responsible at the younger ages and another set at the older ages. The middle group represents a gradual change from the younger to the older, with a corresponding change in the relative importance of the two sets of causal factors. As an illustration let us consider briefly the fertility of cohorts up to ages 30 to 35. Since periods of prosperity

or depression do not last indefinitely, most cohorts by these ages have lived through some good and some bad years, so most of the effect of such extremes on the first birth rate has canceled out. Because of the interval that must elapse between successive births, however, there has been less opportunity for the effect of favorable and unfavorable economic conditions on the second birth rate to cancel out, and still less at each higher birth order. By ages 30 to 35 there has been time for the other factor—the long-time downward trend in the rates for third and subsequent births—to manifest its influence. But since the steepness of the decline increases rapidly with birth order, and since an important proportion of the fifth and higher order births normally occur after age 35, the desire to prevent families of five or more children has had less opportunity to affect the fertility of cohorts by ages 30 to 35 than by ages 40 and over. The net result is that a comparison of the fertility of recent cohorts and earlier cohorts is less favorable to the former at ages 30 to 35 than at ages 18 to 25, but more favorable than at ages 40 to 47.

The foregoing information about the fertility of actual cohorts supports the conclusion that the record-breaking number of births in 1947 is a matter of timing—of the upswing in marriages that began in 1945—rather than a reversal of the trend toward fewer children per completed family. Moreover, even though this new record occurred primarily because of an upsurge in first births, the cohort material makes one wonder whether the slight downward trend in the proportion of women bearing one or more children has been stopped, to say nothing of being reversed. It is true that more women in the cohorts of 1920 to 1930 started childbearing at younger ages than was the case for the cohorts of 1915 to 1919. But whether a larger proportion of the former will have one or more children by ages 35, 40 or 45 remains to be seen. The ranking of the cohorts of 1900 to 1908 with respect to the proportion childless is very different at age 24 than at age 40. It is quite possible that by age 40 the proportion child-

²¹ For information regarding the effect of demobilization see "Current Population Reports," P-20, No. 18, June 30, 1948, Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C., p. 1.

less will be as low for the cohorts of 1915 to 1919 as for those of 1920 to 1930.

It may be argued that lowering the average age at which the first birth occurs in a cohort will tend to raise the completed fertility of the cohort because it lengthens the period during which subsequent births can occur. In a group not practicing contraception this conclusion certainly should be valid. In our society, however, an important proportion of families are planned as to size—over 70 per cent in a native white Protestant group studied in Indianapolis.²² Moreover, there are reasons for believing that this proportion is gradually increasing year by year, as more people learn about effective contraceptives. It is questionable, therefore, whether any tendency which may develop toward having the first child at a younger age will be strong enough to offset the tendency to be more successful in preventing unwanted conceptions. For more and more couples the question of whether to have none, one, two, three, or some other number of children, depends on motivations rather than age at marriage or age at starting childbearing. Unless there is a change in attitudes toward the number of children in a completed family and more are wanted for several years, and unless the ratio of the actual number to the wanted number stops declining, there seems little likelihood of reversing the long-time trend toward smaller families.

The conclusion that the baby boom of 1946-49 is primarily a matter of timing rather than a stoppage or reversal of the downward trend in children per completed family raises the question of the extent to which it consists of (a) births which were postponed during 1931-45 because of the depression, World War II, and other causes, and (b) births which for various reasons

have been moved ahead from 1950 and later years. This question is important because of its bearing on such matters as the number of births to be expected during 1950-55 and the number of children entering school during 1956-61. Information on these matters is useful to manufacturers of baby supplies, to school authorities, and to many others.

Facts regarding the fertility of actual cohorts are very helpful in a consideration of the future course of the number of births. For example, the cumulative fertility rates of various cohorts up to a given age provide a basis for estimating what will be called the "expected" rate for any one cohort. Multiplying such a rate by the number of women in the cohort in question gives the "expected" number of births to the cohort prior to the given age. Comparing the actual number of births to the cohort with the "expected" number thus obtained indicates the extent to which there is an accumulated deficit of births or a borrowing from the future. Because the value of such estimates depends primarily on the reasonableness of the allowances made for secular trends, and because opinions will differ regarding this matter, three series of estimates—a high, a medium, and a low—are presented here. January 1, 1948 is used as the terminal date in this section because 1947 was the latest year for which data on births by age of mother and order of birth of child were available when the article was written.

Each of the three series of estimates is based on some extrapolation of the change between the cumulative birth rates as of January 1, 1920 and January 1, 1930. The latter date (January 1, 1930) is chosen because it is the end of the last long period of prosperity before World War II; hence, in view of the relation between economic conditions, war, and fertility, the cumulative birth rates should have been (and in fact were) higher on that date than at the beginning of any subsequent year up to 1946. The other date (January 1, 1920) is chosen in part because it is the earliest for which estimates of cumulative birth rates are available, and in part because the preceding 20 year period also was on the whole a period

²² The data for "relatively fecund" couples are from P. K. Whelpton and Clyde V. Kiser: "Social and Psychological Factors Affecting Fertility. VI. The Planning of Fertility," *The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, Vol. XXV, January 1947, p. 84 (reprint p. 230) and for "relatively sterile" couples from unpublished material of the above-mentioned study.

when economic conditions were favorable to childbearing. It should be remembered, however, that World War I and the influenza epidemic of 1918 tended to depress the number of births during 1919. Had it not been for these influences the cumulative rates for January 1, 1920, would have compared somewhat more favorably with those

changes are in line with those discussed in the first section of this paper.

The low estimates of "expected" cumulative birth rates for years since 1930 assume the continuance of the average annual numerical declines from 1920 to 1930 (i.e., changes from 1930 to 1948, 1.8 times as large as those from 1920 to 1930).¹³ Continuing to

TABLE 3. CUMULATIVE BIRTH RATES (NUMBER OF CHILDREN BORNE) PER 1,000 NATIVE WHITE WOMEN, BY COHORT AND AGE OF MOTHER AND ORDER OF BIRTH OF CHILD, FOR JANUARY 1, 1920, AND JANUARY 1, 1930, AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE BETWEEN THESE DATES

Cohort	Age on Specified Date	Order of Birth								
		All Birth Orders	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	8th+
Cumulative Birth Rates for January 1, 1920										
1900-1904	16-20	94	75	15	3	1				
1895-1899	21-25	739	417	205	81	27	7	2	1	
1890-1894	26-30	1,591	646	440	257	137	65	28	11	8
1885-1889	31-35	2,330	742	569	390	258	165	100	54	53
1880-1884	36-40	2,950	778	633	472	344	248	177	120	179
1875-1879	41-45	3,417	801	675	525	400	300	227	166	323
Cumulative Birth Rates for January 1, 1930										
1910-1914	16-20	102	82	17	2					
1905-1909	21-25	699	406	193	71	22	6	2	1	
1900-1904	26-30	1,489	644	417	227	114	52	22	8	4
1895-1899	31-35	2,131	735	545	350	217	131	77	41	35
1890-1894	36-40	2,659	770	607	427	293	201	139	91	129
1885-1889	41-45	3,065	792	649	478	346	247	182	129	241
Percentage Change in Cumulative Birth Rates ¹										
	16-20	8.8	8.7	12.7						
	21-25	- 5.3	- 2.7	- 5.8	-12.4	-17.4				
	26-30	- 6.5	- 0.3	- 5.1	-11.5	-16.7	-20.3	-21.9	-22.4	
	31-35	- 8.5	- 0.9	- 4.3	-10.1	-15.9	-20.5	-22.5	-24.4	-33.8
	36-40	- 9.9	- 0.9	- 4.0	- 9.4	-14.8	-19.0	-21.5	-23.8	-27.9
	41-45	-10.3	- 1.1	- 3.9	- 9.0	-13.4	-17.4	-20.0	-22.1	-25.2

¹ A minus sign denotes a decrease. Percentages are not shown where the 1920 rate was less than 10.

for January 1, 1930. Nevertheless, each of the rates in question was larger for 1920 than for 1930 except those for first and second births prior to ages 16-20. (See Table 3.) The decreases were very small (less than 3 per cent) for first births at other ages, and rather small (less than 6 per cent) for second births. Subsequent birth orders had successively larger decreases, those for eighth and later births amounting to between 34 per cent at ages 31-35 and 25 per cent at ages 41-45. These

1948 the absolute annual change from 1920 to 1930 has the advantage of allowing for the possibility that the use of effective contraceptive methods increased at an accelerated pace during the last two or three decades—a possibility for which there is some supporting evidence. It has the disadvantage

¹³ In order to avoid assuming an upward trend after 1930 of the rates for first and second births in the age group 16-20, the 1930 rates are considered "expected" in later years in the low, medium, and high series.

TABLE 4. ACTUAL CUMULATIVE BIRTH RATES, AND MEDIUM, LOW, AND HIGH ESTIMATES OF "EXPECTED" RATES, PER 1,000 NATIVE WHITE WOMEN, BY COHORT AND AGE OF MOTHER AND ORDER OF BIRTH OF CHILD, FOR JANUARY 1, 1948

Cohort	Age on January 1, 1948	Order of Birth								
		All Birth Orders	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	8th+
Actual Rates										
1928-32	16-20	116	96	17	3	1				
1923-27	21-25	752	465	200	62	18	5	2	1	
1918-22	26-30	1,474	706	438	194	81	34	14	6	3
1913-17	31-35	1,858	756	536	279	139	72	38	20	17
1908-12	36-40	2,128	768	569	331	187	110	67	41	55
1903-07	41-45	2,349	772	582	365	227	144	94	61	105
Medium Estimate of "Expected" Rates										
1928-32	16-20	102	82	17	2					
1923-27	21-25	637	386	173	56	16	4	1		
1918-22	26-30	1,339	640	379	182	82	35	14	5	1
1913-17	31-35	1,851	723	504	289	159	87	49	25	17
1908-12	36-40	2,254	758	564	357	220	137	90	56	72
1903-07	41-45	2,573	776	604	404	267	176	121	83	143
Low Estimate of "Expected" Rates										
1928-32	16-20	102	82	17	2					
1923-27	21-25	629	386	172	53	14	3	1		
1918-22	26-30	1,306	640	377	174	73	28	11	4	0
1913-17	31-35	1,773	723	501	279	143	70	37	17	3
1908-12	36-40	2,134	757	562	347	202	116	70	40	39
1903-07	41-45	2,432	776	601	393	249	154	100	63	95
High Estimate of "Expected" Rates										
1928-32	16-20	102	82	17	2					
1923-27	21-25	672	397	185	64	19	5	2	1	
1918-22	26-30	1,422	642	401	207	99	44	18	7	3
1913-17	31-35	2,005	730	528	323	191	111	64	33	26
1908-12	36-40	2,475	765	589	397	261	172	116	75	101
1903-07	41-45	2,842	786	630	446	311	215	154	107	194

of bringing some of the cumulative birth rates to zero before 1970.

The high estimates of "expected" assume that the 1920-30 annual rate of decline was reduced gradually during 1930-45 and that rates were stationary in 1945 and later years at levels equivalent to those yielded by a fifteen year continuation of half the average annual percentage declines from 1920 to 1930.¹⁴ This assumption shows what would happen with the gradual disappearance of the desire for further reductions in the

average size of family—a desire which was widespread thirty years or more ago when large families were much more numerous relatively than at present.

The medium estimates of "expected" assume the indefinite continuation of the average annual rate of change from 1920 to 1930. At the lower birth orders (where the differences between the high and low series are relatively small) the medium is much closer to the low than the high. At the higher birth orders (where the differences

The high "expected" rate for 1945 and subsequent years is obtained by multiplying the 1930 rate by

¹⁴ The average annual percentage decline from 1920 to 1930 is equal to

$$100 \left(1 - \sqrt[10]{1930 \text{ rate} \div 1920 \text{ rate}} \right)$$

$$\left(1 + \frac{10}{2} \sqrt[10]{1930 \text{ rate} \div 1920 \text{ rate}} \right)^{10}$$

TABLE 5. ACTUAL CUMULATIVE NUMBER OF BIRTHS, AND MEDIUM, LOW, AND HIGH ESTIMATES OF "EXPECTED" CUMULATIVE NUMBER OF BIRTHS, TO NATIVE WHITE WOMEN, BY COHORT AND AGE OF MOTHER AND ORDER OF BIRTH OF CHILD, FOR JANUARY 1, 1948. (IN THOUSANDS)

Cohort	Age on January 1, 1948	Order of Birth								
		All Birth Orders	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	8th+
Actual Births										
1928-32	16-20	557	461	81	12	3				
1923-27	21-25	3,930	2,433	1,045	323	93	25	8	3	
1918-22	26-30	7,606	3,641	2,260	999	417	175	71	29	15
1913-17	31-35	9,228	3,754	2,660	1,387	692	359	191	99	86
1908-12	36-40	9,389	3,388	2,509	1,458	827	484	297	181	245
1903-07	41-45	8,971	2,947	2,223	1,393	866	548	360	233	401
Total		39,680	16,623	10,778	5,574	2,897	1,592	926	545	746
Medium Estimate of "Expected" Births										
1928-32	16-20	490	394	83	11	2				
1923-27	21-25	3,328	2,019	906	291	81	21	7	2	
1918-22	26-30	6,910	3,303	1,958	941	423	179	73	27	7
1913-17	31-35	9,195	3,590	2,503	1,436	789	431	242	123	82
1908-12	36-40	9,945	3,342	2,488	1,576	971	606	397	247	316
1903-07	41-45	9,825	2,965	2,304	1,541	1,019	670	464	315	547
Total		39,694	15,614	10,242	5,797	3,284	1,907	1,182	715	953
Low Estimate of "Expected" Births										
1928-32	16-20	489	394	83	11	1				
1923-27	21-25	3,286	2,015	897	276	71	18	6	2	
1918-22	26-30	6,741	3,303	1,943	898	376	146	56	21	0
1913-17	31-35	8,807	3,589	2,490	1,387	710	349	183	85	14
1908-12	36-40	9,413	3,341	2,477	1,531	891	512	311	176	173
1903-07	41-45	9,285	2,964	2,294	1,501	952	588	381	242	363
Total		38,022	15,607	10,184	5,604	3,001	1,612	937	526	550
High Estimate of "Expected" Births										
1928-32	16-20	490	394	83	12	2				
1923-27	21-25	3,514	2,077	965	335	99	26	8	3	
1918-22	26-30	7,336	3,314	2,069	1,070	513	227	94	35	14
1913-17	31-35	9,958	3,627	2,621	1,606	947	549	317	165	127
1908-12	36-40	10,918	3,376	2,598	1,749	1,150	757	512	329	447
1903-07	41-45	10,851	3,000	2,404	1,701	1,186	820	587	410	743
Total		43,067	15,788	10,740	6,473	3,897	2,378	1,519	943	1,331

are relatively large) the medium series tends to become approximately midway between the low and high.

The actual cumulative birth rates as of January 1, 1948, by cohort and age of mother, and order of birth of child, together with the high, medium, and low estimates of "expected" rates, are given in Table 4.

Comparable figures for the number of births are shown in Table 5. The estimates of surpluses or deficits, obtained by subtracting the actual numbers of births from the estimates of "expected" numbers, are given in Table 6.

Among the most important differences between the estimates of actual and "ex-

TABLE 6. ESTIMATES OF THE SURPLUSES OR DEFICITS IN THE CUMULATIVE NUMBER OF BIRTHS TO NATIVE WHITE WOMEN, BY COHORT AND AGE OF WOMEN AND ORDER OF BIRTH OF CHILD, FOR JANUARY 1, 1948, BASED ON MEDIUM, LOW, AND HIGH ESTIMATES OF "EXPECTED" BIRTHS.¹ (IN THOUSANDS)

Cohort	Age on January 1, 1948	Order of Birth								
		All Birth Orders	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	8th+
		A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
Based on Medium Estimates of "Expected" Births										
1928-32	16-20	67	66	- 1	1	1				
1923-27	21-25	601	413	139	32	11	4	1	1	
1918-22	26-30	696	338	301	58	- 6	- 3	- 2	2	7
1913-17	31-35	32	164	157	- 48	- 97	- 72	- 52	- 24	3
1908-12	36-40	- 556	46	20	- 118	- 144	- 122	- 100	- 66	- 72
1903-07	41-45	- 854	- 18	- 81	- 148	- 153	- 122	- 104	- 83	- 146
Total		- 14	1,010	535	- 223	- 387	- 315	- 256	- 170	- 207
(Surplus or deficit reduced by 30% at ages 36-40 and by 70% at ages 41-45)										
1908-12	36-40	- 389	32	14	- 83	- 101	- 85	- 70	- 47	- 50
1903-07	41-45	- 256	- 5	- 24	- 44	- 46	- 37	- 31	- 25	- 44
Total		751	1,008	586	- 84	- 237	- 193	- 153	- 93	- 83
Based on Low Estimates of "Expected" Births										
1928-32	16-20	68	66	- 1	1	1				
1923-27	21-25	644	417	148	47	21	7	2	1	
1918-22	26-30	865	338	316	102	41	30	15	8	15
1913-17	31-35	421	165	170	x	- 18	10	8	14	72
1908-12	36-40	- 25	47	32	- 73	- 64	- 27	- 14	4	72
1903-07	41-45	- 314	- 17	- 71	- 108	- 86	- 40	- 21	- 9	38
Total		1,658	1,016	593	- 31	- 104	- 20	- 11	19	196
(Surplus or deficit reduced by 30% at ages 36-40 and by 70% at ages 41-45)										
1908-12	36-40	- 17	33	22	- 51	- 45	- 19	- 10	3	50
1903-07	41-45	- 94	- 5	- 21	- 32	- 26	- 12	- 6	- 3	11
Total		1,885	1,014	634	67	- 25	16	8	24	148
Based on High Estimates of "Expected" Births										
1928-32	16-20	67	66	- 1	1	1				
1923-27	21-25	416	355	80	- 12	- 7	- 1	- x	x	
1918-22	26-30	270	327	191	- 71	- 96	- 51	- 23	- 6	x
1913-17	31-35	- 730	127	39	- 218	- 255	- 190	- 126	- 66	- 42
1908-12	36-40	- 1,529	12	- 89	- 291	- 323	- 273	- 215	- 149	- 202
1903-07	41-45	- 1,880	- 53	- 181	- 308	- 320	- 272	- 227	- 177	- 342
Total		- 3,387	835	38	- 899	- 999	- 786	- 592	- 398	- 585
(Surplus or deficit reduced by 30% at ages 36-40 and by 70% at ages 41-45)										
1908-12	36-40	- 1,070	9	- 62	- 204	- 226	- 191	- 151	- 104	- 142
1903-07	41-45	- 564	- 16	- 54	- 92	- 96	- 81	- 68	- 53	- 103
Total		- 1,613	868	192	- 596	- 679	- 514	- 369	- 229	- 285

¹ Amounts between zero and 500 are indicated by x.

pected" numbers of births are the excesses of actual over "expected" first births which are found at five of the six age groups in each series. The largest surplus—between 355,000 and 417,000 according to the high and low estimates of "expected"—is that for the cohorts of 1923-27 which were aged 21-25 on January 1, 1948. (See Table 6, column B.) The surplus is approximately 330,000 for the cohorts aged 26-30, between 127,000 and 165,000 for those aged 31-35, about 66,000 for those aged 16-20, and a smaller amount for those aged 36-40. In contrast, the actual number of first births prior to January 1, 1948, had been a little less than the "expected" number at ages 41-45. For all ages combined, the net surplus of first births is slightly over 1,000,000 according to the medium and low estimates of "expected" and 835,000 according to the high estimate of "expected."

The findings for eighth and later births (combined) differ greatly from those for first births. Here the actual numbers of births for the four age groups¹⁵ are a little above the low estimates of the "expected" numbers, but fall below the high estimates by amounts which increase rapidly with age. Thus, women aged 31-35 had had 42,000 fewer eighth and subsequent births than would be expected according to the high assumptions of "normal," while those aged 41-45 had had 342,000 fewer. (See Table 6, column I.)

As can be seen by studying columns C to H of Table 6 most of the statements that could be made regarding surpluses or deficits for second to seventh births would represent a transition between those for first births and those for eighth and subsequent births.

In attempting to evaluate the effect on the future of the large surplus of first births, the small to large surplus of second births, and the large deficits of births of most higher orders as of January 1, 1948, consideration must be given to the age of the cohorts in which they occur. It is obvious

that the younger the age the greater the opportunity for a surplus to be reduced or a deficit to be made up. As shown in the first part of this paper there has been a strong tendency for high rates for first births to a cohort at the younger ages to be almost exactly offset by low rates at older ages, and vice versa. In contrast, the small differences found in the cumulative first birth rates of cohorts at ages 41-45 usually have been maintained almost unchanged during the few remaining years of the childbearing period. It becomes harder to find good illustrations as birth order rises, because downward trends at all ages increase the difficulty of identifying surpluses or deficits, but the same principle should apply. It seems clear, therefore, that the surpluses or deficits of births at older ages estimated by the method described above should be discounted to some extent in trying to evaluate their effect on future numbers of births.

The choice of reduction factors must be rather arbitrary, for there is little helpful information. The factors used here are 70 per cent at ages 41-45 and 30 per cent at ages 36-40; in other words it is assumed that 30 per cent rather than 100 per cent of an apparent surplus (or deficit) of births to a cohort at ages 41-45 will lower (or raise) the number of births to that cohort in subsequent years, and that 70 per cent of an apparent surplus (or deficit) will be effective at ages 36-40. No changes are made at younger ages. It is believed that these adjustments are more likely to be too small than too large. They are applied to births of each order.

Adjusting the estimates of surpluses and deficits in this manner makes little difference for first births, the net surplus according to the low and medium estimates of "expected" remaining close to 1,010,000, and that according to the high estimate rising from 835,000 to 868,000. The adjustment has the largest effect on eighth and later births. Here the estimated surplus according to low "expected" rates is reduced from 196,000 to 148,000, and the estimated deficits for the other two series are reduced by larger

¹⁵ It is assumed that eighth births cannot occur before age 25.

amounts (from 207,000 to 83,000 for medium "expected" rates, and from 585,000 to 285,000 for high "expected" rates). At each parity the adjustment narrows the differential between the three series.

The adjusted estimates all show a surplus of second births—close to 600,000 with the low and medium "expected" rates, and nearly 200,000 with high "expected" rates. At each parity from third to seventh, however, the actual births are well below the medium and high estimates of "expected," though close to the low estimates. The deficits from high "expected" amount to 596,000 for third births, rise to 679,000 for fourth births, and then decrease to 229,000 for seventh. The deficits from medium "expected" are much smaller, but vary similarly from one birth order to another. For all birth orders combined the actual number of births exceeds the low "expected" by 1,885,000 and the medium "expected" by 751,000, but is below the high "expected" by 1,613,000.

The slight changes among past cohorts in the proportion of women living to age 45 who had at least one birth makes the estimates of between 868,000 and 1,014,000 surplus first births seem highly reliable. At the other extreme, the steadiness of the decline from cohort to cohort in the proportion of women having more than seven births makes it seem that the smallest estimate of surplus or deficit—83,000 according to medium "expected" rates—is reasonably correct. It is probable that the medium series is nearest the truth for second to seventh births also. It is possible, however, that the decrease in the proportion of women wanting a second child, and perhaps a third also, has ended. In this case, the surplus of second births may be somewhat smaller and the deficit of third births somewhat larger than shown by the medium estimates of "expected," though much nearer these values than those shown by the high estimates.

This section has dealt so far with the situation on January 1, 1948, because 1947 is the latest year for which the number of births by age of mother and order of birth of

child is available at time of writing. Births during 1948 were about 4 per cent less numerous than in 1947, but births were about 1 per cent more numerous during the first 9 months of 1949 than of 1948. It is probable that the number of first births was substantially smaller in 1948 than in 1947, and that much of this decrease was offset by an increase in second births and some by an increase in third births. Fourth and fifth births may have increased slightly, but sixth and later births probably continued to decrease. The changes between 1948 and 1949 are expected to follow a similar pattern, but with a smaller decrease in first births and smaller increases in second and third births.

By January 1, 1950, the surplus of first births according to medium "expected" rates may well be in the neighborhood of 1,500,000 and that of second births over 1,000,000. Furthermore the deficit of third births on January 1, 1948 may well be changed to a surplus, and those for fourth births reduced somewhat. All births combined may show a surplus of about 2,500,000 on the medium "expected" basis, 4,000,000 on the low "expected" basis, and 500,000 on the high "expected" basis. The medium figure is about equal to 75 per cent of the total number of births to native white women during 1948.¹⁶

¹⁶ Although a drawing on the future as of January 1, 1950, which is equal to the number of births during 1948 may seem unreasonably large, it is only equivalent to each cohort in the childbearing ages being a year ahead of "expected." At the older ages (e.g., 40-44) the differences in number of births to a cohort from one age to the next are so small as to be of little significance. At the younger ages (e.g., 20-24), the differences are large, but several years remain in the childbearing period during which a "gain" of one year can be "lost." Although some cohorts may have as high a cumulative birth rate per 1,000 women prior to age 23 as others have had prior to age 24, this gives no assurance that the former will have as high a rate as the latter prior to age 40 or 45.

It is of interest to note that on January 1, 1941, the actual number of births to the cohorts then aged 16 to 45 inclusive, was below the medium "expected" number by 2,345,000. The high rates of 1941-47 changed this to an excess of 751,000 in seven years, a net gain of 3,096,000.

In conclusion, we may expect that the number of births during 1950 and later years will be reduced by the large borrowing on the future which has occurred prior to 1950. The reduction will be gradual and will extend over a long period if prosperity continues, for this will encourage the continua-

tion of early marriage and the early bearing of the children wanted. But if economic conditions deteriorate substantially, the drop in births which a depression alone would bring will be augmented greatly by the moving ahead of several hundred thousand births from 1950 or later to 1947-49.

STRUCTURE, FUNCTION, AND FOLK SOCIETY*

ALVIN BOSKOFF

University of North Carolina

ONE OF the persistent strands in the last two decades of American sociology has been Howard W. Odum's folk-regional perspective. It has, of course, been subjected to a good deal of well-meaning and well-deserved criticism in the process of groping toward sociological maturation. For while it has fastened on the crucial problems of social planning, societal survival, and international order, it has failed to provide a unified, coherent approach which can be utilized by other practicing sociologists. Its concepts are admittedly vague and exploratory, somewhat weak from an operational standpoint, and not well-knit among themselves. Finally, the growing literature of folk sociology has contributed a number of provocative insights into modern society, but these are generally not pursued systematically as organizing foci for consistent theory.

Indeed, folk sociology seems to have been diffidently lingering about the borders of sociology, awaiting the coming of a suitable conceptual escort into the realm of sound sociological theory. But if folk sociology is more than an isolated approach, it must certainly share certain inherent possibilities with other sociological currents, from which one or more can be selected to aid in plumbing its potentialities. This paper is therefore principally devoted to fitting the concepts of folk sociology into a *structural-functional*

framework, since that seems to offer the most promising frame of reference in modern sociology.

Perhaps the best introduction to the approach of folk sociology is the conception of a logical continuum of *social systems*, from which certain segments are selected, defined, and analyzed for possible conceptual contributions to contemporary sociological analysis. (See accompanying diagram.) It should be emphasized that this is a *logical* continuum which does not imply any judgments about the necessary direction of social evolution or of any inherent order of social organization. The basic thread in this paradigmatic progression is the increasing complexity of social organization, proceeding from the small, isolated social units of unrecorded human history through simple kinship organization, clan, tribe, civil groupings, the nation, and ultimately to the highly organized totalitarian society. Contrapuntal strands in this continuum involve certain *structural uniformities*—relatively stable patterns of behavior—associated with selected stages of societal complexity. These patterns possess variable importance along the continuum and therefore specific patterns can be clearly recognized only in definable portions of the continuum.

Folk sociology focuses on two definable segments of the continuum as matrices for the development of its distinctive concepts. Now it should be clearly understood that these segments—called respectively "folk

* Manuscript received July 1, 1949.

society" and "state civilization"—refer to no historically concrete society. They comprise analytical constructs, ideal types of social organization which are *objectively possible*, but which do not correspond in any high degree to any actual, functioning society.

Yet the ideal type is no mere agglomeration of analytical elements. It contains, as Weber and Parsons have demonstrated, "a fixed relation between the values of the various variable elements involved."¹ Therefore, we may consider "folk society" and "state civilization" as objectively possible functional systems—analogueous to the frictionless systems in physics. Though this procedure involves the imputation of dynamics to a non-existent entity, it does provide a useful fiction which can be tested by comparison with societies that tend to cluster near the ideal type.

face-to-face associations, more intimate group relationships and the (direct) interaction" between the members of that system and nature.² This kind of social system is ideally distinguished by (1) a series of descriptive characteristics which do not lend themselves directly to functional analysis and (2) a set of analytical elements which are distinctly suitable for the consideration of an organized system.

Let us first sketch the descriptive characteristics as briefly as possible. Ideally, it is a small, relatively isolated society featured by primary group relationships and by little or no communication with outsiders. It is marked by a close, relatively unmediated relation to the land, by a simple technology, limited division of labor, the economic independence of constituent units, substantial ~~nationality, minimization of desires~~, and a consequently slow process of social change.

SOCIETAL COMPLEXITY →

Isolated social units	"Folk Society" (Ideal type)	"Transitional Society"	"State Civilization" (Ideal type)
-----------------------	--------------------------------	------------------------	--------------------------------------

← SOCIAL ORGANIZATION CONTINUUM →

FOLK SOCIETY

"Folk society" is a somewhat arbitrarily defined construct which suffers from the limitations of any definition. And as is the case with most definitions, there is an understandable latitude which must be granted those who dissent from the inclusion or exclusion of given elements in that construct. However, folk society is not offered here as a final, definitive characterization; rather it is hoped to provide a clear, provisional circumscription of a hypothetically conceived functional system by means of which we can understand the operation of modern society.

By folk society we mean a social system which is characterized "by the folkways and the mores and slowly developing institutions . . . , predominating in primary relationships such as the primary occupations,

Folk society is particularly homogeneous both biologically and socioculturally, the latter feature being derived from the existence of unquestioned common ends and the prevalence of a religious fabric which lends sanctity to an unrecorded tradition. Finally, one of the distinguishing attributes of folk society is the importance of kinship (whether actual or fictional) and the related "personal" approach to people, objects, and nature.³

² Howard W. Odum, "Notes on the Changing Structure of Contemporary Society," Work Memorandum, November 12, 1948, p. 1. See also his *Understanding Society*, pp. 13, 260, 278, 282.

³ Karl Mannheim, *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction*, pp. 53-54.

⁴ See Robert Redfield, "The Folk Society," *American Journal of Sociology*, January 1947, pp. 293-308; Ralph Linton, *The Study of Man*, pp. 280-284; E. Sapir, "Culture, Genuine and Spurious," *American Journal of Sociology*, January 1924, p. 403; Melvin Tumin, "Culture, Genuine and Spurious: A

¹ Talcott Parsons, *Essays in Sociological Theory Pure and Applied*, p. 77.

These folk qualities assume coherent form in the ideal folk society through the medium of three groups of structural uniformities: folkways, mores, and the primary institutions.

1. The *folkways* refer to the culturally elemental and relatively stable patterns of behavior which develop slowly, unconsciously, and non-rationally as primary adjustments to the repetitive life situations confronted by a society or some definable segment of a society. These adjustments may or may not be objectively appropriate; the important fact is that the folkways in the ideal folk society are handed down by tradition and are not subjected to verification by experience. They comprise relatively non-coercive definitions of proper personal behavior towards persons and objects in every aspect of group life. Consequently, the folkways constitute the basic sub-stratum of folk culture.

2. The *mores* derive from socially selected folkways which have been specifically identified with societal welfare; they are the "matured folkways," which have developed group sanctions to insure conformity with the dictates of emotionally-charged behavior patterns.

3. The *primary institutions*—property, marriage, and religion—are creative, slowly developed translations of the mores "into the world of facts and action."⁵ Institutions, as Parsons neatly points out, bridge the gap between ultimately desired social goals and needs, and the pursuit of immediate ends. The inherent social control problem is met by normative rules which regulate action in accordance with these ultimate values (mores):

"Institutions . . . are patterns governing behavior and social relationships which have become interwoven with a system of common moral sentiments which in turn define what one has a 'right to expect' of a person in a certain position. These sentiments apply to the defini-

tion of the statuses and roles of persons in the social system.⁶

The folkways provide for the basic biological and psychological needs of constituent members. Furthermore, through the definition and distribution of suitable roles and statuses, they aid in the process of socialization.⁷ The mores supplement the folkways by prohibiting under sanctions the performance of roles inimical to the maintenance of a given social system. In addition, the mores help in providing motivation for essential social roles. Finally, the primary institutions, functionally of the greatest importance in folk society, furnish the principal threads of order in the organization of roles and statuses into focal clusters about commonly held values.

STATE CIVILIZATION

In contrast to the folk society and its relatively non-rational, informal, traditional, intimate and slowly developing patterns of behavior, the ideal typical state civilization refers to a social system which has attained a high degree of organization and centralization through the application of specialization, science and technology, functional rationality,⁸ impersonality, and coercive power. As a result of these processes, state civilization is characterized by large population masses, enormous heterogeneity (both biologically and socioculturally), a high degree of urbanization and centralization, formal control techniques, secondary group relationships, the minimization of tradition, diminution of kinship and religious considerations, concern with maximization of achievement, and rapid social change.

This societal picture is organized about the operation of another set of structural uniformities: the technicways, "enacted" institutions, the institutionways and the stateways.

⁵ Parsons, *op. cit.*, p. 276.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 6; John W. Bennett and Melvin M. Tumin, *Social Life*, pp. 45-58.

⁸ Mannheim, *op. cit.*, pp. 54-55.

Re-Evaluation," *American Sociological Review*, April 1945, p. 206.

⁶ William G. Sumner, *Folkways*, p. 53.

1. The *technicways* of state civilization are somewhat analogous to the folkways of folk society. Both types of structural uniformities represent basic, informal adjustments to the life conditions of each social system. But while the folkways involve slowly developing patterns of behavior in response to primary group situations, the technicways comprise behavior patterns which arise rather visibly in response to the demands of a complex and dynamic science and technology. They are developed without particular reference to prevailing moral standards, though it is incorrect to conclude that the state civilization is devoid of a moral order.⁹ Because of their origin, the technicways have little tradition of authority and therefore are often learned through secondary sources (advertising, etc.).

2. The *enacted institutions*—the state, military order, the educational system, science, the industrial and commercial systems, the institutionalized church—in contradistinction to the primary institutions, are rationalized, somewhat specialized, consciously organized and recorded sets of normative rules which arise in response to the needs of a complex, differentiated society in which the problem of social control therefore assumes enormous proportions. In the ideal state civilization, both science and the state become the focal institutions, subordinating the operation of societal patterns to their respective demands and thereby directing the nature and speed of social change.

3. It is difficult to separate the *stateways*¹⁰ from the enacted institutions in ideal state civilization. We might consider stateways to be a special though highly important form of the *institutionways*, which we can

define as the prescribed behavior patterns associated with the enacted institutions and sanctioned by the use of coercive power. The stateways are consequently the institutionways of the state; they are reflected in the consciously organized laws, directives, and rulings of the state's constituent agencies. However, in view of the focal position of the state, the remaining institutionways become organized with reference to the stateways, so that a hierarchy of institutionways can be said to constitute the structural basis for the complex centralization of state civilization.

In our hypothetical state civilization these uniformities have immense functional significance, especially since the demands of a highly organized system are more stringent for its continuation as a "going concern." The technicways, despite their traditionless, transitional character, are quick and, in many instances, accurate adjustments to recurrent technological changes. In our ideal type, they are appropriate adjustments as well, i.e., they enable the members of that system to become oriented to the changing reality of a dynamic society. Thus, the technicways are instrumental in re-defining acceptable roles and statuses and therefore provide an element of stability and order in a system which is subject to the chronic strains of change.

The enacted institutions enumerated above fulfill several of the functions which the folkways, mores and primary institutions ordinarily perform in the folk society. Primarily, they are organized to satisfy the basic biological and psychological needs (food, security, etc.) of component members. Secondly, they provide relatively clear definitions of proper roles and their interrelationships in the system. Thirdly, in supplying unequivocal definitions of recurrent situations, they lend meaning and motivation to the performance of prescribed roles. And finally, the coercive aspect of institutions, symbolized in the institutionways and stateways, provides the societal ultimate in insuring predictability, organization, and social order.

* Cf. Howard W. Odum, "On Trying to Define the Field and Methods of a Dynamic Folk Sociology," Work Memorandum, March 1947, p. 11. See also his *Understanding Society*, pp. 229-231.

¹⁰ Franklin H. Giddings, *Civilization and Society*, pp. 280-281. See also his "An Intensive Sociology: A Program," *American Journal of Sociology*, July 1930.

MODERN "TRANSITIONAL" SOCIETY

In terms of our continuum, contemporary Western society may be placed somewhere between the folk society and state civilization segments. Resembling neither ideal social system completely, and containing important structural features characteristic of both types, modern society is truly *transitional*.¹¹ And apparently it is moving in the direction of state civilization. Consequently, the self-imposed tasks of folk sociology are (1) to determine how these structural elements are interrelated in modern society; (2) to discover the significance of these relations for the maintenance of a going system; and (3) to suggest modifications in both structure and functional relations appropriate to the attainment of commonly held values in transitional society.

We can identify in modern society the operation of each of the structural uniformities to which we have previously referred. Yet these analytical patterns fail to exhibit ideal typical strength and function.¹² Generally speaking, the folkways and the mores are losing their pervasive power in competition with quickly developing technicways. However, it is inaccurate to conclude from the trend of this structural rivalry that morals and morality are thereby obliterated. The process is rather one in which selected or peripheral elements in the traditional morality are unconsciously re-interpreted in the course of social development. These moral transitions are relatively gradual and may result in the virtual repudiation of their ideological fore-bears—as the history of modern society plainly demonstrates.¹³ Con-

temporary society seems to be at the stage at which the older mores are giving way before the moral sweep of commercial values, "efficiency," rationality, and organized power.

While the technicways are growing in range and power, they have not yet attained the precarious stability and clarity of state civilization. Many of our technicways are still exploratory, i.e., they do not provide an unequivocal guide to needed adjustment. In fact, it might be seriously questioned that the technicways can ever assume sufficient stability and permanence to be designated "enduring," as Dr. Odum has done.¹⁴

The primary institutions are increasingly losing a directive, autonomous position in contemporary society. Perhaps the most characteristic feature of this development is the transformation of primary institutions into enacted institutions or, at the very least, the trend toward their operation principally with the support and sanction of enacted institutions. The institution of property, for example, is now highly associated with a complex corporate structure specifically sanctioned by the state. Even the more informal aspects of ownership are to a large extent based on maintenance of a prescribed relation to some segment of the occupational sphere (the "job"). Similarly, informal religious practices have been largely replaced by highly structured, formalized sub-systems—the churches. And finally, the institution of marriage in modern society is constantly being shaped and directed by the subtle institutional imperialism of the church, the state, and the occupations.

The undoubted power of the enacted institutions is, however, not fully transmuted into omnipotent institutionways. The church, science, and even the occupational sphere may be said to function under somewhat circumscribed institutionways—limited in their development by the growing power

¹¹ See John W. Bennett, "Culture Change and Personality in a Rural Society," *Social Forces*, December 1944, p. 123; Howard W. Odum, "Folk and Regional Conflict as a Field of Sociological Study," *Publications of the Sociological Society of America*, vol. XXV, no. 2, May 1931.

¹² The discussion which follows should be recognized as comprising a series of orienting assumptions, inferences and hypotheses which must be verified in the course of careful empirical research conceived in the general framework of this paper.

¹³ See Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the*

Spirit of Capitalism; Robert K. Merton, *Science, Society, and Technology in Seventeenth Century England* (printed in *Osiris*, vol. 4, part 2, 1937); R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*.

¹⁴ Odum, *Understanding Society*, p. 229.

of the stateways. Yet the stateways in turn are restricted in influence by the folkways and mores and the octopal expansion of the functionally expedient technicways. Clear instances of this general process can be recognized in the prohibition experiment, in the difficulties of war-time price control, and in the recent civil rights controversy.

Before we turn to the imputed functional significance of these structural features, we must recall that functional analysis is normally applied to the elements of some recognizable social system which is regarded as a dynamic "going concern." And we must recognize that every social system is comprised of certain situational elements, values, etc., which form a peculiar context for functional analysis *on its own terms*.¹⁵ Modern transitional society is characterized by a number of "functional constants" which are critical in preserving the identity of this particular social system: a high degree of interdependence and specialization, complexity, technical efficiency, a strain toward rationality, widespread concern with security, status and success, and the necessity for organized power. These elements might be considered as "given" and therefore the limits imposed by them provide the context for valid functional analysis.

At this stage in our knowledge, no blanket functional role can be assigned to the folkways and mores of transitional society. Sociology desperately needs a well-planned series of empirical studies designed to (1) catalogue accurately the folkways and mores of constituent groups; (2) determine to what extent these are actually pursued; (3) determine to what extent they provide proper motivation for performing essential roles with a minimum of friction. In the meanwhile, we must avoid the unstated romantic bias that the folkways as a group are inherently functional.

In general, we can view modern technicways as important functional adjustments which provide some degree of orderly response to the potentially disorganizing consequences of a socially non-implemented science and technology. Without the mediation of the technicways, modern society would be structurally "marginal," since the folkways and mores cannot easily adapt themselves to change, and since the stateways often develop to meet only the most critical consequences of societal change. But it is somewhat inaccurate to equate the technicways with societal change. They must rather be considered as effects of, or adjustments to, changes which originate in the findings and applications of science and technology. Consequently, it is likewise inaccurate to speak of the technicways as accelerators of societal change.¹⁶ This is valid only in a comparison with the folkways, which typically minimize change. Actually, the technicways select and canalize the chaotic potentialities for change inherent in scientific and technological developments. Thus, the technicways, in adjusting to these developments, act to limit the dangers of change by bridging the gap between established and emerging values and functions.

We know a good deal more about the institutions of modern society in this regard, principally through the work of Talcott Parsons and his disciples. As a result, we can point to the ambivalent functional position of contemporary institutions. While in some respects the kinship system, the church, the occupations, science, and the state act to channel behavior into prescribed, legitimized roles through institutional definitions of situations, the normal operation of these institutions likewise generates dysfunctional behavior—anxiety, insecurity, irrationality, and aggression.¹⁷

¹⁵ Odum, Work Memorandum, March 1947, p. 16.

¹⁷ See the following articles by Talcott Parsons: "The Kinship System of the Contemporary United States," *American Anthropologist*, January-March 1943, pp. 22-38; "Certain Primary Sources and Patterns of Aggression in the Social Structure of the Western World," *Conflicts of Power in Modern*

¹⁶ This demands the conscious rejection of some "ideal" or "normal" system, which is often unconsciously posited as the only proper context for human adjustment. See C. W. Mills, "Professional Ideology of Social Pathologists," *American Journal of Sociology*, September 1943.

In view of the insistent demands of a complex, highly differentiated society, we might suggest the absence of certain functionally appropriate stateways (relating to management-labor relations, discrimination, etc.). But it seems more reasonable to evaluate *existing* stateways. In general, the stateways relating to marriage, education, taxation, political behavior, welfare, etc., provide a minimum co-ordination of institutional roles with each other and with the orienting values of modern society. However, the stateways perform no highly consistent functional role, since they have not attained the advanced degree of coercive power of ideal typical stateways. In the democracies, in fact, the stateways are constantly tested for possible evasion by local and regional folkways, by dysfunctional technicways, and by specific institutional structures.¹⁸

FOLK-REGIONAL SOCIOLOGY

Thus far, we have assumed for purposes of simplicity and clarity of exposition that the structural elements discussed above are uniformly distributed throughout a given social system with respect to strength and functional importance. However, it is by now generally accepted that a complex social system, performing many functions and covering extensive land areas, necessarily involves some degree of *spatio-structural differentiation*. The units, segments, or societal sub-structures which emerge from this process provide another level of structural uniformities which have been popularly designated as "regions."

The region as a constituent unit in a social system refers to a specific functional configuration of structural elements in the context of a more or less provisionally defined

geographic area. More operational, however, is the ecological definition of the region as a constellation of contiguous communities possessing similar and complementary structural elements which form a recognizable socio-spatial entity.¹⁹ Consequently, the region can be viewed simultaneously as an analytically separable structure (a system in itself) and as a structural element in a wider social system. Regions within a given framework may then be considered as comprising relatively distinct variations of societal patterns which are organized to form "regional patterns." And it is at this point that folk sociology and regionalism, which are logically and conceptually independent perspectives, converge to form a folk-regional approach.

The differentiation of regional units appears on four closely related levels. First, regions may vary with regard to the presence and strength of component structural uniformities. Thus the power of the folkways and mores, the technicways, etc., is intimately associated with the differential conditions and development of constituent regions. Second, regions plainly differ as to the *content* or character of these uniformities. We speak particularly of regional folkways and mores, and perhaps there is some justification for distinguishing regional stateways as well. Third, the balance or organization of ideal typical structural uniformities varies by region, so that we may speak of predominantly folk regions, state civilization regions, and "intermediate" regions. Finally, as a consequence of these levels of variation, regions are functionally differentiated; they organize at one level component structural elements in terms of a unique functional role in the over-all social system. And, it seems, it is the functional

Culture, edited by Bryson, Finkelstein and MacIver, pp. 29-48; "The Sociology of Modern Anti-Semitism," *Jews in a Gentile World*, edited by Graebner and Britt, pp. 101-122; "Some Sociological Aspects of the Fascist Movements," *Social Forces*, December 1942, pp. 138-147.

¹⁸ This process of attempted constriction, by the way, clearly indicates a major dysfunctional role of the legal profession, without which the stateways might achieve greater positive functional significance.

¹⁹ "Similar" and "complementary" are used to differentiate region and sub-region. Similar communities may be said to constitute sub-regions while sub-regions may be said to exhibit complementary relations in the formation and maintenance of regions. See the author's article, "An Ecological Approach to Rural Society," *Rural Sociology*, December 1949.

balance of regions which gives individuality to a social system.

What is the significance of this kind of structural differentiation? For one thing, the region offers a helpful explanatory context for social behavior, since neither the local community nor the total social structure of a complex society affords a proper focus for "diversity in complexity." The community is too isolated structurally, the over-all social structure is too inclusive, for such a purpose.

Secondly, through the development and distribution of specialized roles and in the peculiar organization of these roles with widely prescribed social roles, the region as an entity perceptibly contributes to the operation of a given system. The clearest indication of this lies in the economic division of labor, by which regional resources (natural and human) subserve the demands of modern transitional society. However, the development of regions, or of specific regions, does not insure automatic functional significance. Regions in a given framework may arise at different periods and often develop at varying rates, with the result that some regions are imperfectly integrated with the functioning of the over-all system. Likewise, intense competition or rivalry between simultaneously developing regions may seriously endanger the stability and security of that system.

But there is a tendency to reify the region unduly in assessing its societal role. Consequently, the peculiar structural nature of regions is once more noted. And therefore it is suggested that the functional or dysfunctional character of given regions is directly traceable to the nature of component structural uniformities. Such a viewpoint would seem to be a highly important consideration in devising specific goals for social planning.

SOME APPLICATIONS

In what may seem to be much too brief a compass, the foregoing has been an attempt to develop an organized, critical résumé of the major concepts of folk-regional sociology within a structural-functional framework. With this framework as a

base, then, let us further attempt a provisional estimate of folk-regional sociology by employing its approach to problems and areas specifically selected by its adherents.

Folk sociology is particularly concerned with illuminating the process of social change—certainly one of the least understood areas in sociological theory. In terms of our framework, social change can be defined as the continuing process of societal development which is manifested in significant alterations in the form, function, and meaning of constituent structures (groups, relationships)—significant in that these alterations have definite consequences for the stability of a social system. The folk-regional approach interprets social change as inhering in the emergence of a structural rivalry between folkways, mores, and primary institutions on the one hand, and the technicways, the enacted institutions, and the institutionways on the other. Thus social change can be "measured" by the proportionate strength of these structures, and by the way in which they re-define legitimized or acceptable roles in the social system. In other words, folk sociology seems to have translated the criteria of social change into an analysis of the interrelations of its concepts.

An important element in this approach is the marked emphasis on science and technology as the major sources of social change in Western society. This is, of course, a return to the perennially controversial hypotheses of Ogburn and Chapin,²⁰ for which the crucial studies have not yet been made. But is this the *universal* mechanism of social change? And if so, what structural features are necessary for the emergence and development of science and technology?

This approach to social change must be recognized as being largely *descriptive*, rather than *explanatory*; in our present state of knowledge, that is a label which can be appropriately applied to every serious theory of social change. To understand the dy-

²⁰ See P. A. Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, pp. 742-746 for a critique of these hypotheses.

namics of social change, we must be able to evaluate the possibilities of "new" definitions of the situation which are available in the cultural tradition (the social heritage of folk-ways, mores, institutions).²¹ While Sumner noted a strain toward consistency in the folk-ways and mores, their informal, non-rational character, particularly in the context of a developing social order, often favors the secondary articulation of imperfectly integrated patterns. It was this general kind of analysis, by the way, which Weber and Tawney employed in part in tracing the origins of modern capitalism.²²

Furthermore, the problem of motivation toward change must be more fully understood. The assumption of a perfectly stable, interlocking system of roles and statuses is a sociological chimera (the use of ideal types notwithstanding). Every social system of any complexity contains "very important elements of internal conflict and tension,"²³ in terms of the strains placed on actors in given roles and statuses.

An analysis of social change must also involve the ways in which "deviant" behavior becomes "socially structured and linked with legitimizing cultural patterns."²⁴ Folk sociology tries to explain socially structured deviant behavior in part through the concept "technicways," though it has not been clear in explaining their origin. There is a tendency to regard the technicways as *de novo* patterns of adjustment shaped only by the insatiable demands of changing technology.²⁵ Instead, it is suggested that the technicways combine orientation to technological change with patterns drawn from the available culture; and it is further suggested that many technicways are based on translation of peripheral or even deviant folkways and mores. Consequently, the opposition between folkways and technicways is not structurally obligatory. The technic-

ways can conceivably reinforce folkways for measurable periods of time.

Finally, folk sociology has likewise been unclear as to the mechanism by which "deviant" patterns are legitimized. The underlying premise seems to be, with respect to modern transitional society, that these patterns tend to be imperfectly legitimized in a kind of structural limbo which is said to be the basis for problems of adjustment.²⁶ However, folk sociology tends to regard the institutionways, and particularly the stateways, as legitimizing patterns, yet fails to illuminate the process by which deviant patterns are converted into stateways and institutionways.

Social problems constitute a related area of concern for folk sociology. Every functioning social system is normally confronted with some recognizable discrepancies between widely held ideals and actual behavior. However, folk sociology explicitly relates social problems in modern society to the rapidity of social change. Consequently, social problems become matters of adequate adjustment between the folkways and mores, and the technicways. This emphasis on the "natural," rather than the "pathological," character of social problems, supported by structural analysis of their emergence, is now rather widely accepted and offers a fruitful approach to the study of specific problems. But a deeper understanding of social problems must await more detailed knowledge of the mechanism of social change.

Social change and social problems are phases in a conceptual progression which terminates in social planning—the final problem in folk sociology to be considered here. Referring again to the basic framework of this paper, social planning may be defined as the deliberate process by which the structural units of a social system are functionally organized in terms of some desirable orienting values.²⁷ Now folk sociology seems to offer one of the best generalized approaches to planning in its

²¹ Parsons, *Essays in Sociological Theory*, pp. 8-9.

²² Weber, *op. cit.*, *passim*; Tawney, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

²³ Parsons, *op. cit.*, p. 317.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

²⁵ See Odum, *Understanding Society*, p. 367.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 366-367.

²⁷ Cf. Mannheim, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

consideration of both planning goals and structural means. Essentially, it envisages the function of planning as the creation of a proper balance among the structural uniformities to secure stability, orderly social change, and, in view of the trend toward destruction, societal survival.²⁸ It would include an analysis of these structural uniformities to determine precisely which are functional and dysfunctional, in what combi-

nations these relations are manifested, as well as recommendations for securing more functional relationships.²⁹ Appropriate planning mechanisms are conceptualized in the *social technicways*,³⁰ whose purpose is to achieve the goals of planning through the selection and ordering of technicways to minimize the effects of conflicting forces.

²⁸ Odum, Work Memorandum, November 12, 1948, p. 6.

²⁹ Odum, Work Memorandum, March 1947, p. 26.

³⁰ Odum, Work Memorandum, November 12, 1948, p. 7.

ARE IDEAS SOCIAL FORCES?*

STANISLAW ANDRZEJEWSKI

Rhodes University College, South Africa

THE question whether ideas can be considered as a by-product of social conditions, or whether they must be treated as autonomous social forces, is one of the most important problems of sociology. Although orthodox Marxism or "Paretoism" has very few devotees among trained sociologists, the approach to this problem on the lines of economic interpretation of history seems to be quite prevalent. There can be no doubt, of course, that the influence of social structure on ideologies is extremely pervasive, and that no explanation of their existence and transformations can be complete unless it takes this aspect into account. Nevertheless, the ideas, as I shall try to show in this article, must be treated as factors possessing considerable measure of independence.

The usual scheme of economic interpretation of history is that changes of technology produce changes of economic structure, which in their turn transform the superstructure, consisting of political organization, religion, art, etc. In many cases this interpretation does give a satisfactory explanation of various social changes. Attempts to trace social effects of changes in

technology are extremely useful and important but they cannot be taken as final explanation because they raise another question: what caused these changes?

Nobody has so far found out what are the social conditions of technical progress but there can be no doubt that technical and scientific invention, no more than any other activity, does not "hang in the air." Many theories of cultural lag simply ignore this problem. They assume that non-material culture must adapt itself to progressing technology and do not visualise the possibility of technical progress being arrested by social conditions. One has only to think of many spinning and weaving machines which have been invented and then destroyed during the Middle Ages, or of the steam engine of Alexandrian Greeks the mere existence of which has been forgotten, to see that not every invention must be utilized. Moreover the fluctuations, particularly declines, of scientific activity and above all the cases of clear-cut technical regression (ex. Mesopotamia in XIV c.) can be explained only with reference to social conditions. Any analysis of these must take beliefs into account. All theories, therefore, which pretend to reduce ideologies in general to a dependent variable of technology must be tautological.

* Manuscript received June 22, 1949.

Besides, although introduction of new methods of production never seems to fail to influence other aspects of sociocultural life, there are many cases of most profound changes in ideological sphere and of transformations of political and even economic organization without any important modifications of technology. The great expansion of ancient Greek commerce, for instance, the rise and decline of capitalism in classical antiquity were not, in contrast to modern developments, accompanied by any marked improvements in methods of production; there was progress not so much in technical processes as in the extension of the industry, in the number of workshops built and the number and extension of markets opened to it. The rise and fall of the Roman Empire, the spread of Christianity occurred in the same period. No changes in methods of production corresponded to such momentous occurrences as the rise and decline of Buddhism in India, its spread to China or the conquests of Islam. Polynesian societies are very similar as far as methods of production are concerned but display profuse variety in their political and economic organization. Technology is much the same in the United States and in Soviet Russia but this similarity is not reflected in economic organization.

Even if technological determinism is rejected there still remains another, and better, way of explaining away ideas as independent forces: they may be said to be mere justifications, "rationalizations," serving to mask the pursuit of egoistic interests. Constellations of these interests, it must be remembered, are not determined solely by technology, as can be seen from the preceding examples of connection between technology and political and economic organization.

There certainly is abundance of cases of curious coincidence between the spread of certain ideologies and the emergence of interests for which they can serve as a useful cover. Capitalism and Calvinism, imperialistic expansion and the ideology of "white man's burden," advocacy of freedom of enterprise and the interests of business-

men, socialism and proletarian discontent can be cited as examples of such connection. Even if such coincidence, however, is manifest there still remains a problem of legitimacy of interpretation: if somebody asserts that he is striving to further some noble idea, while we notice that his actions curiously promote his interests, are we entitled to say that his professed enthusiasm for the cause is mere bluff? In many cases we can prove or at least presume conscious deceit, but more frequently all evidence seems to indicate sincerity. It is quite obvious, for instance, that the power of the priests is not due, as thought Voltaire, to their skill in pulling wool over the eyes of unsuspecting populace. This difficulty of interpretation can be to a large extent overcome with the aid of psychoanalysis. Clinical observation has shown that many beliefs subserve desires (interests) of which the patient is completely unconscious. Therefore the existence of some dim, unconscious logic has been proved. In spite of this the "interestal" interpretation of ideas cannot provide a complete explanation for a number of reasons.

In the first place, it is evidently possible to inculcate into human beings beliefs which are quite contrary to their egoistic interests. Nearly all nations have succeeded in instilling the idea into their members that they must be ready to offer their lives in defense of their country. Or think of individuals who died for an abstract idea: for Marxism, for instance, which denies the power of ideas. Or how can one's interests be furthered by believing that one is going to suffer eternal torment for one's sins?

In the second place, if it were true that ideas merely serve as justifications for interests, how would it be possible for ideological systems to spread over groups with conflicting interests? Whose interests, for instance, were served by medieval Christianity? Those of the serfs, or of the lords, or of the townsmen, or of the clergy? Many sects did, no doubt, express the interests of various groups but as soon as they became churches and some kind of ethical code was imposed on all sections of the population,

divergence of interests and ideas reappeared. The prohibition of theft naturally suits the interests of the rich but why it should be upheld by the poor cannot be explained in the same way.

The mere existence of morals, ideas which inhibit human desires, cannot be accounted for on the ground of "interestial" interpretation of ideas. No doubt, psychology can explain how we acquired our moral code, by referring to processes of conditioning, formation of super-ego (conscience), etc. But the fact remains that these notions block instead of facilitate the pursuit of interests. Moreover, it is clear that not always does our observance of this code favour interests of those who implanted it in our consciences. What do parents gain, as far as their egoistic interests are concerned, by teaching their son not to be an unscrupulous careerist? It is then the inertia of ethical norm, independent to a certain extent of the play of interests, which molds our ideas of right and wrong.

Nobody would nowadays accept Rousseau's conception that laws and morals originated from a contract. Nevertheless some writers maintain that all ethical norms are based on some sort of conscious or unconscious reciprocity. This opinion, to which the studies of Malinowski lent additional support, is certainly not baseless. It contains, no doubt, a great amount of truth but it also has its limitations. It may be useful, for example, in explaining origins and functioning of prohibitions of assault or theft, but what kind of reciprocity can underlie the prohibition of masturbation?

Many recent studies of ideas do less than justice to contributions of older writers like Tylor, Frazer and Hobbhouse who stressed, perhaps overstressed, the intellectual factors. Searching for interests and other desires determining the bias in the choice of beliefs, they seem to forget that ideas may be accepted or rejected simply because they seem to be true—because they carry conviction. Many beliefs about the structure of the universe could not have been determined by interests. Pasteur's theory and the modification of medical practice consequent upon it

did not gain ground because men began to wish to be healthy more intensely than before. The opposition to it stemmed from deep-rooted preconceptions and ingrained habits and not from interests of the medical profession. In order to further his purely egoistic interests a person who believes in eternal damnation will act in a completely different way from that followed by one who does not share this belief. Ideas of this kind spread or disappear according as they gain or lose plausibility—as they become more or less convincing.

Whether any given idea will appear convincing or not to a people depends on many circumstances: conditions of social life, technology, properties of the language, education, basic personality structure, geographical environment and many others. But among these circumstances which decide the fate of new ideas must be included beliefs already in the field. There is, therefore, some kind of intrinsic dynamics in the ideological sphere: some sort of immanent logic of what Cournot called *l'enchaînement des idées*. This immanent logic of development is particularly prominent in the field of scientific and technical knowledge. Social conditions may facilitate or hinder inventive activity, or even stop it altogether, but what can be invented or discovered depends on what is known already: every step presupposes the previous one. Even in the domain of religious, ethical and philosophic thought there seems to exist, as L. T. Hobbhouse tried to show, some similar kind of immanent logic: the more difficult and complex concepts can only emerge gradually, after less abstruse notions have been already formulated and assimilated. The evolution of the concept of responsibility is a good example of such development. The spread and waning of ideas are not, then, independent of social circumstances, but evidently they cannot be considered as their mere by-product.

Only a very small part of a culture of any given society has originated within it; most of it has been borrowed from outside. What can be borrowed depends naturally on contacts with other cultures; and, so far as the

inner structure of a society is concerned, these contacts must be treated as accidental. The fact that China is next to India, from where it could borrow Buddhism, and not to Europe, from where Christianity might have been introduced, cannot be conceived as dependent on the character of Chinese society and culture. Borrowing, no doubt, is selective, and acceptance or rejection of any trait is determined by forces operating within society. But although conditions may be extremely propitious for acceptance and spread of a given trait, they may not permit its independent invention and development. Northern Europe was apparently ready to adopt Christianity, but we can be sure that it could not have produced such a system independently.

Beliefs, fashions, manners, etc. may spread from one group to another without much regard to their intrinsic qualities. The group which adopts them may do so not because they satisfy some already existing need, but simply because they come from a group enjoying higher prestige. Stiff collars, long trousers and waistcoats are certainly not worn by inhabitants of the tropics because of any intrinsic merits of such attire. Many African natives, particularly the educated, abandon polygyny in order to resemble the Europeans. Christianity, notions of honour and propriety, etc. are often embraced for precisely the same reason.

It also must be mentioned that there are many cases of systems of ideas, imposed by foreign conquerors, persisting after their departure; for example, the Arab conquest of Persia.

An ideological system, evolved in response to earlier conditions, may persist into later times when it could not be created. Christianity, for instance, originated from a mixture of Jewish, Hellenic and Syriac elements. After the Mohammedan conquests contacts between the Hellenic and Syriac culture areas were well-nigh severed, and therefore this kind of syncretism would be impossible. Nor could the Fathers of the Church have risen during the Dark Ages when the disappearance of Roman schools was followed by general ignorance. Christianity, which

Medieval Europe could not have produced, pervaded and shaped every sphere of its life.

The so-called Reception of the Roman Law in early modern Europe was due mainly to needs of developing commerce, banking and of monarchical centralization then in progress. Without these new needs the Roman law would, we may presume, continue to be the object of interest to archivists only. But from this does not follow that a legal system of the same quality could have been produced independently in Renaissance Europe. The Roman law was created on the basis of legal and philosophic traditions deriving from Hellenic, Egyptian and Mesopotamian sources, the mere existence of which was not even suspected by erudites of the Renaissance. Besides, the number of lawyers with requisite intellectual background was extremely small. In any case independent creation of a legal system of such complexity would have required centuries, as it did in Rome, with the result that the nascent capitalism and absolute monarchy would have no ready-made, appropriate legal framework. Their development would necessarily be slowed down and, if other fostering conditions disappeared in the meantime, perhaps permanently arrested. The body of ideas, embodied in manuscripts which lay in dusty corners of archives, constituted then a potential force which needed certain facilitating conditions to become effective, but which cannot be regarded as a by-product of these conditions.

These examples, to which many others could be added, prove the basic soundness of Tylor's concept of survivals and invalidate many of the criticisms advanced against it by functionalists. No doubt this concept was sometimes overworked, but the fact remains that many existing beliefs and practices can be understood only in the light of conditions which prevailed in the past and have since disappeared.

Once a complex of beliefs has been embodied in sacred books it acquires a certain rigidity: it must be accepted or rejected in its totality. Without going deeper into the problem of what determines the degree of

this rigidity, I can only mention that hierarchization of its priesthood, or other exponents like a political party, is extremely important in this context. A system of this sort may be accepted because some of its traits satisfy the needs existing in a given society, but a number of other traits are imported, so to speak, accidentally, that is to say, without any relation between their intrinsic qualities and circumstances already existing in this society. To make it clearer let us take an example: Christianity has been accepted by the rulers of Eastern Europe and forced upon their subjects for a number of reasons: its clergy were the bearers of the remains of Græco-Roman culture of great usefulness for the proper functioning of administration, such as the art of writing; it was the religion of more civilized and powerful countries and therefore inspired awe. Some other circumstances conducive to the acceptance of Christianity might be added. But it is quite clear that it was not adopted because its code of sexual behavior appeared particularly attractive. There is no slightest evidence that the peoples in question were dissatisfied with their morals. Nevertheless, once established the Church managed, though after protracted struggle, to stamp out polygyny and enforce its monogamic ideas. We see then that even although the acceptance of an ideological system may be determined by the inner forces of a society, once accepted it becomes a force of its own.

When it is said that a certain ideology has been fostered or generated by some social conditions, it is usually assumed that such ideology must be a justification, a "rationalization" of these conditions. But it is by no means obvious that it must always be so. It is possible that social conditions may foster ethical notions condemning them, irrespectively of interests involved. This, I think, is the case of contemporary Western civilization.

We are dominated by the idea of equality of opportunity, which is so deeply ingrained in our minds that we take it for granted that this is "the" justice, "the natural law."

It is not my purpose to criticize this attitude which I share, and naturally sociology, being a science, is non-evaluative and cannot prove that such evaluation is right or wrong any more than physiology can prove that vanilla ice cream is better than chocolate ice cream. But before proceeding any further, I must emphasize that this attitude is no more natural than its opposite. We think that it is unfair that a stupid son of a prince should have an advantage over a gifted son of a pauper. But having been born clever or dull, with a pretty or an ugly face, is just as much a matter of luck as having been born a prince or a gypsy. An accident of being born poor is an unfair disadvantage to an able man, but the handicap of being born without gifts enabling one to compete successfully with others justly, according to our notions, brings on the individual humiliations of a failure. These few remarks show, I think, that our notions in this matter are no more "natural" or "logical" than those underlying the institution of caste; both are in reality extra-rational, not irrational, sentiments.

The question now arises: why did this belief in the justice of equality of opportunity come to prevail? It is natural that ambitious members of lower classes should uphold such views, and use the shift in the balance of power between upper and lower classes which occurred in the nineteenth century to carry them into practice.¹ But why did those who cherished no hope of winning in the competition, the great majority to whom it did not really matter, embrace those views? Why above all did upper classes, with whose interests such notions stood in direct contradiction, come to accept them? That they did so is certain; British and other European aristocracies surrendered without an armed struggle because they began to doubt their right to the privileges they enjoyed. Incidentally, I should like to draw the attention of the reader to the profound contradiction in Pareto's thought: on the one hand he asserts that the loss of

¹ On the causes of the above mentioned shift see my forthcoming book on *Military Organization and Social Structure*.

faith in their right to govern is the cause of downfall of ruling classes, while on the other hand he sees in ideas nothing but justification of interests. If ideas of politico-ethical nature are only justifications of interests, how can it come about that somebody may be holding ideas inimical to his interests? In the case of European aristocracies all evidence points to the conclusion that they, or at least many of them, recognized the justice of equality of opportunity because it seemed to them "logical."

Indeed, this belief is a corollary of the general outlook on life called individualism, the chief characteristic of which is that it treats the individual as something isolated—not organically connected with the group to which he belongs. He as such and not his group has rights. From this point of view customs like blood feud or caste solidarity must appear nonsensical and reprehensible. In societies where stratification is hereditary it is families or kins who are thought to occupy certain positions, who are thought to have rights and duties. The idea that somebody should be a judge or a shoemaker simply because his father was such appears to us absurd because we think of them as of individuals—not as of links in the chain of family line. Why do we think so? Why do we consider the bonds linking the individual to his group as something unimportant in comparison with his personal characteristics? The answer is, as Simmel and Bouglé have shown, that it is the multiplicity of social units to which an individual can belong—multiplicity of intersecting groups, to put it otherwise—combined with great social mobility, which makes social bonds, including family bonds, seem almost insignificant.

Social structures, distinguished by multiplicity of intersecting groups and high social mobility, were brought about mainly by two agencies: the centralized state and the complex of economic institutions known as capitalism. They deprived the smaller social units of most of their functions and authority, thus emancipating the individual from their control and enabling him to move from one group to another. They generated,

therefore, egalitarian ideologies, demanding equality of opportunity. But both capitalism and the centralized state facilitate concentration of power and wealth, and thus tend to increase social inequalities. Untrammelled capitalism, in particular, with its opportunities for accumulation of wealth and with its insistence on rights of property, inevitably leads to the formation of dynasties of hereditary rich. The tension, between the actual conditions generated by capitalism and the ideologies fostered by it indirectly, constitutes one of the most important driving forces of contemporary social transformations. It is clear that the prevalence of egalitarian ideas cannot be explained by the misery of lower classes caused by capitalism. On the contrary, the lot of the masses is far more favourable in chief capitalist countries than in many other societies, where the poor accept their fate and no egalitarian ideas are in circulation (e.g., traditional India). Moreover, the standard of living of lower classes is not necessarily connected with opportunities, which in any circumstances only few can use, of rising in the social scale. We have here, then, a clear case of an institutional complex generating an ideology which is avowedly antagonistic to it, instead of being its justification.

The foregoing considerations show, I think, that a sociological study of ideas must avoid both the one-sided "interestial" interpretation and their treatment, only too common among historians of thought, as if they existed in a social vacuum. Social effects of ideas, their social conditioning and their immanent dynamics must be studied with equal care. Moreover, it is not the question of which aspect is more or most important. Such a problem is insoluble and false. The real task is to investigate interconnections between types of social processes and the phenomena in the sphere of ideas. Max Weber's studies represent the most significant attempt so far made in this direction. The clues which can be found there deserve to be further developed, and a similar approach would, no doubt, prove fruitful in fields other than that of religion.

RELEVANT WORKS OF WRITERS MENTIONED

- Georg Simmel, *Soziologie*. Leipzig, 1908.
 Célestin Bouglé, *Les idées égalitaires*. 3rd ed. Paris, 1925.
 L. T. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*. London, 1915, 2nd rev. ed.
 ———, *Social Development*. 2nd ed. London, 1929.
 E. B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*. London, 1873.
 Max Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religions-*

- soziologie*. 3 vols. Tübingen, 1923.
 ———, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Religionssoziologie*. Tübingen, 1922.
 B. Malinowski, *Crime and Custom in Savage Society*. London, 1932.
 ———, "Introduction" to *Hogbin's Law and Order in Polynesia*. London, 1934.
 A. A. Cournot, *Traité de l'enchaînement des idées fondamentales*. Paris, 1911.

SOCIAL MOBILITY IN CHINA*

FRANCIS L. K. HSU

Northwestern University

I. THE PROBLEM

NOT much is scientifically known about social mobility in China. Most people who discuss the subject, including some serious students, have been impressed by the great imperial examination system which has functioned in China for over a thousand years, which was a model for the development of the civil service examination systems in the West,¹ and which served to build a great empire the administrators of which were chosen by ability and talent.²

A number of scholars adhere to a more or less opposite view. This group, though comparatively small, is gaining in importance. The outstanding student among this camp is K. A. Wittfogel, who has up to date presented the only body of quantitative data on the subject. The major observation of this student is that the imperial examination system, far from encouraging vertical mobility, was very much undercut by the *Yin* privilege, through which the son of an official could enter the bureaucracy without having

anything to do with the examination system.³

The purpose of this paper is to show that the *Yin* privilege notwithstanding, there is substantial evidence in support of the former view, namely that a fairly high degree of social mobility existed in Chinese society during the last thousand years. This will be done by showing that (1) in the majority of cases prominence (chiefly bureaucratic, but also social, economic or literary, as will be made clear below) did not last over one generation; and (2) that of the families which did maintain themselves a little longer, the vast majority did not last over two generations. These facts have led me to the tentative conclusion that there was a considerable degree of vertical social mobility in China, since with no evidence for any drastic reduction of the opportunities of prominence, the families which fell would in the normal course of events be replaced by others which rose.

II. ANALYSIS OF MATERIAL FROM DISTRICT HISTORIES

The material to be presented here represents a partial report of a wider study which is still in progress.⁴ The basic data are taken

* Paper read at the first annual meeting of The Far Eastern Association held at Yale University on April 6, 1949.

¹ Ssu-yu, Teng, "China's Examination System and the West," in H. F. MacNair, *China*, Berkeley, 1946, pp. 441-451.

² E. R. Hughes, *The Invasion of China by the Western World*, London, 1937, p. 132, and S. W. Williams, *The Middle Kingdom*, New York, 1899, Vol. I, pp. 562-565.

³ K. A. Wittfogel, "Public Office in the Liao Dynasty and the Chinese Examination System," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 1947, pp. 13-40.

⁴ This work is under the sponsorship of The Committee on Research of the the Graduate School

from the biographies contained in Chinese district histories. District histories (sometimes called District Gazetteers) are a well-known documentary source to students on China. The vast majority of the nearly two thousand districts in China have such histories. Some of these documents consist of five to ten volumes; others run into thirty, or fifty, or more. Each set of district histories, amongst other things, contains a large or small number of biographies of male natives of the district who have, for one reason or another, achieved some prominence. These histories have been in existence for various lengths of time. Some, like those for Changsha, were first composed in 1871; others, like those for Nan Pi of Hopei province, were made only less than twenty years ago. The ones which began many centuries ago have as a rule been rewritten or recomposed several times by effort of natives of the districts who had reached some social and political height. Many additions of material, including many new biographies, have usually been made with each fresh effort at rewriting or recomposing the district history.

In connection with the local biographies I am first of all concerned with two things: (1) Some men rated individual biographies, others did not; and (2) some men, though not biographees,⁵ were mentioned in the biographies of their fathers, brothers, uncles, patrilineal cousins, or other family members, while others were not. For purpose of this study those men who were mentioned in other people's biographies are regarded as having achieved some degree of *prominence* over those whose names were not mentioned in any biography; and those men who rated individual biographies themselves are regarded as having achieved a higher degree of

prominence over those who were merely mentioned in some biographies. Since the composers of most district histories appear to spare little effort in identifying the ancestry or progeny of all their biographees, particularly the more prominent ones, the assumption is not absurd that those immediate ancestors and descendants of biographees who were in any way notable would rate separate biographies or be mentioned in their kinsmen's biographies; and that, conversely, those immediate ancestors or descendants who did not rate as individual biographees, nor were mentioned in their kinsmen's biographies, were probably not prominent at all.

Data from four major district histories will be presented here. These are: Chang Sha (Hunan); T'ai An (Shantung); Wu Hsien (Kiangsu); and Sian (Shensi). These four are chosen for presentation here because they represent four widely separated areas and also because of their relative importance in different periods of Chinese history. The data are analyzed in the following ways:


1. First the data are arranged to reveal the proportion of those in each of which only the prominent man himself is mentioned as compared to those biographies which are related to one another by lineal relationship or in each of which other lineal ancestors (such as father) or descendants (such as son) are also mentioned by name. For example, the biography of H. C. Ou of Changsha made no mention of anyone except himself and his achievements; on the other hand the biography of C. Y. Fan of Wu Hsien, Kiangsu, contained some references to his sons, his grandsons and his great-grandsons by name and by achievements. Furthermore, each of Fan's four sons and one of his grandsons rated a separate biography in the same district history. (See Diagram I)

2. Secondly, those biographies which contain references to the biographee's lineal ancestors or descendants by name and by achievements, or which are tied up to each other by lineal relationship, are then analyzed to reveal the number of generations

of Northwestern University. The basic data used in the present analysis were extracted from the district histories by Mr. Yuan Liang, of the University of Chicago.

⁵The term "biographee" signifies in this paper the person whom the biographer writes about in any given biography.

DIAGRAM I




A-a biographee or his kinsmen who has been mentioned in his biography, or who rated separate biographies.

O-a person whose existence is assumed but who is not a biographee nor mentioned in any biography.

through which prominence lasted. For example, in the biography of M. S. Teng of Wu Hsien, Kiangsu, only his son Hsiu, is mentioned. This is then entered into the results as *one instance* in which family prominence lasted two generations. The same would be true if the son is a separate biographee. If the sons of Mr. Teng's son were mentioned, or if Mr. Teng's father were mentioned in the same biography or in a different biography, the case will then be entered into the results as *one instance* in which family prominence lasted three generations. (See Diagram II)


DIAGRAM II



However, three other circumstances are of importance here. For example, Mr. C. C. Pan of Wu Hsien, Kiangsu, not only has a son who is a separate biographee but also two brothers, C. D. and C. T., who are also separate biographees. Furthermore C. T. has one son who is named in C. T.'s biography, while C. D. has a son and a grandson who are also separate biographees. In this case we have three separate lines of continued prominence and accordingly the

data are entered in the results as two instances in which family prominence continued for two generations and one in which it continued for three generations. (See Diagram III a)


DIAGRAM III a



A different condition prevails in the aforementioned case of C. Y. Fan of Wu Hsien, Kiangsu. The biographies mentioned that Fan had one "seventh generation grandson," named Pang Cheh who had a son Wen Ying. In addition the biographies also mentioned two other groups of Fan's descendants: 1. a "seventeenth generation descendant," Yun Lin and his son P. Ying; and 2. a "twenty-third generation" descendant Lai Chung and his son Hwa. All three cases are entered into the results as three instances in which family prominence was continued for two generations.

The third condition concerns a rule of thumb. If a father is a biographee or mentioned in a biography, the son is not but the grandson again is, then the case is entered as an instance of continued prominence lasting *two generations*. But if the prominence is interrupted by more than one generation the prominence is considered discontinued. (See Diagram III b)

DIAGRAM III b



Prominence lasting
two generations

Prominence is
discontinued

5. Lastly the data are analyzed to show the kinds of achievements by the biographers and others who are mentioned in the biographies. Five kinds of achievements are found: (1) being a member of the bureaucracy; (2) having received one or more imperial degrees; (3) being locally known for exemplary conduct, according to Confucian and other traditional ethics, such as filial piety, harmony among brothers, charity toward the public, etc.; (4) having become wealthy through commerce; and (5) being well-known for distinctions in art, poetry, literature or knowledge of sacred scriptures.

A number of observations may be made on this table. First, the number of biographees among whom prominence continued for two or more generations is consistently lower in every district than the number of biographees among whom prominence did not continue after one generation. (The percentages in Column III are always smaller than those in Column IV). This result agrees substantially with my previous study of three district histories from Chekiang Province. (Chin Hsien was the exception, in which case Column III would have been 62 per cent and Column IV, 38 per cent).⁹

When we employ "being mentioned in a biography" as a criterion of prominence we find the picture slightly changes. The order is reversed so that the number of prominents in some districts "among whom prominence continued for two or more generations" became larger than those among whom prominence failed to so continue. (Some percentages in Column V are larger than those in Column VI.) The tendency for the former to increase is consistent, although the rate of increase, governed by some unknown factors, is not. The general reversal of the numerical

The individuals in circles are grouped together and are then added to the total number of individuals among whom Prominence continued for two or more generations.

4. Fourthly the data are arranged to reveal the number of individuals who are related to each other (brothers, cousins, uncles and nephews, great-grandfathers and great-grandchildren) but among whom no continued prominence according to the above rules is found. (See Diagram V)





DIAGRAM V



TABLE

Locality		Chang Sha	Sian	Tai An	Wu Hsien				
Analysis									
I. Total No. of Biographies		1,382	1,214	1,855	880				
II. Total No. of Prominent Individuals		2,364	1,789	1,910	1,296				
III. No. of Biographies among whom prominence continued for two or more generations		609 or 43%	361 or 28.8%	324 or 17.4%	365 or 41.5%				
IV. No. of Biographies among whom prominence did not continue after one generation		773 or 57%	851 or 71.2%	1,531 or 82.6%	515 or 58.5%				
V. No. of all prominent individuals among whom prominence continued for two or more generations		1,553 or 65%	883 or 49%	376 or 20%	755 or 58.0%				
VI. No. of all prominent individuals among whom prominence did not continue after one generation		811 or 35%	906 or 51%	1,535 or 80%	541 or 42%				
VII. Total number of instances of continued prominence		511	273	142	217				
VIII. Number of generations through which prominence lasted among all	Two generations	237 or 46%	197 or 72%	94 or 66%	142 or 65%				
	Three generations	176 or 34%	46 or 16%	36 or 25%	45 or 21%				
	Four generations	88 or 17%	17 or 6%	9 or 6.3%	16 or 7%				
	Five and over	3%	6%	2.7%	7%				
IX. Number of Prominent individuals who are related to the prominent lineages singly (included in V.)		²⁰ (about 1.2% of V or 2.4% of VI)	⁴¹ (4.6% of V or 4.2% of VI)	⁷ (1.9% of V or 0.4% of VI)	²⁰³ (26.8% of V or 39% of VI)				
X. No. of prominent individuals who are not related to prominent lineages but also are related to each other singly (included in VI)		⁷⁰ (4.2% of V or 5.5% of VI)	¹⁰⁷ (12.1% of V or 11.8% of VI)	¹⁸ (4.8% of V or 11.6% of VI)	⁵⁸ (7.6% of V or 10.7% of VI)				
		Chang Sha (Total XI 1553) (Total XII 811)	Sian (XI 883) (XII 906)	Tai An (XI 376) (XII 1535)	Wu Hsien (XI 755) (XII 541)				
XI. Kinds of distinction achieved by all among whom prominence lasted for two or more generations	Biographies	A*	507 or 83%	Total 361	311 or 86%	Total 324	267 or 82%	Total 365	252 or 69%
		B	9 or 1.5%		None		14 or 4.6%		10 or 3%
		C	61 or 11.9%		23 or 6.3%		19 or 5.8%		45 or 13%
		D	None		None		None		None
		E	4 or 0.7%		13 or 3.7%		9 or 2.7%		38 or 10%
		F	28 or 2.9%		14 or 4%		15 or 4.9%		20 or 5%
	Non-biographies	A	777 or 83%	Total 522	422 or 81%	Total 51	19 or 37%	Total 390	228 or 58%
		B	81 or 8.7%		18 or 3%		18 or 35%		22 or 6%
		C	72 or 7.6%		70 or 13.8%		10 or 19%		94 or 24%
		D	None		None		None		1 or 0.2%
		E	7 or 0.5%		10 or 2%		4 or 7%		43 or 11%
		F	3 or 0.2%		2 or 0.2%		1 or 2%		2 or 0.8%
XII. Kinds of distinction achieved by all among whom prominence did not last after one generation	Biographies	A	312 or 40%	Total 851	494 or 58%	Total 1531	622 or 41%	Total 573	221 or 43%
		B	72 or 9%		15 or 2%		646 or 42%		16 or 3%
		C	270 or 35%		277 or 37%		189 or 12%		171 or 33%
		D	None		None		None		None
		E	20 or 2%		68 or 8%		19 or 1.2%		88 or 17%
		F	99 or 14%		47 or 5%		59 or 3.8%		19 or 4%
	Non-biographies	A	15 or 39%	Total 55	30 or 54%	Total 4	None	Total 26	8 or 30%
		B	17 or 44%		2 or 3.6%		None		None
		F	6 or 17%		23 or 42%		4 or 100%		18 or 17%

* Key to letters:

A.—Being member of the bureaucracy, or holder of any official title.

B.—Holders of imperial degrees.

C.—Exemplary conduct.

D.—Wealth through commerce.

E.—Distinctions in art, literature, calligraphy, poetry or sacred scriptures.

F.—Combinations of the above.

strength of the two groups indicates that, within the frame of reference of the present paper, more descendants of prominent individuals achieved moderate prominence. Expressing the same thing differently, it means that, if we lower the criterion of prominence we find a higher incidence of inbreeding among prominents. However, in every district, even with the lowered standard of prominence, "fresh blood" seems apparently to appear to the extent of 35 to 80 per cent of all cases involved in the various districts.

Next let us consider the length of continued prominence. As explained in the beginning of the paper, in each district, the number of instances of continued prominence is registered. The instances are then arranged in sequences to show through how many generations they lasted. In this section of the analysis no distinction is made between biographees and those who are merely mentioned in biographies. Two things emerge at once: (1) In all districts the incidence of prominence lasting two generations is much higher than that lasting three or more generations; and (2) in all districts the incidence of prominence lasting two or three generations constitutes 80 per cent or more of the whole. This again agrees very well with my previously obtained results in three districts of Chekiang Province. In the three Chekiang districts analyzed, the incidence of prominence lasting two to three generations constituted 75 to 94 per cent of the whole.⁷

Two questions must be answered here. One question is, granted that prominence did not last along lineal family lines, what about individuals who became prominent because they had prominent cousins, uncles, nephews, or great-great-grandfathers? If the number of such individual is large, does it then not mean a high degree of inbreeding among prominents?

In answering the question we must look for two kinds of facts. First, the number of prominent individuals who are related to members of prominent lineages (i.e., lineages in which prominence was continued for two

or more generations) as cousins, great-great-grandfathers, nephews, etc. In three of the four district histories the number of such individuals is so small (ranging from 7 to 20) that they would be of no significant consequence to the main observations, however they are handled. Only Wu Hsien of Kiangsu province has a much larger number (203) which would make a quarter of all Wu Hsien prominents among whom prominence continued for two or more generations. However, all of these numbers, large or small, were included in the computation of the percentage of individuals among whom prominence continued for two or more generations. (That is to say, the numbers for each district contained in Column V include the numbers contained in Column IX for that district.) The addition of these numbers made no difference in our major conclusion. For example, in the case of Wu Hsien, even after adding the very large number of 230 to the total of "prominent individuals among whom prominence continued for two or more generations" (Column V), the size of the latter category is still well within the range set by districts.

A second kind of facts consist of the number of prominent individuals whose prominence was not continued lineally, but whose cousins, uncles, or brothers were prominent; the prominence of the latter was also not continued lineally. (See Diagram V). The percentages occupied by these prominents in each district are again so small (ranging in number from 18 to 107) that they would not have made any difference, one way or the other, to the major thesis of this paper.

To sum up: the purpose of this paper is to elucidate by quantitative data the extent of vertical social mobility in Chinese society. With specifically defined criteria for the term prominence and a particular set of documentary material, it has been demonstrated that roughly 50 per cent of the local prominents in any district studied came from unknown origin and that roughly 80 per cent of the descendants beyond the grandson generation of the local prominents also became unknown.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 309.

This picture of rapid change of family fortune within a few generations is very striking, especially where class is usually determined by position in the bureaucracy, and where the position in bureaucracy depended very much upon family influence. The latter being the case, one would expect family prominence to continue, for obvious reasons. Even from the present analysis, the strength of family influence in bureaucracy is evident. For example, if we examine the biographees among whom prominence lasted for two or more generations, we find in three out of four districts over 80 per cent of them distinguished themselves by position in bureaucracy. (See Table, Column XI). On the other hand, of the biographees among whom prominence did not last more than one generation, only about 50 per cent were bureaucrats. (See Table, Column XII). These facts suggest that distinctions in bureaucracy had better chances of being continued along kinship lines than others. Nevertheless, taking the data as a whole, the singular thing is that, in spite of the importance of family influence, the picture of discontinued prominence emerges more vividly through this analysis than otherwise.

But here a further question arises. There is an American saying, "From shirt sleeves to shirt sleeves in three generations." Would such a saying not suggest that prominence also fails to last along lineal lines in the United States as well? While one cannot at present express a definite opinion on the subject, one must reject any close comparison between the two societies in this respect due to a basic reason. In American life an individual may achieve social prominence in a variety of ways. It has been said that the diaper service, which is now a nation-wide American industry, was started by a group of enterprising University of Chicago students during the depression. In China, on the other hand, the path of social ascension has been very narrow. Of 7,359 prominent individuals involved in 5,331 histories from four widely separated districts, only one individual was marked as distinguished due to "wealth through commerce." (See Table, Column XI, Wu Hsien). Practically all cases

of prominence in all districts were based upon (1) position in bureaucracy; (2) imperial degrees or honors; (3) distinction in literature poetry, art, etc.; and (4) exemplary conduct following Confucian principles. The largest percentage of any group of prominents was based upon position in bureaucracy.

This being the case, the term prominence may be defined for China as we have done it here with some actual correspondence to the class structure of the society, but it becomes much more complicated if applied to the United States. Is the machine tool shop owner son of an American small town politician less prominent than his father? Where vertical mobility is complicated by so much horizontal mobility, there are as yet neither the necessary criteria nor the relevant data for drawing definite conclusions on comparative social mobility in the United States and in China.

III. FURTHER OBSERVATIONS

This picture of a fairly frequent vertical social mobility also agrees with my observations in several communities as well as in the wider Chinese national scene in general. For example, whether it is the North China village in which I was born, the Manchurian town in which I spent the latter part of my youth, or the two Southwest communities at which I stopped as a field worker, I found it easy to acquire knowledge about the present downcast conditions of members of families which only a few years ago, or one or two generations back, had still been prosperous.

This fall of many prosperous families does not seem to have much to do with the argument advanced by H. T. Fei in an article on *Peasant and Gentry*⁸ namely, that powerful families have a tendency to lower their fertility, so that they die out. The only evidence that Fei gave was his own family. Yet even *a priori*, the fact that concubinage and better nutrition are the prerogatives of the well-to-do will deprive Fei's

⁸ H. T. Fei, "Peasant and Gentry," *American Journal of Sociology*, July, 1946.

argument of plausibility. Also when we look at the numerous descendants of such well known men as Yuan Shih-Kai, Li Yuan-Hung, Chang Cho-lin, Li Hung-Chang, Cheng Kuo-Fan, and many others, we shall find fertility has rather little to do with the fall of families. The rich and well situated do reproduce, but their descendants tend to fail of the standards set by their forebears.

The rather drastic difference between the conclusion offered here and that of Dr. Wittfogel, which was referred to at the beginning of this paper, is obvious. In Dr. Wittfogel's article already mentioned, he presented a quantitative statement on the social origin of "111 leading officials" (mostly prime ministers) of T'ang dynasty and "153 biographies of officials of different rank who lived during the dynasty's middle period when T'ang institutions were in full flower."⁹ Upon analysis he found 77.5 per cent of the 111 leading officials reached their rank by way of examinations; 16.2 per cent no record; while only 6.3 per cent by way of their father's position. Among the 153 officials of different rank the picture is much less clear. Here 27.4 per cent reached officialdom by way of examination; 60.8 per cent no record; while 11.8 per cent by way of *Yin*, that is, their father's position. Dr. Wittfogel's observation is:¹⁰

⁹ K. A. Wittfogel, *op. cit.*, pp. 26-27.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

"The number of officials in the second category who benefited from the *Yin* privilege is impressive; it is even more impressive when seen in relation to the number of degrees recorded: 18 to 42."

It is hard to see how data such as these convey any impressiveness of the *Yin* privilege. No information is given as to how the 153 officials were selected; nor what proportion of the 153 formed of the total number from which the smaller number were selected. Lastly, it is also hard to see any scientific value in any quantitative statement of which 60 per cent of the data is unknown.

Of course, Dr. Wittfogel was discussing an early period of Chinese society and the material presented here from the district histories refer mainly to later periods, especially Ming and Ching dynasties. Secondly, it is probable that, with more of his monumental work coming to light, some of the present difficulties will be resolved.

After completion of this paper I discovered, to my surprise and satisfaction, that a conclusion similar to mine was reached by Dr. E. A. Kracke, Jr. in an article entitled "Family vs. Merit in Chinese Civil Service Examinations Under the Empire."¹¹ Dr. Kracke's sources—two lists of civil service graduates dated 1148 and 1256—were entirely different from mine, but he came to the same general conclusion.

¹¹ *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, Sept. 1947, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 103-123.

CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS IN PANAMANIAN RACE RELATIONS*

JOHN BIESANZ†

Tulane University

THE 800,000 people of Panama and the Canal Zone present a fertile and hitherto neglected field for the student of race relations. In the ten-mile-wide strip of the Canal Zone and the two largest Panamanian cities which are located within it but do not fall under American jurisdiction, the "race problem" is especially complex. Within this small strip of land, for centuries a crossroad of the world, three large groups, with three distinct definitions of the racial situation, have been brought together since the turn of the century. These include: (1) the native Panamanians, of mixed Spanish, Indian, and Negro ancestry, among whom racial amalgamation was rapidly proceeding; (2) thousands of white North Americans occupied in the maintenance and defense of the Panama Canal, and who have imposed a bipartite ("Jim Crow") definition of the situation on all aspects of life and work in the Canal Zone; and (3) thousands of West Indian Negroes, mostly from British islands, who were accustomed to British colonial policy. The interaction of these three groups has resulted in alterations in each group's definition of the racial situation.

In this paper we shall examine particularly Panamanian attitudes toward the fifty thousand Negroes of West Indian birth or ancestry, the group to which Panamanians refer when they speak of a "race problem."

The typical Panamanian attitude toward this group is at present a non-violent antipathy, with extremes of repulsion and of easy-going tolerance.

1. *Prejudice against the West Indians is not part and parcel of a historic race conflict, as in some countries, nor is it held indiscriminately against all blacks.*

Panama has been a melting pot since the early 1500's, when Indian and Negro slaves carried the treasures of Peru over the royal road across the Isthmus to enrich their Spanish masters. A Negro stood with Balboa on the peak in Darien whence they first saw the Pacific; one accompanied Pizarro to Peru; Negroes far outnumbered Spaniards in Old Panama City when it was the Treasure House of the New World. In spite of their reputation for cruelty the early Spaniards treated their slaves more humanely in many respects than did the Anglo-Saxons. Unlike the absentee owners of West Indian plantations, they lived on the hacienda, imparted much of their culture to their slaves and insisted on baptism and Christian teaching. They were readier to take colored mistresses, and did not consider it unthinkable to marry them.

Miscegenation was common among all three races. Before long the typical strain of mixed Indian, Spanish, and Negro blood emerged, in an infinite variety of combinations. Census takers have found it difficult to draw a line between mestizo and mulatto; therefore they lump all mixtures of white, Indian and Negro in the "mestizo" category. Only a very dark Negro is listed as Negro; for as is typical of Latin American countries, any considerable admixture of white blood has traditionally removed one from Negro status.¹ In 1940 the civil population (not including primitive, non-assimilated Indians) was made up as follows: White, 12.2%;

* Manuscript received August 9, 1949.

† The author was United States Visiting Professor at the National University in Panama in 1946-47. The present paper is based on his field study in Panama at that time and during the two following summers.

¹ One author thinks 80% of the Panamanians have some traces of African blood. Paul Blanchard, *Democracy and Empire in the Caribbean* (New York: Macmillan, 1947), p. 243.

Negroes, 14.6%; mestizos, 71.8%; other races, 1.4%. In the urban area, with which we are principally concerned,² Negroes comprise 28.3% of the population, the whites, 18.4%.

To these figures should be added the racial composition of the Canal Zone, the principal communities of which are divided from Panama City and Colon only by a street. In 1948 the civilian population of the Zone was 47,077. Of this number 22,402 were United States citizens. More than 12,600 were West Indians, and a large proportion of the 10,000 Panamanians were of West Indian descent. Other nationalities numbered only about 2,000.

During the last century, Panama was called the "black province" of Colombia. Though a small aristocracy guarded its racial purity, amalgamation was proceeding rapidly in the urban centers. As part of the cultural heritage of the slave system of colonial days, skin color and hair texture were a rough index of status; but Negroid traits did not prevent one from rising in the social scale. Even today, Negroes of old Panamanian stock debate in the National Assembly, teach in the National University, achieve prominence in business, publishing, writing, law, medicine. Two Panamanian Negroes have even been President.

In the 1850's West Indian Negroes were brought to work on the Panama Railroad; in the 1880's they came again to help in the French Canal effort. Those who stayed were woven into the fabric of national life with little difficulty, and today are indistinguishable from the older Negroes except for an occasional English or French surname.

Thus, when Panama became a republic in 1903, its Negroes were culturally assimilated, Spanish-speaking Catholics, and

within the Canal section at least, were in the process of biological amalgamation.

Then in 1904 the Americans began to dig the Panama Canal, and ended the period which many Panamanians nostalgically recall as one of perfect racial democracy. Panamanians had never furnished a sufficient labor force for any new construction. As demonstrated by the railroad builders and the French Canal diggers, the West Indians were the best labor source. West Indian Negroes had a reputation for strength, endurance, resistance to disease and the tropical climate. Those from the British islands could speak English. Moreover, a present-day leader says that their comparative lack of government protection made them easily exploitable; the British regarded a few thousand laborers in their overcrowded islands as expendable. The Isthmian Canal Commission contracted 31,000 West Indian Negroes as laborers. So many more came on their own initiative that in 1913 there were more than 44,000 of them on the payroll. Thousands of Southern Europeans were also employed; but they had come at their own risk, for their governments did not permit wholesale hiring as did the British colonial administrators.

It was during these construction days that the Zone assumed the aspect of a bipartite racial situation. American citizens had superior jobs, pay, and accommodations. The Caribbean wage scale governed the rates of pay for unskilled laborers. The latter preferred to be paid in silver coin, which resembled the currency with which they were familiar; hat in hand, they shuffled up to the pay cars for their rolls of nickels and dimes. The Americans were known as the "gold roll" and the non-citizens as the "silver roll." Through the years this distinction assumed the character of a euphemism for white and colored; these distinctions applied not only to widely divergent wages, but to "silver" and "gold" towns, schools, clubhouses, commissaries, toilets, drinking fountains—and even to segregated windows at the post-office. After construction days were over and most of the South Europeans left, this caste system, ostensibly based on skill

² Because the interior is physically isolated, for lack of good transportation, and plays only a limited role in national affairs, this paper is concerned almost entirely with the Zone and "terminal cities" of Panama and Colon. A "racial map" of the country from west to east would show comparative lack of Negroid traits in the west, increased concentration toward the Canal; east of the Canal live descendants of escaped slaves and Indians.

and citizenship, became, for all practical purposes, indistinguishable from a Negro-white caste system, more all-pervading than in the Deep South.

What was the Panamanian reaction to this set-up on the Zone? It must be remembered that Panama was a new Republic, created overnight when Colombia became balky about terms for a Canal treaty with the United States. Its small population was decimated by the recent Civil War of the Thousand Days, debilitated by yellow fever, malaria and other tropical ills. During the period of uneasy union with Colombia, her institutions had remained few and undeveloped. Such traditions as she had included a spirit of *laissez-faire*, tolerance, liberality toward immigrants, and a high degree of social mobility. Except for the revolutionaries, few felt any sense of Panamanian nationalism. Few would have cared to work on the Zone even had they been regarded as desirable employees; during the construction decade it is said that only five hundred worked on the Canal. There was plenty of business and work in the Republic during the boom period.

The early Panamanian attitude toward the West Indians was one of tolerant indifference. Let the West Indians stay and do the hard work; they would be repatriated when the digging was done and the Panamanians could bask in the prosperity of the new Canal forever. Meanwhile, there was money to be made. The West Indians were good spenders. Landlords built huge wooden tenements for the many who preferred the freedom of Panama to the rules and regulations of the Zone.

As for the West Indian Negroes, they had even less unity than the Panamanians. They came from different islands, belonged to various sects, spoke dialects that were sometimes unintelligible to others from the same island. Most had come with but one idea: to make enough money so they could live comfortably back home, in the more congenial atmosphere of the British West Indies. There British colonial policy had established no such sharp dichotomy as that of the Zone: they felt that their lowly status was

chiefly a matter of class rather than race; if a man had enough money and manners he could hobnob with anybody. Also, they had been taught a deep respect for authority which helped them to accept the dichotomy of the Zone. They were buoyed by pride in their British culture, and went to great lengths to preserve it and teach it to their children; they withdrew from Panamanian culture with disdain, regarding it as strange and inferior.

The United States had agreed to repatriate all contract labor when the Canal was finished. Had she done so, Panamanians now charge, there would be no "race problem" on the Isthmus, no incubus of unwanted people to complicate the problems of the little Republic. Historians find, however, that Panama must share the blame for non-repatriation. Landlords and businessmen, sensing the danger to their pocketbooks of a wholesale exodus of thousands of good tenants and customers, exerted pressure on the Panamanian government and convinced them that repatriation would disrupt the national economy. Panama then asked the United States not to repatriate those who wished to stay. Whether or not the American government should have insisted on carrying out the agreement to the letter, as some now declare, the fact remains that non-repatriation was the starting point of many present-day antagonisms.

Those West Indians who wished to return were taken back home. But thousands wished to stay. Many had not been able to accumulate the tidy sums of their dreams; they thought they could make a better living on the Isthmus than back home. Many had formed family ties in Panama. Some went to work on the banana plantations of Bocas del Toro. Thousands stayed on as a permanent labor force for the Zone. Blanshard estimates that at present there are fifty thousand West Indians and Negroes of West Indian descent on the Isthmus; most of these are in Panama City, Colon and the Canal Zone. The 1940 census showed more than 20,000 British West Indians living in the Republic; a good share of these earned their living in the Zone, while in 1948 there

were 12,600 West Indians in the Zone itself.

2. *Panamanian prejudice against the West Indians arises because of competition, real or imagined, in an economy dominated by white Americans on the Canal Zone.*

When it began to dawn on Panamanians and West Indians alike that the immigrant Negroes were on the Isthmus to stay, a "race problem" arose. Several facts point to the economic basis of this problem. While the antipathy of the Panamanians remained unsystematized on the personal-contact level, it was expressed in legal measures whenever they were aware of competition for subsistence and status in the Zone-dominated economy. These measures are closely correlated with periods of depression and unemployment on the Isthmus.

Soon after the Canal was finished the first World War broke out and took up the slack of unemployment. A period of widespread unemployment in the early twenties caused the Panamanians to look around and pin the blame for their situation on a convenient out-group. As a result, in 1926 West Indian Negroes were dubbed "undesirable immigrants." Up to that time they had come in freely on passports. They had preference in employment on the Zone partly because of their knowledge of English, partly because they had proved themselves reliable; but Panamanians felt that their competition was unfair, taking the bread out of Panamanian mouths.

The next peak of anti-West Indian feeling occurred in 1932, with huge demonstrations demanding their repatriation. During the prolonged depression of the thirties a nationalist movement arose which had as its slogan, "Panama for the Panamanians." In the brief administration of Arnulfo Arias in 1940-1941, this movement culminated in a clause in the new Constitution of 1941 providing that all children of "prohibited immigrants" who had come since 1903 were to lose their citizenship. The war boom, with jobs a-plenty for all comers, dissipated much of this nationalist spirit. The new Constitu-

tion of 1946 restored citizenship; but the immigration of English-speaking Negroes is still prohibited and practically all who were imported by the Zone authorities during the last war have been repatriated. The enormous vote polled by Arias in his attempted comeback in 1948 indicates that this feeling is still strong among the Panamanians.

3. *The rejection of the West Indians is not based primarily on biological grounds, though it is rationalized in terms of physical differences.*

The West Indians were highly visible objects on which to fasten feelings of hostility whenever the Panamanians felt a threat to their economic status. This visibility was only partly biological. History has provided us with a control group which is physically indistinguishable from the West Indian Negroes but has traditionally suffered little discrimination except from the white aristocracy who guard the purity of their lineage from intermarriage. The comparative acceptance of this group demonstrates that prejudice against the West Indian is not a transference of traditional race prejudice.

Even the blackest Panamanian Negro feels no racial solidarity with Negroes elsewhere; he is a Panamanian first, last and always. He feels contempt toward a far lighter West Indian. This is of course even more true of the "mestizos" or mixed bloods.

Prejudice against the West Indian "chombos" is rationalized in part in physical terms, nonetheless. Resentful of the American tendency to lump all dark-skinned people together as "Negroes" the Panamanians profess to find the features of the old Panamanian Negro more refined and delicate, his bodily build more slender and graceful, his hair smoother. In contrast, they describe the West Indian Negroes as coarse-featured, with thick lips, flat nose, and ungainly build. The false basis of this rationalization is apparent from the fact that, except by language, one can rarely tell a native Negro from a West Indian who had adopted Panamanian habits of dress. To mistake a native for a "chombo" is to insult him grievously.

4. *This prejudice is not a function of class differences, though it is sometimes rationalized in terms of class.*

In some situations race prejudice and intergroup tension are said to be a product of the lower class status of the Negro. This is not the case with the West Indians in Panama.

In the early days of the Republic, many of the office workers, teachers, and doctors were West Indians, as were many of the artisans who helped sanitize and build up Panama City. Though the majority were poor and backward, they had acquired some standards of hygiene and neatness in their home training, and considered the Panamanian laborers very backward and shiftless. Since those days, the Panamanians have progressed with great rapidity, while trying to keep the West Indians on a comparatively low level through discriminatory legislation against employment above a certain level. Nonetheless, the bulk of the West Indian immigrants and their descendants occupy a higher economic and educational level than the bulk of the Panamanians.

According to the Panamanian stereotype of the West Indian, he is preferred for employment on the Zone because he has a lower standard of living and is willing to work for less than the native laborer. Actually, studies have shown that West Indians command higher wages than natives in many positions, not only on the Zone but also in the Republic, and are in greater demand because of their reputation for reliability, their skills, and their knowledge of English. The Zone consistently pays wages which, while low, are equal to or slightly higher than wages for similar work in the Republic. In addition Zone wages are said to be worth about a seventh more than corresponding wages in the Republic because of the privileges accompanying such employment: buying at the government commissaries, attending free clinics, being eligible for cheap or free medical care.

Upper- and middle-class Panamanians tend to compare the majority of West Indians with themselves, rather than with

the lower-class Panamanians. "They are content to live in one room," they say, without taking into account the enormous numbers of Panamanians who also live in cramped quarters, or the number of West Indians who live in suburban homes and in middle-class apartments.

The average West Indian is better educated than the average Panamanian. In fact, according to the 1940 census, Negroes are more literate than whites. The West Indian Negro's zeal for schooling is unmatched by the lower-class Panamanians. When nothing else is available, the West Indians set up a tiny private school. In elementary education, they are ahead of the Panamanians; but they have a lower percentage of people with higher education.

Many have risen to middle-class status, but even they are not freely accepted. Thus, it is clear that the dislike of Panamanians for West Indian Negroes is not the dislike of a higher class for a lower one. In fact, there is some resentment of the fact that this immigrant group has been able to achieve a generally higher status than the average native laborer and farmer.

5. *The chief basis for prejudice against the West Indians is cultural difference.*

The fact that "prohibited immigration" includes, not Negroes, but *English-speaking* Negroes, is the clue to Panama's "race" prejudice. It is not simply biological visibility that marks out the "chombos," but biological visibility in combination with cultural differences, the chief of which is language.

West Indian Negroes have been slow to adopt Panamanian culture. Coming in such huge numbers in such short time, they have been largely self-sufficient. Working on the Zone, they have continued to be oriented toward Anglo-Saxon culture. The first generation never dreamed that Panama would be home for the rest of their lives; they planned to go back when they had accumulated enough money, and saw no point in learning Spanish. Those from the British islands were intensely proud of their British culture and ridiculed Panamanian ways.

They sent their children to small private schools, usually connected with a church, where they learned British history, geography and civics, computed in pounds, shillings and pence, and completely ignored the fact that they were living in Panama. More than 3,000 enlisted in the British Army in World War I. Pictures of the Royal Family adorned most homes.

The first generation also dressed and ate very differently from the Panamanians. The head scarves and flounced skirts of the lower-class women, their habit of carrying loads on their heads, their straw-hatted and gloved Sunday dress were conspicuously "queer," as were the men's gaudy regalia in lodge processions, their extremely formal Sunday, wedding and funeral garb.

Panama lacks a strong native culture, and what there is is almost obliterated in the chief cities. As a nationalist spirit grew, the Panamanians fastened on the Spanish language as one of the sacred symbols of the *Patria*. Resentful of the fact that in their own chief cities one can hardly find a good job unless one knows English, they struggle against the tide of Americanization with legal measures. All organizations must have Spanish names and conduct their business in Spanish; business signs must have the Spanish name first, and in larger letters than the English one. Recently a law was passed that all primary schools must conduct their classes in Spanish, teaching English only as a foreign language. This of course was a measure striking at the numerous small private schools of the West Indians. At the same time, however, they are reluctant to admit children of West Indians to their overcrowded public schools.

Panamanians not only criticize the fact that the West Indian is not assimilating into Panamanian culture, but also scorn many elements of West Indian culture. According to popular belief, the Panamanian Negro has contributed the national dances, much of the folk music and verse. The West Indian is conceived of as culturally inferior; many Panamanians declare that all he has contributed to their national life is the use of marijuana and other corruptions. As is

always the case with a stereotype, the Panamanian conception of the West Indian embodies fear, resentment and dislike, and is composed of fallacies or half-truths based on generalizations from the worst rather than the best or even the average.

The only compliment the Panamanians give the "chombo" is that he is strong and hard working. "He works like a 'chombo'" is the popular expression, the counterpart of the American "works like a 'nigger'." Aside from that they regard him as servile (while they are proud of being rebellious), speaking a strange variety of English and a little broken Spanish, superstitious, member of strange and numerous religious sects, willing to work for low wages and live crowded into one room, flashily dressed though poorly fed, and prolific to a dangerous degree. Incidentally, the belief that the Negro is reproducing so rapidly that he will soon outnumber the native Panamanians is not supported by census figures. In 1940 one out of five people in the age group 60-69 were Negroes; while less than one in ten of children under five years were Negroes.

6. *As the cultural visibility of the West Indians declines, prejudice against them as a group is declining.*

The generation which came in such huge numbers in such a short time and presented such a sharp contrast in language, religion and ways of life is dying out and is not being replaced by new immigration. In the forty-five years since the Canal was begun, the original immigrants have had children, grandchildren, and even great-grandchildren who remember no home other than Panama. Many of these descendants are indistinguishable from Panamanians of old stock.

There have long existed such obstacles to assimilation as West Indian resistance due to British patriotism, orientation toward the Zone, and Panamanian reluctance to adopt the West Indians as compatriots. As so often happens with children of immigrants, however, the descendants of West Indians have scorned their parents' pride in being British. Many have grown up in the Zone, speaking only English; but the lack of hous-

ing in the Zone has forced many families to live in the Republic, and their children have grown up speaking both languages. More and more these young people are conscious that they are Panamanians; they are entering public schools and even the National University. When they do this, they invariably Hispanicize their first names if at all possible. Along with Spanish they adopt native gestures and shed the British reserve of their parents and grandparents for the free-and-easy spirit, the volatile temperament, the easy laughter, the love of music and dancing of the natives. Some are so anxious to be thoroughly Panamanian that they embrace Catholicism; in several instances we observed, conversion seemed to be the final step in acceptance into the group. At the same time that Panamanians go on charging that West Indians do not care to be assimilated into national culture, West Indian leaders are cautioning younger people that they should not reject English entirely, since those who are bilingual find their knowledge of both languages a marked advantage.

Some native Panamanians are dubious about the motives for Panamanization: they charge that the West Indians are British by loyalty, Americans by economic necessity, and Panamanians by expediency. While that may have been true of many some years ago, increasing numbers of Negroes of West Indian descent feel that Panama is truly their own country. According to a student poll, they feel far more liking for the Panamanians than the Panamanians feel for the West Indians. Of 189 native Panamanian high school and college students, 43% expressed dislike for West Indians, 37% neither like nor dislike them, and 20% expressed liking. In contrast, when the writer polled high school students of West Indian descent on the Zone, 84% answered that they like Panamanians, most of them intensely, 9.3% are neutral, 6.7% show some degree of dislike. None of the 34 boys intends to spend his like working on the Zone; only 3 of 41 girls intend to do so. They say Panama offers "fair treatment" and "opportunities." They consider Panamanians "democratic," "easy-going," "liberal," "sin-

cere," "friendly," "more tolerant than Americans." Only a few mentioned defects: "lazy," "not progressive," and "foolish because they absorb white supremacy."

Panamanians who cling to the stereotype of the culturally different "chombo" may soon find that the target of their prejudice has disappeared. Each succeeding generation exhibits fewer traces of the West Indian culture of the original immigrants and more complete adoption of the Panamanian variety of Hispano-American culture.

7. *There are indications that the dominance of Americans in Isthmian economy is giving new weight in Panamanian minds to biological characteristics. Thus, the decline in prejudice against the West Indian Negro as he becomes increasingly Panamanized is apparently being accompanied by some increase in prejudice against Negroid traits per se.*

Panamanians vociferously condemn racial discrimination on the Zone, and claim that by contrast they are tolerant, unprejudiced, and exercise no discrimination on the basis of skin color. Many observers declare, however, that prejudice and discrimination have increased since the Americans came, and attribute it to the "example" of the Americans. They see fewer old Panamanians with markedly Negroid traits occupying high positions; they agree that it would be impossible for a Negro to become President now. The diplomatic corps is almost completely white, by Panamanian standards at least. Pronounced Negroid traits are said to be an almost insuperable barrier to admittance to exclusive social clubs. One occasionally hears such remarks as the following from light-skinned Panamanians: "You have this race business neatly taken care of in the States; what we need is segregation," and "Marrying Americans improves the race."

There are several ways in which Panamanians apparently "learn" race prejudice from Zone Americans. One of the chief methods is through the caste system of the Zone, in which whiteness of skin has been a prerequisite of upper-caste status. Panamanians intensely resent being lumped

with West Indian Negroes and treated as "aliens" on their own soil. Their cries of "race discrimination" refer not to the treatment of the West Indians, which they consider quite adequate, but to their own consignment to lower caste. When a lighter-skinned Panamanian wins a gold-roll job, or a silver job with gold privileges, he no longer feels on a plane with a darker-skinned friend who is consigned to silver status in all aspects of work and life on the Zone. The "silver" one burns with resentment that he should be thus treated; the gold worker finds it easy to adopt the rationalizations of white supremacy. In a sense he is like the *nouveau riche*; he is unsure of his status, so he is the greatest snob of all.

Conscious of American race prejudice, the government usually takes care to appoint only white men to diplomatic posts; even the British legation has often failed to invite West Indians to its affairs because of this consideration for American feelings.

Marriages between American men and Panamanian women are frequent. In many cases the wife is quite dark by American standards; in an attempt to gain status she abandons her darker friends. Many girls dye their hair and paint their faces in an attempt to appear more Caucasian, and thus win an American husband. In social clubs, Panamanians feel that they had better be cautious about accepting conspicuously Negroid members lest they offend American members. Some hotels, restaurants and night

clubs during the war did not make Negroes welcome, fearing it would hurt business.

Sensing this growing discrimination against Negroid traits *per se*, the native Panamanians of Negroid blood react, not by joining a race movement of "Negro solidarity," but by blaming the "chombos" for their lower status; if they were not here, they reason, we would not be lumped with them and discriminated against. Thus their feeling of hostility toward the Americans and the native whites is partially deflected toward the West Indians.

CONCLUSION

The pattern of race relations in Panama is one of a mixed native population in contact with a large Negro immigrant population, both of whom live in an economy dominated by white Americans who have imposed their definition of the racial situation on an extensive area. Prejudice against the immigrant group has arisen concomitantly with a struggle for subsistence and status in this economy. The West Indians are marked as an outgroup primarily because of their non-Latin culture traits rather than their Negroid characteristics. As they acquire Panamanian culture traits, they become indistinguishable from native Negroes, and prejudice against them tends to decline. At the same time, the presence of Americans in a dominant position has tended to increase Panamanian consciousness of and discrimination against Negroid traits *per se*.

SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT AMONG WISCONSIN NORWEGIANS*

PETER A. MUNCH

University of Wisconsin

FROM the point of view that culture, in the broadest sense of the word, is the total *adjustment* of human society to its physical and social environment, it is evident that no specific form of culture can be transplanted from one environment to the other without a more or less radical change. Unless the two environments are exactly alike in every respect—and no two environments will be found to be exactly alike—the migrating group will have to *re-adjust* to the new environment, i.e., it will have to discard certain value attitudes and patterns of behavior and replace them by others that better answer the new situation.

Especially, in a complex cultural situation like that of the United States, where several groups of different racial and cultural backgrounds are thrown together in one geographical area, participating in the same political and economic system, we would have to expect rather drastic cultural changes to be involved in the process of adjustment between all these different groups.

Besides, when the European immigrants of the 19th century came to this country they found an already established society, with its own form of culture, with its own values, norms, and patterns of behavior that, in some respects, were vastly different from their own. And they were immediately put under a heavy social and cultural pressure to conform to the new culture, a pressure that seems to have increased as the new society was more firmly established with always more comprehensive and efficient institutions. As a matter of well known fact, great efforts have been made in order to bring about this cultural conformity of the American people—through organized propaganda, "Americanization" programs, and,

especially, through indoctrination in the compulsory school. The ideological rationalization of this activity is the well-known concept of the United States as a cultural "melting pot" that should produce an "amalgamation" of all the divergent culture forms that have been brought over to this country from all parts of the world.

Along with this organized and officially sanctioned pressure on every alien culture group, the immigrants of the 19th century were also put under a social pressure from the Old American groups, who seem generally to have assumed an exclusive and superordinate status in relation to the more recent immigrants and their descendants. This unofficial pressure, based on economic standing and a long family history in the country, was mainly exercised through the formation of exclusive associations and a formal, rather refined, social life where more recent immigrants and their descendants were not accepted on a basis of equality.

Finally, as time went on, the immigrants were also exposed to the pressure of a certain part of their own kinsfolk and former associates, namely those individuals, groups, and factions who submitted to the American way of life and became more American than the Americans—even in that respect that they refused to accept for full association those groups and individuals who stayed loyal to their original culture groups.

In fact, the "melting pot" was rather conceived of as a "smelting furnace" that was supposed to burn out the alien culture elements like slag from the pure metal of American culture.

And yet, ethnic groups still exist in this country, easily discernible by various traits characteristic of each particular group and, above all, by a special loyalty that keeps them together as groups and isolates them more or less from other groups. Evidently, as

* Manuscript received August 2, 1949.

one writer puts it, the "melting pot" has failed to reach the melting point.¹

Although these ethnic groups are very conspicuous in most cases, they have been paid little attention in general descriptions of American culture in the past. And in local, state, and federal administration there has been a deliberate tendency to neglect their existence: they have hardly been paid any attention at all except maybe as a phase in the development of the nation that would be overcome in time. Administrators as well as scholars seem to agree to regard these ethnic groups as a "cultural lag," a "hard core" of each group having failed, so far, to adjust itself to the new environment in accordance with the "melting pot" theory.

However, looking at the various ethnic groups in the United States, it appears that some of them actually have very little in common with their original culture. In comparison with the people of their respective countries of origin, they clearly stand out as Americans, which is brought to a very conspicuous evidence every time an American visits his "old country." Yet they have a special *loyalty* within the group that makes it stand out clearly as an ethnic group. Truly, this loyalty is very often brought to overt expression through the cultivation of certain culture traits by which the group distinguishes itself from other groups. These distinguishing culture traits, however, are not necessarily of an aboriginal nature. They have very often been acquired in this country and would have to be described as truly American. This is true, for instance, of the "Sons of Norway" lodges of the Norwegians, or the cultivation of tobacco which has almost become a symbol of Norwegianism in certain parts of Wisconsin. In some cases, it seems, the immigrant group has made a thorough adjustment to the new environment without losing its identity as an ethnic group. An almost complete *cultural* assimilation has not always

been followed by the expected *social* assimilation.

The social differentiation of ethnic groups in the United States can hardly be explained in terms of a "cultural lag." It is evidently not due to a "lack of adjustment" to the new social order. In human society, there are forces working both ways, both towards assimilation and towards differentiation of groups. And the existence in this country of easily distinguishable ethnic groups, even after more than a hundred years' residence, through three or four or even five generations, under a tremendous social pressure, suggests that here there have been *positive* forces working towards a *differentiation* of groups on the basis of ethnic origin.

From this point of view, the Norwegian settlements in Vernon County, Wisconsin, are of particular interest. In this area there are two distinct Norwegian settlements. One is situated in the northern central part of the county, on the plain known as Coon Prairie, and extending strongly into Coon Valley and other adjacent valleys. The other settlement occupies the southern central part of the county with its center of gravity around Folsom, in the town of Franklin, and in West Prairie, in the town of Sterling. It spreads heavily to the south into Crawford County, where Soldiers Grove forms another center. Between these two Norwegian settlements, in the central part of the county, there used to be a strong settlement of Old American stock. This settlement is older than any of the Norwegian settlements and had already at the time of the Norwegian immigration created an important trade and business center in the city of Viroqua, which was likewise dominated by the Old Americans. This city is now the county seat.

The two Norwegian settlements in this area have many important traits in common. In the first place they are equally old. Both settlements were founded about 1850. And both of them were first formed, not by direct immigration from Norway, but by expansion of the Koshkonong settlement in southeastern Dane County. Furthermore, the two settlements were both situated at an equal distance, about 5-10 miles, from the city of

¹Lowry Nelson, *Rural Sociology*, New York: American Book Company, 1948, pp. 189-196; "Speaking of Tongues," *American Journal of Sociology*, 54 (November 1948), 202-210.

Viroqua which formed a convenient and natural prospective trade center for both of them. With respect to the social situation, they were both under the dominance of the Old Americans in and around Viroqua who controlled the economic life of the area through their business and banking system. These Old Americans gladly accepted the Norwegians as labor hands and as housemaids—in fact, it was reported that once it was quite fashionable for a Viroqua family to have a Norwegian housemaid. But they did not accept the Norwegians in their social life and thus exercised a social pressure on the subordinate groups of Norwegians.

However, in one very important respect, there is a great difference in the socio-ecological situation of the two settlements. As already stated, when the Norwegians first came to this area the central part of the county was already occupied by a settlement of Old Americans. This settlement, however, extended strongly to the south into the town of Franklin. Besides, in the northern part of Crawford County a strong Irish settlement developed, with centers of gravity in Soldiers Grove and in Rising Sun, just south of the county line. Thus, while the Coon Prairie Norwegians settled in a practically empty space, the ones who settled in the southern part of the county had to squeeze in between other settlers. Consequently, from the very beginning, the Norwegians who settled in the Folsom-West Prairie area had, relatively, a much more extended line of contact with non-Norwegian groups than the ones who settled in the northern part of the county.

Moreover, this initial difference in the socio-ecological situation of the two settlements was stressed to a marked degree through the later developments. A comparison of existing plat maps of the county shows that the Norwegian settlements in this area have expanded in the course of time. Part of this expansion is due to the arrival of new Norwegian immigrants who, somewhere around 1880, came directly from Norway and formed a third Norwegian settlement in the area between the two already in existence. But, apart from this new immigration of Norwegians, there has


also been a strong expansion of the southern settlement, the Norwegians in this area having gradually made their way into the Old American settlement and partly outcrowded the original settlers. The Coon Prairie settlement, on the other hand, has hardly had any outward growth of territory for the last 70 or 80 years at least. In this settlement the development has rather been one of spatial consolidation, the tendency having been to get rid of foreign elements within the area of the settlement itself rather than expanding into new areas.

Thus, the development in the Folsom-West Prairie settlement has been towards an extension of the line of contact with non-Norwegian groups, whereas the Coon Prairie settlement has shown a tendency towards an always stronger consolidation with a corresponding contraction of the line of contact.

This difference in spatial development already implies a marked difference in the form of adjustment of the two settlements to the new environment. And further investigation reveals that there are even other remarkable differences in the cultural and social adjustment of the two groups which are clearly correlative to the difference in spatial growth just described.

What actually happened is this: From the Folsom-West Prairie settlement the Norwegians have made their way into the Old American community around Viroqua, not only in a spatial, but even in a social and economic respect. Not only did they expand their settlement into the rural area around Viroqua; they even invaded the city itself, established businesses, and took an active part in the economic functions of the city. Today, about half the population of Viroqua is of Norwegian descent.

The Coon Prairie settlement, on the other hand, through its spatial and socio-economic consolidation, has been able to build up an independent and socially self-sufficient community of its own. In the city of Westby, which is about 95% Norwegian, it has even created its own community center with most of the economic, social, and cultural services that are usually allotted to such a center in



The Central Part of Vernon County, Wisconsin.
Land Owned by Norwegians in 1878 and in 1930.

a community of that size. In this way, the Norwegians in this settlement have actually managed to withdraw the whole area from the economic and social control of the "Yankee" dominated city of Viroqua.

In accordance with what might be expected from these conditions, the Coon Prairie settlement is even culturally and socially a very solid Norwegian community which appears to have had relatively little

contact with, or influence from, other ethnic groups as well as the American society, although it is not uninfluenced by American ideology. The Norwegian language is still used in daily conversation, even by the third and fourth generations, and certain Norwegian customs and values have been preserved strongly. This is more true for the rural area. But even in the city of Westby it is true to some degree, although the city

is definitely American in its outer appearance as well as in its socio-economic functions. This community is very hard to break into, as is felt strongly by everyone who has tried it. There is a strong loyalty to the community and a correspondingly strong social pressure against any deviation from the accepted local pattern. What foreign elements have come in have either been assimilated completely to the cultural pattern of the community or they have been isolated socially until they preferred to leave. A few German farmers who have come in from the neighboring German settlement in the lower part of Coon Valley have had to learn the local dialect of the Norwegian language and speak it fluently.

In sharp contrast to these conditions, the Norwegians in the southern settlement seem to be quite adaptive to the American way of life. And, as the situation is today, they are definitely more acceptable to, and actually accepted by, the non-Norwegian group. What is taking place in the city of Viroqua seems to be a perfect acculturation process with a free interchange of culture patterns. Even this city is definitely an American city, and Norwegians as well as non-Norwegians submit quite freely to the process of urbanization which is commonly mistaken for "Americanization." In certain respects, on the other hand, Norwegian patterns have put a definite stamp on the community, the non-Norwegian group having conformed to certain rural Norwegian customs, such as food habits, the forenoon and afternoon coffee hour, etc. Nationality differences are seldom stressed. The ideology of the community is outwardly indifferent to national origin. People do not usually talk or think in terms of nationalities, and there is no longer any recognized difference of social status between the nationality groups. Norwegians and non-Norwegians mix freely in clubs and other secular organizations. Inter-marriages are quite frequent, and so are partnerships in business and work across nationality lines. Outwardly, the Norwegians do not mark themselves off from the rest. The use of Norwegian language in public

situations is negligible, and it seems obvious that it will die out as a means of communication with the present older generation.

Thus there is a marked difference in the form of adjustment of these two Norwegian settlements. And the most likely explanation seems to be pointing to the difference in the social situation that each of them had to respond to.

However, when we analyze the social structure of the two settlements more closely, it appears that there is a difference more in form than in principle of adjustment between the two groups.

In the first place, the Coon Prairie settlement is not merely a Norwegian community transplanted. In one respect, it has been very adaptive to the pattern of American society or rather to its ideology. The Norwegians who settled down in this area obviously came with the definite idea of establishing a democratic society on the basis of the genuine American ideas of liberty and equality. Most of them came from the dependent social class of *husmenn*, or cotters, who did not own their land in the old country, but had to work on the farm of the landowning *bonde* in return for the right to use a small piece of his land, large enough to feed one or two cows. But whether they came from this class or from the more fortunate class of the landowning *bønder*, they seem to have agreed to abandon this social distinction in their new community. This spirit is still very strong in the settlement. Even in the second and third generations there is a strong traditional recollection of the social distance between *bønder* and *husmenn* that used to be very pronounced in the rural communities of Eastern Norway in the 19th century. And there is still a rather emotional resentment of these conditions and a strong and conscious will to establish and maintain a thoroughly democratic society in the new country.

However, by bringing these ideas into effect the Coon Prairie settlement segregated itself culturally and socially, not only from its Norwegian mother society, but also from the factual American society, especially as it

manifested itself in the neighboring Old American community in Viroqua, with its distinctions of social status and its discrimination of nationalities.

In this respect the Coon Prairie settlement has acquired some of the characteristic traits of Utopia. As mentioned before, there is a strong loyalty to the community and its local pattern, and the unbroken tradition of democratic equality of status is the all-important focus of this loyalty. The people feel that this community, which is their own creation, is their "America," and they are proud of it. This loyalty—in connection with certain Norwegian patterns, such as a strong attachment to the family—has created a rather strong exclusiveness towards *any* outsider, whether he is of Norwegian origin or not, and has increased the social and cultural isolation of the community.

In Viroqua, on the other hand, the adaptiveness to the more conspicuous traits of American life is greater. But when it comes to certain nonmaterial values of social life, there is a definite cleavage between the Norwegians and the non-Norwegian group even there. Even in this community there is a strong persistence of certain values and attitudes that belong specifically to the Norwegian group. And, like in Westby, there is a strong social pressure exercised by the group, claiming conformity to the Norwegian values on the part of anybody who wants a more close association with that group.

In the first place, the Norwegians are strongly identified with the Lutheran Church. According to common usage, "Norwegian" is almost synonymous with "Lutheran." The exclusiveness of the Norwegian group on this point is revealed by the fact that Norwegians who have joined the Methodist or any other church are no more considered as Norwegians—which is simply a consequence of the fact that, by quitting the Lutheran Church, they have cut themselves off from a very important part of the social life of the Norwegian group.

Another important focus of loyalty among the Norwegians even in this community is the family, especially the extended family

which is often referred to as the "clan." Here is where another important part of the social life of the Norwegian group takes place in the form of visiting, celebrations, and regular family reunions. Of course, this is again a social activity from which the non-Norwegians are excluded although they are freely accepted in case they are married into the clan—which happens quite frequently—and assume a certain loyalty to the clan.

Finally, a marked distinction seems to prevail between the Norwegian and the non-Norwegian groups in certain principles and values in connection with the determination of social status. In this respect, the Norwegian group adheres very strongly to a pattern that prevailed in Norway in the 19th century and still is the valid pattern in the least urbanized rural areas of Norway. According to this pattern, a group of professionals, state officials, and patrician business people distinguished themselves from "the common people," namely, *bønder* and *husmenn*, by a certain family background with education, alertness in behavior, and "culture," i.e., interest and knowledge in literature, music, and art, acquired through several generations of strong family tradition. A Norwegian élite of this kind once was very strong in Westby, but has now almost disappeared. In Viroqua, however, it is still in existence and is recognized by the Norwegian group. This élite is a very small group and rather exclusive, especially to the non-Norwegian élite of successful business people by whom it is accused of being "snobbish." Yet, this Norwegian élite has certainly retained a high recognition in the Norwegian group by stressing such values as family tradition, education, and "culture" rather than the accumulation and conspicuous display of wealth of the present non-Norwegian élite.

Thus, the Norwegian group in Viroqua has actually counterbalanced the social pressure from the Old American group by establishing an adverse pressure from the Norwegian group. Consequently, the city of Viroqua itself is an interesting example of a pronounced dual community, with a dualism

that can be traced through the whole of the social prestige scale from top to bottom. The split between the two groups seems to be most pronounced at the top of the scale. The two élites are rather exclusive to each other, although the withdrawal seems to be stronger on the Norwegian side. It is in the middle and lower social strata where we find the most free association between the two groups. But, again, the strong family ties of the Norwegians tend to exclude non-Norwegians from the more intimate social activities of the Norwegian group.

On the whole, the Norwegian group seems to be the more exclusive of the two. Thus, while the non-Norwegian group is apparently open for the Norwegians to join in whenever they like, the Norwegian group is pretty much closed. Norwegians will participate in the usual clubs and organizations, such as lodges, the American Legion, Kiwanis, etc., almost in proportion to their number in the community. Norwegian Lutheran women will even take part in the Methodist Ladies' Aid. But the opposite is never found, and the only way that a non-Norwegian by descent can be included and fully accepted in the social life of the Norwegian group seems to be by marrying into a Norwegian clan and conforming to certain Norwegian values and customs, such as family ties (applied to the Norwegian clan), certain food habits, and, first of all, Lutheranism.

With all their conspicuous differences in the form of adjustment, however, in one respect these two Norwegian settlements have made a parallel adjustment to their social situation in the new society: they have both built up a social system of their own, rather firmly knit through a strong loyalty within the group, and with a sharp bounding outwards towards the encompassing society. There is no doubt in my mind that this reaction is a response to the social situation in which the groups found themselves in the New World. Feeling that they were not fully accepted in the new society they had no choice other than trying to provide for the satisfaction of the social needs of

their members within their own group, unless they wanted to submit to a rather subordinate status in the society. And they were able to do it because they were large enough and had an élite of their own that was morally strong enough to withstand the pressure, but first of all because they adjusted to the pressure by assuming an increased solidarity within the group and a sharpening of the outer social bound coupled with a strong adaptiveness to certain American culture patterns.

Whether these observations can serve as a general explanation of the social differentiation of ethnic groups in the United States is very uncertain at the present stage. Great variations are found in the form of adjustment that is made, not only by the various nationalities but even by different settlements of one and the same nationality group. For that reason, one should be very careful in making any general statement about the form of adjustment, or the degree of persistence, of any particular nationality in the United States. Besides, the problem of adjustment is pretty much the same whether the immigrant group is of German, Polish, Italian, or Norwegian origin. The main problem of any immigrant group is not how to preserve as much as possible of the original culture, but how to be *accepted* in a social configuration in the new social environment. And the form and direction that the adjustment takes in each case is not only determined by the form and contents of the original culture but probably more so by the particular *social situation* that the group has to respond to in each particular case.

However, there is at least one trait in the social situation that the European immigrants of the 19th century met in this country that is common to them all. They were all, more or less, under the same social pressure from the American society. In the case of Vernon County, Wisconsin, this social pressure proved to be instrumental in creating an intensive solidarity of an immigrant group over against the American society and thereby became fatal to a com-

plete assimilation of that group. And it is quite possible that, even in other cases, this pressure may be the ultimate reason why the cultural "melting pot" of the United

States so often has failed to "reach the melting point." Under a too heavy pressure, the process has turned out to be a hardening rather than a melting process.

SOME SOCIAL FUNCTIONS OF IGNORANCE*

WILBERT E. MOORE AND MELVIN M. TUMIN†

Princeton University

IGNORANCE is commonly viewed today as the natural enemy of stability and orderly progress in social life. It is equally commonly believed, as a corollary, that any increase in knowledge automatically brings with it an increase in benefits to mankind. As a result education, as the formal technique of imparting this knowledge to the uninformed, has become elevated in many lay and professional circles to the status of a panacea for all of man's ills.

This enthusiasm for education, and for the "rational" approach which is considered its handmaiden, is found throughout the social sciences. That sociologists share this enthusiasm is indicated by the readiness with which, as applied scientists, they advocate such things as enhanced knowledge on the part of prospective marriage partners; improved lines of communication in industry; increased awareness of community and national affairs; greater knowledge about the "real" meaning of such terms as race and nationality; increased sensitivity to personal differences and the nuances of interpersonal relations; and therapeutic treatment of neuroses through giving the patient a knowledge of the sources of his anxieties.¹

* Manuscript received June 22, 1940.

† The authors wish to express their thanks to Harry C. Bredemeier, Don J. Hager, Paul K. Hatt, and Marion J. Levy, Jr., and to students in a graduate theory seminar, who have aided by criticism of preliminary drafts of this paper.

¹ It should not be overlooked here that there is an essential ambivalence concerning the role of knowledge. For, despite the institutionally sanctioned emphasis on education and on "facing the

The rationalistic bias, which finds its way into many sociological writings of the last half century, may, however, be contrasted with several developments in social science that have served to diminish the importance ascribed to rational, scientific knowledge. Two of these may be singled out for special mention. The first has been the careful study and analysis of the functions of magic, ritual, and superstition in social organization. This culminates, perhaps, in the findings of Malinowski concerning the role of magic as a means for providing a subjective and socially sanctioned security with regard to anxiety-producing features of the physical and social environment.²

The second development has been the distinction between irrational and nonrational orientations, and the recognition of the high importance in society of ultimate values and attitudes toward them. This development is exemplified especially in the works of Pareto and Parsons.³

facts," there is considerable "folk" acceptance of the contrary idea that "where ignorance is bliss, it is folly to be wise," or, in a more popular formulation, "what I don't know can't hurt me."

² See especially Bronislaw Malinowski, "Culture," in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, 4:621-645; Malinowski, "Magic, Science and Religion," in Joseph Needham, ed., *Science, Religion and Reality*, New York: The Macmillan Co., 1925, pp. 19-84. The latter paper has been reprinted in the volume of Malinowski's essays, *Magic Science, and Religion* (Boston: Beacon Press; Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1948).

³ See Vilfredo Pareto, *The Mind and Society* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1935, 4 vols.); Talcott Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1937).

The first of these developments calls attention to a widespread type of social action that functions as a "satisfactory" alternative to complete knowledge and perfect control. And, since resort to magic is so generally distributed throughout human society, there is at least some doubt that it is likely to be eliminated by any predictable expansion of knowledge and technique.

The second development emphasizes the fact that empirical knowledge and ignorance do not in combination exhaust the socially significant orientations of the individual to his environment. It thus helps to distinguish clearly between ignorance, on the one hand, and ultimate, including superempirical, values, on the other.

Neither of these developments, however, has included an explicit examination of the role of ignorance as such. Both have served to narrow and redefine its relation to other types of orientations. But in both there is some implication that genuine ignorance, as distinct from knowledge on the one hand and nonrational beliefs and values on the other, is only a disturbing element in social action and relations, and is accordingly subject to successive constrictions in importance.

It is the central purpose of this paper to examine explicitly some of the contexts in which ignorance, rather than complete knowledge,⁴ performs specifiable functions in social structure and action. Some of the observations that will be made have already been recognized in the literature. It is suggested, however, that their significance has ordinarily been missed, since they provide uncomfortable exceptions to the prevailing

⁴ Ignorance is to be taken here as simply referring to "not knowing," that is, the absence of empirically valid knowledge. "Perfect knowledge" is considered as the totality of all knowledge ideally available to man in general, and not simply that which is believed available within any context of social action. Ignorance may refer to past, present, or future conditions or events, as long as valid knowledge is conceivably available. For the purposes of this paper, ignorance is to be kept distinct from "error," whether of fact or of logic, and from the act of *ignoring* what is known.

rationalistic emphasis in sociological writing.

The central theorem of this paper holds that, quite apart from the role of ultimate values and the attitudes relative to them, perfect knowledge is itself impossible, and an inherently impossible basis of social action and social relations. Put conversely, ignorance is both inescapable and an intrinsic element in social organization generally, although there are marked differences in the specific forms, degrees, and functions of ignorance in known social organizations.

The following attempt to classify the sociological functions of ignorance is necessarily rudimentary and primitive. There is unquestionably some, and perhaps considerable, overlapping among the various categories. It is to be hoped that the greatest portion of this overlapping is due to the fact that attention will be focussed on primary functions in specific action contexts, ignoring, for purposes of classification, the secondary and derivative functions. It is also possible that further investigation and analysis would reduce the variety of specific functions to more general principles.

THE STRUCTURAL FUNCTIONS OF IGNORANCE

1. As Preservative of Privileged Position

The function of ignorance that is most obvious, particularly to the cynical, is its role in preserving social differentials. However, a purely cynical view is likely to overlook the extent to which the continuity of any social structure depends upon differential access to knowledge in general, and, *a fortiori*, to specialized knowledge of various kinds. In many instances, of course, the counterpart of ignorance on the part of the outsider is *secrecy* on the part of the possessor of knowledge. Some of the outstanding examples of this general function of ignorance are summarized in the following paragraphs.

a. *The Specialist and the Consumer.* Ignorance on the part of a consumer of specialized services (for example, medical or legal advice) helps to preserve the privileged

position of a specialized dispenser of these services. This is in some measure a by-product of the division of labor, and theoretically the same persons may occupy super-ordinate or subordinate positions as one or another service or skill is demanded. However, there are both theoretical and empirical bases for concluding that some persons whose skills are both scarce and functionally important will occupy a generalized superior status.⁵ Although that status is not solely the product of the ignorance of others, in concrete instances it is partially maintained by such ignorance.

One evidence of the function of ignorance as a preservative of privileged position lies in the situation where the consumer acquires, through continuous exposure to the services of the specialist, a sense of his own ability to deal with his problems, and thus to dispense with the services of the specialist (e.g., where we learn how to treat common colds, simple fevers, and bruises, and where we learn how to send stern notes concerning contractual obligations). Thus the range of situations in which the special services are believed to be required is altered from the original position.

On the other hand, the specialist commonly develops devices to protect himself against this sort of attrition. A common device is that of specialized and possibly esoteric vocabulary, or the use of instruments and techniques not intrinsically required for the solution but seemingly so.⁶

⁵ Kingsley Davis and Wilbert E. Moore, "Some Principles of Stratification," *American Sociological Review*, 10: 242-249, April, 1945.

⁶ Indeed, in the field of medicine and psychiatry it is not necessary that the alleged technique or treatment be the empirically valid means; health may be restored as a result of the fact of treatment rather than of the specific content. It is not even necessary for the specialist to know the source of his success. The important point is that the consumer must rely upon the superior knowledge of the specialist, whether or not that knowledge is genuine or even understood. For example, it is common among psychoanalysts to operate on the assumption that neuroses may be treated by digging out the sublimated facts, and facing up to them squarely. It seems quite probable that therapeutic success, in at

However, the central point remains that real or presumed differential knowledge and skills are inherently necessary to maintain mutually satisfactory relationships between specialist and consumer.

b. *The Specialist and the Potential Competitor.* Another facet to the preservation of the privileged position of the specialist is perhaps worthy of special mention. It was noted in the preceding paragraphs that the specialist's position may be endangered by "the patient becoming his own physician." A related danger is that the privileged position of the specialist will be so attractive that too many competitors will appear in the market. This is simply another, and more common, way of saying that ignorance operates to protect the specialist from potential competitors. Perhaps the commonest devices for guarding against this danger are "trade secrets" and their protection through the control by the specialists themselves of training and thus of access to the privileged positions. Examples in contemporary society are to be found in the limited access to certain professions and in the restriction of apprenticeship on the part of various craft unions. Although often justified as a means for protecting technical standards, these restrictions appear also to preserve a sharp distinction between the knowledge of specialists and the ignorance of aspirants. For the society as a whole the result may be a restriction in essential services, either directly through limitation of the number of specialists or indirectly through increasing costs so that other goods or services must be sacrificed by the consumer.

c. *Role Differentiation and the Maintenance of Power.* In any society internal social order is in part maintained by allocating statuses and differentiating roles along lines of age, sex, and generation. These differentials serve as hooks on which differences in life-chances are hung, and the

least some cases, may depend upon the ritual efficacy of treatment and not upon complete knowledge; indeed there are factually and rationally impossible situations to which this is the only effective solution.

result is that differentials in knowledge also fall along these lines. In non-literate societies, this tends to result in a monopoly of skills on the part of the elders and the consequent monopoly of power in their hands. It also results in sexual division of special skills, providing females with sources of power that their physique would not otherwise give them, and providing males with a source of power that acts as a balance to the power inherent in the female's control of sexual access.

The universal diffusion of age-respect as an organizing principle of social relations in primitive societies is functionally dependent upon and compatible with differential distribution of skills and knowledge along age lines. Since most primitive societies surround these differentials with traditional sanctions, and since knowledge of alternatives is highly limited, the situation is essentially stable.

The contrasting case in Western civilization serves further to document these contentions. In Western society there is an observable attrition in parental control over children and an equalization of power as between the sexes, in part because of the accessibility of extra-familial sources of knowledge and skill. Where the young can learn skills independently of the instruction of their parents, and where females have an increasing access to economic independence, there tends to be a marked attenuation of the power based on the former parental and male monopolies of knowledge and skills. It should be noted, however, that the extra-familial access to knowledge and skills (and the power derived therefrom) is by no means unlimited. Censorship, whether by State or Church, is one obvious form of limiting access to knowledge as a means of preserving power structures.

d. *Avoidance of Jealousy Over Unequal Rewards.* Ignorance operates to maintain smooth social relations by preventing jealousy and internal dissension where differential rewards to approximate status equals are not based on uniformly known and accepted criteria. It is a common administra-

tive rule of formal organizations that salaries are confidential. The efficacy of this rule may rest upon the existence of special treatment and individual agreements, which, if known, would give rise to intramural bickering. It may also rest upon the lack of absolutely objective criteria of performance, so that the person not equally rewarded may claim as bias what is in fact a difference of judgment. Whether the confidential differentials are based on favoritism, meeting outside offers, or some commonly acceptable criteria that are debatable in their application, ignorance of the differentials serves a positive function where either the public statement of the criteria or their open application to particular cases would create difficulties.

This principle also applies outside of formal organizations. Even invitations to dinner or other "social" events are commonly confidential if the criteria of inclusion and exclusion are not both self-evident and defensible. Within the family, younger children, who are likely to regard themselves as the equals of their older brothers and sisters, may be kept in ignorance of the privileges of the latter as a device less fraught with potential conflict than the principle of age differentials.

e. *Secrecy and Security.* As a general principle, ignorance serves to maintain the security of the individual or of the social system as a whole wherever knowledge would aid an actual or potential enemy. This principle is commonly understood, although in somewhat different terms, with reference to national security. However, the principle operates in other contexts also. The success of a military or law-enforcement undertaking, and the security of its participants, may depend upon the element of *surprise*. Indeed, any power structure may depend in part upon ignorance not only of its specific activities, but also of its basic intentions. Even the security of the individual may depend upon ignorance by others of personal attributes or past experiences that have no intrinsic bearing on his present status but which would be regarded unfavorably if

known: for example, the technical Negro who is passing for white, the reformed convict, the person below or above the required age for his position, the illegitimate child subsequently adopted.

2. As Reinforcement of Traditional Values

a. *Isolation and Traditionalism.* Traditional behavior depends in part upon ignorance of alternatives. The classical case of ignorance reinforcing traditional behavior is the significance of isolation from new stimuli in the maintenance of the round of customary practices in primitive and peasant societies. It is likely, however, that isolation alone does not account for the failure to explore alternatives; having achieved some kind of working equilibrium, such a system is not likely to foster inquiry. There is no "good" reason why it should do so, and ample reason, in terms of continued stability, why it should not. However, no social system is without internal strains and dissident elements; it is here especially that ignorance of alternatives helps preserve the existing order of things. It is also possible that knowledge and acceptance of alternatives would result in a more stable set of relations.

The same generic phenomenon is found in any society in the isolation of the individual from new ideas. Where the individual's notions of right and wrong are rigidified, susceptibility to new knowledge and influences is minimized. The "conservative" is a short-hand term for this phenomenon. As this equilibrium may also have its weak points, ignorance may be necessary to preserve whatever balance has been achieved.

b. *Ignorance of Normative Violations.* Another way in which ignorance serves to protect the traditional normative structure is through reinforcing the assumption that deviation from the rules is statistically insignificant. This is especially crucial in those situations where there is a strong tendency to deviate which is repressed but which would be expressed if it were known that deviation was statistically popular rather

than limited. This is perhaps particularly true of sexual conduct,⁷ but may occur with respect to any system of norms that is subject to considerable pressure or internal strain. In a sense, therefore, the normative system as such may suffer more from knowledge of violations than from the violations themselves.⁸

A similar conclusion may derive from a somewhat different functional context. There is the possibility that various activities are contrary to particular normative prescriptions, yet perform a function in the maintenance of the approved structure as a whole. Ignorance of violations would thus serve to prevent outraged suppression of these functionally significant practices, of which perhaps the most common examples are prostitution and gambling.⁹

c. *Reinforcement of Group Mandates.* Ignorance also serves to reinforce ultimate values and heighten the sense of community through induction of subservience of individual to group interests. This is made possible in part by active or passive barriers to knowledge of the consequences of following individual as against group mandates. All socialization processes in all human societies operate to reduce curiosity and knowledge

⁷ It is not unlikely that one by-product of the public reaction to the Kinsey report may be that the knowledge of the widespread practice of some hitherto tabooed sexual acts will materially stimulate further participation with less guilt in these acts. This in turn raises questions as to the implications of such knowledge of the divergence of ideal and actual behavior for the socialization of future generations.

⁸ On the other hand, knowledge of violations of strongly-supported norms may lead precisely to a reassertion of convictions that might otherwise suffer the attritional effect of indifference. This is the famous principle elaborated by Emile Durkheim. See his *On the Division of Labor in Society*, trans. by George Simpson (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1933), pp. 80-105. This possibility does not remove the significance of ignorance as a component of various situations, but does emphasize the importance of other conditions.

⁹ See Kingsley Davis, "The Sociology of Prostitution," *American Sociological Review*, 2: 744-755, October, 1937. The functional role of gambling is well analyzed in a forthcoming study by Edward C. Devereux, Jr.

about the presumed socially dysfunctional alternative of pursuing individual tendencies. These processes act so effectively in most cases that the matter rarely appears as a matter of choice, much less as a conflict. All social groups thus require some quotient of ignorance to preserve "esprit de corps."

3. As Preservative of Fair Competition

Most competitive systems, whether in economic production and exchange or in games of chance and skill, assume not only a uniform range of knowledge and rational skill but also an explicit or implicit ignorance. Thus the idea of the "free competitive market" assumes equal initial access on the part of all concerned, and an impersonal limitation on advantage of all participants. In such a situation, differential access to knowledge gives inequitable advantages and destroys the freedom and fairness of competition. Similarly, the rationale of an open-class system of stratification assumes equality of opportunity, which includes as a major element equal access to knowledge and technical training requisite for class mobility. The normative justification of the system is thus endangered by notable inequalities of access to knowledge, *unless there is an effective range of ignorance about this also.*

There is, however, in the impersonal market system a more fundamental role of ignorance, rather than of equally limited knowledge that might in principle be extended to equally perfect knowledge. To keep the system genuinely and impersonally competitive, each competitor must *not* know all the policies and decisions of his competitors. Such knowledge would unavoidably destroy the bases of competition either through the creation of overwhelming power combinations or, in other circumstances, making the outcome so certain that no further action would be required.¹⁰ Indeed,

¹⁰ Although not formulated exactly in this way, this point emerges from the application of the theory of games to economic behavior in John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior*, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947). See also Morgenstern,

the inability to predict results, whether from simply inadequate or from structurally barred knowledge, is a prerequisite to many situations of competition and conflict. Illustrations of this principle range all the way from poker games and athletic events to armed warfare.

4. As Preservative of Stereotypes

Viewed from the standpoint of the individual actor, all social behavior is directed toward stereotypes of other social units, representing greater or lesser degrees of abstraction or misconception of the precise and complete characteristics of the other units. So-called primary and informal groups tend to reduce the role of stereotypes to a minimum by great emphasis on wide ranges of personal knowledge and involvement, whereas formally structured relations in their nature emphasize the stringently limited role of the actor. Even in the former case, however, ignorance of the *full* range of individual characteristics and motivations is not only factually present, but also intrinsically necessary. The most intimate of friends are happily ignorant of some of each other's habits and thoughts. In fact, an important element of socialization involves acquisition of the habit of appearing to conform to the expected stereotypes demanded in standard situations.

a. *Bureaucratic Organization.* The general principles discussed in the preceding paragraph have a special relevance in formal bureaucratic structures, which by their nature depend upon narrowly and precisely defined roles and, therefore, personalities. The nature of the established relations among individuals in such organizations is such as to foster ignorance of "irrelevant" personal characteristics, and indeed to re-

"The Theory of Games," *Scientific American*, 180 (5): 22-25, May, 1949. The function of ignorance in the market is explicitly treated in Morgenstern, "Perfect Foresight and Economic Equilibrium," a mimeographed translation of "Vollkommene Voraussicht und wirtschaftliches Gleichgewicht," *Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie*, 6: 337-357, August, 1935.

quire such ignorance whenever knowledge would impair impersonal fulfillment of duties. The rules that define authority and function are such as to make possible the cooperative interdependence of actual or potential personal enemies, just as in the military services the subordinate is required to "salute the uniform and not the man." Similarly, in state-entertaining a strict protocol makes it unnecessary and probably inadvisable to inquire into the personal merits of attending officials.

It is also well known, of course, that in strictly bureaucratic organizations, where membership constitutes an occupation and frequent face-to-face contact is the rule, the expected ignorance is subject to attrition by greater familiarity and the establishment of "informal" procedures and relations. These are likely to be based upon characteristics and attitudes irrelevant and possibly inimical to the formal expectations, although they may be more effective components of the operating organization than are the official and limited expectations. The continuity of the organization thus depends upon an effective balance between the ignorance required for orderly procedure and the knowledge acquired by participants.

b. *Ethnic and Class Stereotypes.* Among the more commonly recognized stereotypes that at least partially thrive on ignorance, are those relating to ethnic groups and other minorities that may be the object of scapegoat reactions. It is true that "education in the facts" often does little to remove the prejudice that supports, and the discrimination that expresses, the stereotype. It may nevertheless be asserted that knowledge that the facts do not support one's stereotype may significantly affect the quantity and quality of intensity with which these stereotypes are held and acted upon. Maintenance of the stereotype in the face of superior knowledge then at least involves the cost and strain of additional rationalization.¹¹

¹¹ Where the affective component of the stereotype is weaker, knowledge may serve to reduce the

The element of ignorance in stereotypical behavior is also illustrated in reference to class. It appears that the notion of "typical class behavior" is a most significant basis of social action precisely at those points where there is least knowledge of the actual heterogeneity internal to "classes." This may be stated in a more general way. The idea that there are characteristics and attributes common to a social class is likely to be most firmly believed precisely by those farthest removed, in the class structure, from the class in question. In a highly complex open-class system, most relationships between status unequals take place not in the general context of inter-class relations, but in specific contexts of bureaucratic superior and inferior, landlord and tenant, professional and client. Many of these relationships may specifically rule out questions of general inequality (as in market relations), and in others the ranks of the actors may vary with the context of the action. It is only where the specific attributes of individuals and the specific contexts of action are unknown, ignored, or irrelevant that the more general category of class is likely to have any significance. Yet for certain limited purposes social action may be structured along class lines as long as the stereotype with its component of ignorance is maintained.

5. *As Incentive Appropriate to the System*

a. *Anxiety and Work.* There are a variety of situations in which ignorance of present rating or future chances is used as a device to create anxieties and spur activity in a competitive system. Thus, in a bureaucratic organization rules are ordinarily thought of as giving predictability. However, they may be so constructed and applied as they relate to persons in the lower strata that prediction is difficult and the worker is expected to

effectiveness of the stereotype or actually remove it as one of the action premises of the individual. In this connection, see the interesting study by Gordon Allport and Bernard M. Kramer, "Some Roots of Prejudice," *Journal of Psychology*, 22: 9-39, July, 1946.

be motivated by his insecurity.¹² With slight modification, the principle would appear to fit the situation of students, but more especially of their teachers. Indeed, to the extent that risk, uncertainty, and insecurity have ignorance as a common component and anxiety as a common incentive, the principle is a general feature of the rationale of competition.

It is easy to see that the principle, so generalized, has a point of diminishing or negative returns, varying with the circumstances. There is unquestionably an attrition of motive when anxiety is prolonged, owing to the way anxiety typically produces personal disorganization and is thus disruptive of the organization required for efficient performance.¹³

b. *The Aleatory Principle.* Ignorance also operates as an incentive in a quite different context from that just discussed. Here attention is directed to the role of "new experience" in human life, where the attractiveness of the new experience depends in part upon the uncertainty of the outcome. Certainly the attractiveness of many games of chance, as well as of those games and sports where chance may equalize or offset known differences in skill and performance, rests in large measure on their unpredictable outcome. In fact, there is some rough evidence that ignorance of the future in recreational activities assumes an especially significant role where routine (read: perfect predictability) and boredom are characteristic of work assignments and where there is a sharp break between working time and leisure time.

THE INTERPLAY OF IGNORANCE AND KNOWLEDGE

Knowledge and ignorance may for some purposes be viewed as polar antipodes on a

continuum. Seen this way, there is an objective relationship between them that is at least analytically independent of any actor's definition of the situation.¹⁴ That relationship may be described in the following terms: For every increase in what is known about a given phenomenon there is a corresponding decrease in what is unknown. In any actual situation of social action, however, this analytical relationship between the known and the unknown is conditioned by the fact that social actors always know at least somewhat less than the totality of what is theoretically knowable. At least in some contexts, therefore, recognition of ignorance by the actor is prerequisite to the acquisition of knowledge, and may itself be regarded as a gain in knowledge.

Where there is a felt need, by an individual or group, for a solution to a problem, ignorance can operate as a factor dynamic to social change. There is, of course, no intrinsic directionality in ignorance or its recognition which determines that empirically valid rather than invalid solutions will result. But each of these alternative possibilities has differential consequences for the later interplay of ignorance and knowledge. For, by and large, those "solutions" which are psychologically reassuring but empirically invalid or superempirical may simply postpone the crisis or problem situation. And since in doing so they may distract attention from and possibly hide the source of the problem, it can also be said that they tend tacitly to institutionalize those crises or problems where psychological reassurance is not by itself sufficient.

On the other hand, it may also be said that while empirically valid solutions do eliminate the specific problems to which they are relevant, they by no means reduce the inherently problematic character of social life and are not therefore more generally final in the reassurance they provide. For, there is no exception to the rule that

¹² See Alvin W. Gouldner, "Discussion" of Wilbert E. Moore, "Industrial Sociology: Status and Prospects," *American Sociological Review*, 13: 382-400, August, 1948, at p. 398.

¹³ See Allison Davis, "The Motivation of the Underprivileged Worker," in William F. Whyte, ed., *Industry and Society* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1946), pp. 84-106.

¹⁴ This continuous distribution of knowledge and ignorance makes many of the observations in this paper reversibly viewable as functions of limited knowledge rather than of ignorance.

every time a culture works out an empirically valid answer to a problem, it thereby generates a host of derivative problems, if only in terms of the social reorganization required to incorporate the new solution.¹⁵ In one sense, then, the difference reduces to one where the maintenance of ignorance institutionalizes old problems and the acquisition of knowledge makes continuous the introduction of new problems. The dynamic role of ignorance in social change is thus played in the recognition of its existence and the subsequent formulation of answers, whether empirically valid or not.

SUMMARY NOTE

Ignorance is not a simple analytical element, but rather a more or less hidden component of situations usually discussed in other terms. It follows that the categories of function treated here are not entirely homogeneous. Thus, in some instances such

¹⁵ See Robert K. Merton, "The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action," *American Sociological Review*, 1: 894-904, December, 1936. This holds, as well in the structure of scientific theory as it does in the structure of social relations. For an expansion of this notion see Merton, "The Bearing of Empirical Research upon the Development of Social Theory," *American Sociological Review*, 13: 505-515, October, 1948.

as market competition ignorance may be viewed as an element or condition within a circumscribed system. In other instances such as the maintenance of national security, ignorance may be a necessary condition for outsiders. In all these instances, however, the problem is one of shifting perspective, since maintenance of position or the existing relationships may be viewed within a narrower or broader frame of reference.

Functional analysis must distinguish elements necessary for any social structure and those necessary within particular, given configurations. If a single society is taken as the unit of reference, then it may be necessary to distinguish the whole and the part. Known societies are not so neatly intermeshed as to assure that a particular function of ignorance within a segment of society (for example, the privileged position of the specialist with regard to potential competitors) is favorable to other segments, or to the society as a whole.

If the foregoing observations are sound, it follows that ignorance must be viewed not simply as a passive or dysfunctional condition, but as an active and often positive element in operating structures and relations.

CURRENT ITEMS



COMMUNICATIONS AND OPINION SOME COMMENTS ON JESSIE BERNARD'S "THE POWER OF SCIENCE."

It seems ungrateful to comment in an even mildly critical manner on so admirable a paper as Jessie Bernard's "The Power of Science and the Science of Power,"¹ especially since I agree with nearly all of it. The principal statement to which I must object is that when I argue for the wider application of science and scientific method in human affairs, I imply that science necessarily will be used for "socially desirable ends." It is admitted that my statements leading to the implication mentioned are "less explicit and self-conscious" than those of some others. Let me, nevertheless, be as explicit and self-conscious as possible in my repudiation of the alleged implication.

I do not see that any or all my statements, correctly quoted by Professor Bernard, imply the idea that science will, in some automatic fashion, insure its use for what she (and I) call "socially desirable ends." This phrase, like all ethical statements, is necessarily ethnocentric—relative to some culture. To the person (and whatever group he is a member of, including gangsters and murderers) who use science, the end for which they use it presumably constitutes *to them* socially desirable ends. Any scientific statement ("if the spark, etc . . . then the explosion") contains no such implicit ethical conclusion because the culture (or other conditions) to which scientific statements are relative are always *explicitly* and *conditionally* stated. Everything Professor Bernard has said about my *beliefs and tastes* regarding "socially desirable ends" is true. I simply reject her further statement that because I have expressed these sentiments, I also and therefore believe that somehow science must or will be used for these ends. I do not.² She herself

quotes me as follows: "*There is nothing in scientific work as such, which dictates to what ends the products of science shall be used.*" Nor do I flinch from a single one of "the more sinister totalitarian implications" (whatever they are) of my conclusions. Unlike some of my colleagues at home and abroad, I do not consider my personal likes or dislikes of scientific conclusions, or their conformity to either communist or democratic dogma, as of the slightest relevance to scientific validity.

In view of the generally admitted nature of science and scientific conclusions, I cannot see why Professor Bernard considers the conflict of values (e.g., tobacco and liquor versus milk) as a reflection of the "impotence of science." It simply is not the function of science to decide what land or grain is to be used for. Science consists of a system of "if . . . then" statements. Why try to convert it into statements without the "if"? Likewise, Professor Bernard lapses into the position of the group she criticizes when she speaks of scientists being assigned the jobs of "slum clearance" and "protecting individual rights." No one knows better than Professor Bernard that these are not and never can become scientific jobs at all. The most that scientists, as scientists, could have to do with such matters is to say, "if you clear this slum, then the costs and consequences in money and individual property rights are thus and so." The fact that many social and other scientists, as well as the public, are confused about the scientist's relation to such problems, is flagrant evidence of the pitiful superficiality of our scientific education even on such elementary matters.

It is true that I have expressed considerable optimism on the probability that science will in fact, on the whole and in the long run, be used for the ends that the masses of men desire, and I think this is really the point at which Professor Bernard's criticism is directed.

and emphatically since that time. For my most recent statements see *Philosophy of Science*, Oct. 1948, p. 341 ff. and *Sociology and Social Research*, Sept. 1949. See also my "Semantics and the Value Problem," *Social Forces*, Oct. 1948, pp. 114-117.

¹ *American Sociological Review*, XIV (Oct. 1949), 575-584.

² I have consistently held this position since the publication of my first book (*Social Research*, 1929) and have elaborated on the subject frequently

If so, I do not profess that these probabilities are reliably computable at this time. I merely "feel" optimistic about them on grounds that I have stated elsewhere. Nor is my optimism greatly shaken by Professor Bernard's unquestionably correct statement that science does not directly or necessarily insure consensus. Why expect so unreasonable a result from science, or imply that since science does not insure consensus, therefore those of us who have argued its very great possible value toward ends we desire have somehow over-rated science? I have recognized the very real problem Professor Bernard has raised, and have expressed the view, which she quotes, that in my opinion a principal precaution we can take to avert the dire consequences she correctly points out as possible, is to protect, maintain, and use the most efficient instruments so far developed for determining the wishes of the masses, namely, the poll. For the rest, the only precaution I can see is to continue to cultivate the convention, custom, or habit of *acquiescing in majority rule*. If inculcating it in children "very much after the manner of the Catholic church," which she cites, is the most effective way, I favor that method because I like the predicated result. (I say the same regarding Comte's *Positive Polity*). There is nothing intrinsically rational, scientific, or demonstrably absolutely "good" about majority rule. There is merely widespread adherence to the principle in our society, arrived at by the same processes by which consensus has always been achieved.

I think Professor Bernard has put her finger on a vital point in this connection when she observes that science can, however, serve a consensus-compelling function (and now fulfills such a function in the physical sciences) for those who accept it. Note also that on such subjects minorities are quite firmly brushed aside. (Public Health officials *compel* religious sects to dispose of their dead in approved ways. Victims of contagious disease are *forcibly* segregated, if necessary.) My statement that the hearts of the masses of men are usually in the right place is actually tautological because I hold that *whatever* that place is, it is the "right" place so far as the broad "ends" of society are concerned. I lack the conceit to imagine that my tastes in these matters are necessarily in some final or permanent way superior to those which others, and especially other generations, may value. I think Russell is right about

ethical statements being matters of individual taste. But it must not be overlooked that these "tastes," for all their apparent "privacy" and "subjectivity," are largely *group conditioned*. There is, therefore, no actual conflict between Russell and Dewey on this point. In the last analysis, the external authority which Dewey fears, might be considered merely the authority of nature itself as revealed by scientists.

I assume that, in spite of Professor Bernard's misgivings, there will always be, in every society which can be properly so called, *some things* on which there is very considerable consensus. *That* consensus will determine, directly or indirectly, what science is to be used for. When I say directly or indirectly, I refer specifically to the fact, and I believe it is a fact, that dictators too do not come into being and operate for any length of time entirely without considerable popular support and, perhaps, with the support of the overwhelming majority of the underlying population. I notice that, especially in modern times, dictators, like Democrats, keep their ears to the ground with remarkable interest in the swing of sentiment among those to whom they dictate. Furthermore, they all maintain elections as at least a gesture to the same principle. The idea that science might be the pan-culturally valid system compelling consensus through the demonstrable validity of its methods is a consummation I contemplate with great satisfaction and some optimism.

I have, as one of *my* preferences, expressed the view that the masses of men had better be consulted, although I have explicitly stated that this is only a democratic bias on my part, not a scientific conclusion. If the rising generation shares this bias very strongly, and I doubt it, they will follow my advice as to the efficient means of consulting the masses. Otherwise, they will ignore the majority and all minorities except their own, and employ science for quite other ends than I prefer. Among other things, I think they will regard many of my concerns for minorities as sentimental nonsense, incompatible with the kind of integrated behavior required in a technologically more advanced society. My nostalgic views to the contrary are probably obsolete. Nevertheless, I shall continue to resist the totalitarian trend because I dislike it. My inability to mistake this preference of mine for a scientific conclusion has mystified many of my colleagues and has been regarded by them as a mark of my

moral deterioration. That seems to me to be an entirely irrelevant consideration as bearing on the probable logical and scientific validity of my opinion on this and other subjects.

Professor Bernard is right in what she says about the ambivalence of people's wants and that some people continue to want incompatible things even after science has demonstrated their incompatibility. But it is also true that in proportion as the demonstration is conclusive, scientifically speaking, people who continue to want incompatible things are increasingly regarded as mentally ill. It is not unreasonable, therefore, to assume that a wider acceptance of science might reduce the pursuit of incompatible goals. The advancement and diffusion of the other sciences have had this effect. It is worth noting that very few people expect to eat *physical* cake and also have it, which is why the illustration has its force as *reductio ad absurdum*.

I know of no scientist who regards science, even in its fullest imaginable development, as producing a society in which there are no problems and no conflict. The most I have ever suggested is that science would be a relatively efficient instrument to adjust the difficulties that will arise in what is essentially an endless quest. We now strive with these difficulties with relatively inefficient tools. Science, by virtue of its power of relatively reliable prediction, can enable man to take into account the more remote and recondite costs and consequences of his present decisions. Science can never *make* decisions for man apart from his tastes and his personal peculiarities, which are the result of his entire evolutionary history together with contemporary conditionings.

Professor Bernard has performed a real service in calling attention to an unwarranted assumption on the part of many social scientists regarding the ethical implications of science. I fully agree with her main thesis. I object only to the suggestion that if I had fully realized these implications, I would have been less enthusiastic for science. It is interesting to note that, in spite of her misgivings, Professor Bernard, in the end, comes to the same conclusion.

GEORGE A. LUNDBERG

University of Washington

REPLY TO LUNDBERG'S COMMENTS

I wish to apologize if I have attributed to Lundberg a position which he deliberately repudiates. There was no such intention. The article "Power of Science, etc." is one of a

series on science as a social institution in which the relationship between science and conflict has been examined from several angles.¹ The contribution of science in conflict situations, where it seems so necessary, appears to be nil, constituting a gap in the power of science which has seemed to me important enough to warrant some elaboration. It seems to have been neglected by those—including Lundberg—who were pleading science's case. It will be seen from this context that the article was not intended as a personal criticism of Lundberg. He was used as a whipping boy largely because he is the most outstanding, articulate, and forceful representative of a certain point of view.

I should not wish the article to appear to be an attack on Lundberg himself because with his work as expositor of the applicability of scientific method to sociological data I, like most sociologists, fully concur. Indeed, it is the benchmark of the sociologist that he "believes in" the application of scientific method to sociological data. If he did not, he would not be a sociologist but an ethicist or philosopher or journalist or theologian. Some sociologists might argue that more than scientific method was necessary for a science of sociology. There might be some disagreement as to the specific techniques to be used. But there are probably few sociologists who do not subscribe in theory at least to the principle that sociological data are amenable to scientific treatment. Lundberg has made an important contribution in his hammering home of this important principle. Like his great teacher, L. L. Bernard, he has brought Comte up to date and this is, in my opinion, his greatest contribution.

Even when Lundberg turns from an exposition of the feasibility of a science of sociology and becomes an advocate of the application of scientific method to the problems of social life, there is, I dare say, agreement with him among many if not most sociologists. A recent code proposed for scientists specifies the propagation of the scientific point of view as a duty of the scientist as a professional man if not as a technician.²

¹ "Social Salvation through Science," *South Atlantic Quarterly*, Jan., 1947, pp. 44-55; "Prescriptions for Peace: Social-Science Chimera?" *Ethics*, July, 1949, pp. 244-256; "Sociological Mirror for Cultural Anthropologists," to appear in *American Anthropologist*, 1949; "Where Is the Sociology of Conflict?" unpublished; "Can Science Transcend Culture?" unpublished.

² John R. Baker, *Science and the Planned State*, 1945, p. 100.

Nevertheless, Lundberg's salesmanship of scientific method may produce misgivings among many sociologists, not because they are any less partisan than he to science but because it seems to them that in his enthusiasm for his product he has implied more than he can deliver. If too much is claimed, science itself is discredited as a false messiah. Lundberg's punch line points out that in spite of my misgivings I come to the same conclusion that he does, namely that we must use science. My misgivings are not with respect to science but only with respect to the over-selling of science.

With respect to the application of science I find Lundberg's position confusing. On the one hand he explicitly and self-consciously repudiates the position I erroneously imputed to him, that science necessarily will or must be used for socially desirable ends; he doubts if the rising generation shares his democratic bias; he thinks they will regard many of his "concerns for minorities as sentimental nonsense, incompatible with the kind of integrated behavior required in a technologically more advanced society." His contrary views, he feels, are probably obsolete. He doubts if the rising generation will follow his advice as to the efficient means of consulting the masses (the poll); if they do not follow it "they will ignore the majority and all minorities except their own, and employ science for quite other ends than I prefer." In spite of these doubts with respect to the uses of science by exploitive minorities, he nevertheless feels optimistic and hopeful that "science will in fact, on the whole and in the long run, be used for the ends that the masses of men desire." Either this is a tautology—whatever ends science is used for constitute, by definition, what the masses desire—or it means, presumably, that the exploitive minorities will somehow or other persuade the masses of men to desire what the minorities want them to desire. One wonders, which minorities? Quite aside from this seeming inconsistency, there is what appears to me to be a fallacy in the very concept "masses of men" which I shall refer to presently.

It seems to me that Lundberg the salesman of science has over-simplified many of the ethical implications inherent in the application of science to social life. Science, he tells us, consists of a system of "if . . . then" statements, and he asks, why try to convert it into statements without the "if," that is, without the conditioning factors. Perhaps it is my own obtuseness which makes it appear to me that it

is he, not I, who attempts to omit the "if . . ." It is precisely the "if . . ." which presents the great ethical problems in the application of science, in spite of Lundberg's statement that "any scientific statement ('if the spark, etc . . . then the explosion') contains no such implicit ethical conclusion because the culture (or other conditions) to which scientific statements are relative are always explicitly and conditionally stated." The ethical implications are present because the conditions necessary to produce the given result constitute, in effect, a prescription which may become an imperative for action. "If the spark, etc . . . then the explosion" can also be stated technically, "to set off the explosion, apply a spark." The implicitly ethical formulation would be: "if you want to set off the explosion, apply a spark." The sequence is thus: a pure-science statement of antecedents and consequences; a technical or engineering statement of the necessary antecedents to produce the given consequences; an ethical statement ordering the antecedent behavior in order to achieve the consequences. "If you subject this metal to these conditions, then you will get these results" was the form—seemingly non-ethical—which contingency statements took when scientific technique was entirely under the auspices of scientific mores and the ethical problems were implicit, so that they did not appear even to exist. The goal sought by the great scientists was simply an accurate account of how the world and its elements operated. Scientific technique in the nineteenth century was put to use for ends which such scientists themselves determined and under the control of rigorously enforced mores. In the twentieth century other people began to come to the scientists with their kinds of problems. The engineer or technician then took the pure-science form of the contingency statement and reversed it. "To get such and such results, subject the metal to these conditions." When the element of will is introduced, "if you want to get such and such a result, do thus and so," the pure-science contingency statement has become transformed into an ethical statement. Today the technician's employer asks the technician to supply the "if . . .," that is, the necessary antecedent steps to his "then . . ." or desired consequences. It is the technician's employers who render the pure-science contingency statement fundamentally ethical. He wants certain ends; the technician furnishes the means.

Thus whenever behavior is predicted under certain specific conditions, no matter how

scientifically, an ethical statement is also being implied. The "then . . ." half of the contingency statement corresponds to goals.³ If I have given the appearance of trying to convert scientific statements into absolutes, to underestimate the "if . . ." component of scientific statements, I have not made myself clear. The "if . . ." in scientific contingency statements often constitutes the prescription for action.

It is true, as Lundberg states, that there are always some things on which there is consensus in every society and it is true that science is likely to be used in these areas. He uses as an illustration of the brushing aside of minorities on the sanction of science one of such areas, namely that of public health. Where there is consensus the problem we are discussing does not arise. But science will also be used by special interest groups for their own ends, even when these ends are contrary to what the "masses of men" desire. Science, in brief, will be used for what the "masses of men" desire as well as for what they do not desire.

Lundberg asks, why expect so unreasonable a result as the insurance of consensus from science. I do not. It is precisely because I do not expect this result that my expectations with respect to the application of science are so much more modest than his.

Lundberg the utopist is operating in an area of personal taste and here it is improper to criticize his personal preferences. He freely admits he is dealing with personal preferences. The good society which he envisages is one in which the rulers, whatever form the government may take, regularly and conscientiously submit to the "masses of men" the scientifically determined consequences of alternative courses of action and secure from the "masses of men" a vote on which course they wish to have pursued. Then, with equally scientific efficiency the rulers proceed to implement the mandate thus determined. (A scientific procedure has

³ Even algebra may be said to have its "ethical" implications. Two and two are four can also be stated, to get four, add two to two. Or, if you want four, add two to two. The implicitly ethical nature of contingency statements is sometimes exploited in drama and fiction when one character is made to hint at a course of behavior without actually commanding it, in order to maintain an illusion of immaculate innocence. For example, one criminal may remark: "If a match should drop in his building. . . ." His companion replies, "You mean I should burn his building down?" "Who said you should burn his building down? I was just telling you what would happen if a match should drop," etc.

already processed the minority to submit to the will of the majority.) This utopia is no more unrealistic than others, from Plato down — nor any less so. Perhaps neither the advocacy nor the criticism of personal utopias has any place in a professional journal, but since the matter is up, I should like to point out what seems to me a semantic fallacy in Lundberg's formulation, especially since it is crucial in his system. When we use the term "masses" (in a scientific as distinguished from a propagandistic sense) we are deliberately excluding from our attention all the differentiations which characterize normal social structures. We are emphasizing the great massive kinds of behavior, viewing large numbers of people as organic wholes behaving with organic unity.⁴ "The teeming masses," "the seething masses," "the toiling masses," "the masses versus the classes" we say when we view people from this rather distant perspective which blots out individual and group differences. Viewed thus, with all the eddies of conflict deliberately blurred, we can easily impute consensus to the great mass. Lundberg is, it seems to me, thus begging the whole question when he implies that going to the "masses of men" will solve the profound ethical question involved in the control of science. Actually, in a scientific sense, there is no referent for the term "masses" to give scientists their assignments. When Lundberg the sociometrist looks out of his study window I am sure he sees what Herbert Blumer⁵ and the rest of us see, not coherent, unified, consensus-bound "masses of men," but special-interest groups, often in conflict with one another, working actively for certain goals. They are not passive, inert atoms waiting patiently to be polled, but aggressive and dynamic groups, impatient to impose their wills. Lundberg would do better, in my opinion, to send his scientists not to the non-existent "masses of men" for their assignments but to the documents which state clearly and explicitly the professed values of our culture.⁶

It would take more space than I think the

⁴ For a criticism of a similar fallacy among cultural anthropologists see "Sociological Mirror for Cultural Anthropologists" to appear in the *American Anthropologist*.

⁵ "Sociological Theory in Industrial Relations," *American Sociological Review*, XII (June 1947), 271-278; "Public Opinion and Public Opinion Polling," *ibid.*, XIII (Oct., 1948), 542-554.

⁶ *American Community Behavior*, Chapter 4 and Appendix.

subject warrants to elaborate the other problems inherent in Lundberg's good society. Nor would it serve any scientific purpose. Lundberg himself has no illusions about the feasibility of his utopia. That is the kind of society he would like to live in. As a sociologist he recognizes its unreal nature. It is his myth, a myth which gives meaning and drive to his efforts, that shapes the objectives of his research, and determines his course of behavior. He will fight for such a good society—as he valiantly does—even while admitting its improbable fate. It is a myth which does honor to the man if not to the scientist.

JESSIE BERNARD

Pennsylvania State College

REPORT ON THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL-SOCIOLOGICAL CONFERENCE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MAINZ

A determined effort to break down some of the academic barriers which have divided German social science into a large number of hermetically sealed compartments was made at the Anthropological-Sociological Conference held at the University of Mainz on 27 and 28 September 1949 under the auspices of the German Sociological Association. From the remarks of some of the participants it appeared that this was the first time in many years in which professors of physical anthropology, sociology, legal science, and theology, to mention some of the fields represented, had gotten together under the same roof. Although the conference itself was extremely quiet, there being no "great" performances and no intellectual duels, the significance of the conference should not be underestimated, since it is an important step in a growing German movement to pull the scattered social sciences together into an integrated whole, which will view the human being not merely as the possessor of this or that attribute, but as a *personality*.

The program, which was planned and executed under the chairmanship of the veteran Professor Leopold von Wiese of Cologne, and which constituted a definite tribute to his organizing ability, consisted of two problems, each of which was dealt with in a number of short talks by representatives of all the different social sciences, there then following a discussion with the object of arriving at as much of a synthesis as possible.

The first subject was "The Personality and the Collective." This discussion was begun by the sociologist Dr. W. E. Mühlmann of Wiesba-

den, who after distinguishing between the anthropological interest in the "typical" member of a society at a given time and place and the sociological interest in the relations between members, pointed out that it was impossible to consider an individual apart from his social environment. Expanding on the "Whatever Miss T. eats turns into Miss T." theory, Dr. Mühlmann indicated that the environment becomes a part of the personality itself, a fact which must be considered in planning any deliberate social changes. This thought was continued by the philosopher Jean Vial of Paris who explained the view taken by the contemporary French personalist philosophical movement of the relations between man and society. The personalist views the individual as a personality responsible for shaping itself but with the unique limitation that it can only achieve its own fulfillment by operating actively upon the society of which it is a part—that is to say, society challenges the individual to perform socially constructive acts and thereby achieve its own completion. The personalists differ from the existentialists in that they believe in an absolute standard of right and wrong of divine origin.

The discussion was brought unto a more specific and practical track by the psychologist Alexander Mitscherlich of Heidelberg who explained in some detail the mental processes taking place in an individual when he behaves as part of a mass. He pointed out that even the most individualistic thinker needs certain socially transmitted terms of reference in order that he can visualize the world about him as a unity having some sense and direction. Unfortunately, the rationalism arising from the 18th century enlightenment has been carried in some quarters to such an extreme as to eradicate this deeper "sense," with the result that the irrational drives of the individual float aimlessly around, seeking some point to which they can attach themselves. This situation provides a natural field of action for the "saviour" such as Hitler or his more recent counterpart in the medical field, Bruno Gröning, who has recently been performing cures by faith on a wholesale basis and has started a sizeable cult. The economist Professor Walter Weddigen of Nuernberg and the social service specialist Professor Ludwig Heyde of Cologne explained in some detail the impacts of the various forms of modern society upon the individual, the latter emphasizing particularly the transfer of the central interest of the typical worker from

his job to his leisure time. Professor Thomas Württenberger of Mainz and Professor Fritz Blättner of Kiel discussed legal and pedagogical aspects of the problem. The ethnologist Dr. Günter Wagner of Hamburg used a discussion of the ethics and morals of primitive society to illustrate the need for a degree of objective relativism in the scientific examination of today's society, particularly the need for questioning not only the degree of adherence to moral standards but the moral standards themselves. Unfortunately, the effects of this advice were somewhat neutralized by the last speaker, the theologian Professor Michael Schmaus of Munich, who urged the assembled social scientists to carry on their work within the traditionalist pattern, that is to say, to accept the ecclesiastically sanctioned norms as unchangeable and unviolable.

While individual parts of the discussion showed commendable efforts to come to grips with modern social problems, it is the feeling of this observer that the discussion as a whole was much too theoretical and showed a tendency to avoid the extensive and intensive experimental experience which American social science finds so essential. There are still evidences of unwillingness to come to grips with certain burning social problems where it is impossible to find a "comfortable" solution, that is, a solution in accord with traditional views. Some of these untouched problems are, for instance, corruption in the civil service, refugees, revival of irrational political movements, illegitimate children and abortions, juvenile delinquency, lack of balance between age and sex groups in the population, and so forth.

The discussion on the second day was considerably more constructive, since it concerned itself with a specific problem, the social and cultural results of the great increase of population in the 19th century. The statistical basis for the discussion was given by Dr. K. G. Specht (Europe), Professor Nels Anderson (America), and Dr. Mühlmann (Asia). There followed discussions by Professor Ilse Schwidetzky from the biological point of view, by Dr. Paul Reiwald of Geneva, a specialist in mass psychology, by the economist Professor Mackenroth of Kiel, and the historian Professor Peter Rassow of Cologne, and finally by the sociologist Professor Freyer of Wiesbaden.

The point which provoked the most discussion following the formal program was Profes-

sor Mackenroth's exposition of the relation between expansion of population and expansion of production capital, as well as the maladjustments which occur from time to time and cause either a period of large-scale unemployment or a period of labor shortage. Dr. Reiwald's discussion of the quantitative factor in the creation of masses, that is to say, masses which behave according to the now classic theories of LeBon, also provoked considerable discussion as well as some discomfort among the conservatives. Reiwald pointed out that, although the increase in population was in part a result of industrial expansion, it itself produced the need for an ever-increasing degree of large-scale organization and specialization, with the result that most individuals become steadily more dependent upon the social mechanism for their living, that the substantial content of life is gradually whittled away and replaced by a series of "functions," and with the further result that the necessary large-scale aggregation of workers produces the ideal conditions for the building of mobs and for the creation of a politically manipulable mass-mind.

Had the foregoing discussion taken place in America, it would have undoubtedly led up to the key question: Should the state adopt a positive policy with regard to restriction of population and biological selection? The German social scientists, however, have apparently not yet gotten to the point where they are able to pick up a "hot potato" of this kind and discuss it objectively. There seemed to be a fear that the grappling with actual problems under the category of "What should we do about—" would jeopardize the new and fragile unity of the social sciences, which may be likened to a premature baby who has to be kept in the incubator for a while. All in all, the conference marked considerable progress as compared with the chaotic state of affairs after the fall of the Nazi regime, but it showed equally conclusively that German social science as a whole (as distinguished from the excellent work of specific individuals) still has a long way to go.

KURT GLASER

NEWS AND ANNOUNCEMENTS

Edward L. Bernays Award. The Commission on Community Interrelations of the American Jewish Congress, headed by Research Director Dr. Stuart W. Cook, has been given the Edward L. Bernays Intergroup Relations Award, consisting of a \$1,000

U.S. Government bond, for the best original action-related plan for improving intergroup relations in the United States.

The Award was sponsored by the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, a subdivision of the American Psychological Association. The Award was presented by Gordon W. Allport, Professor of Psychology, Harvard University, and Chairman of the Judges Committee, at the convention of the American Psychological Association held September 5-9, 1949, at Denver, Colorado.

The Commission won the Bernays Award on the basis of two papers it submitted in a nationwide competition among leading social scientists. The winning papers are: "Community Self Surveys of Discriminatory Practice," by Clair Selltitz and Margot Haas Wormser; and "Incident Control Studies in Effective Answers to Common Prejudiced Remarks," by Abraham Citron and John Harding.

For 1949-50 the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues is sponsoring the Edward L. Bernays International Tensions Award. A \$1,000 U.S. Government bond will be presented to the individual or group contributing the best action-related research on the problem of reducing tensions in relations between nations.

Chairman of the Judges Committee is Dr. Robert MacLeod, Chairman of the Department of Psychology, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York. All studies submitted for this Award must be received by Dr. MacLeod in duplicate not later than July 1, 1950. All research published or completed during 1949-50 will be eligible for consideration. Manuscripts reporting such completed research, but which have not yet been published, are also eligible.

The 1948 Edward L. Bernays Atomic Energy Award was won by Professor Hornell Hart, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina.

Federal Security Agency. The theme of the Midcentury White House Conference on Children and Youth, for which planning is under way at the request of the President, "shall be to consider how we may develop in children the mental, emotional, and spiritual qualities essential to individual happiness and responsible citizenship," according to an announcement by Federal Security Administrator Oscar R. Ewing, chairman of the National Committee. The date for the Conference will be the week of December 3, 1950.

This is the fifth of the White House Conferences on Children called at 10-year intervals by the President. Earlier conferences have studied the physical and economic problems affecting children, and have resulted in improved conditions and needed legislation.

Mr. Ewing stressed that the Midcentury Conference is to be a citizen's conference, with full participation from parents and youth, as well as those working in fields of child development. He

said that numerous state committees are being formed to provide pre-conference fact finding and to promote home-town participation in Conference activities. In this, Mr. Ewing pointed out, it differs from previous conferences, since major emphasis is being placed on fact finding and recommendations beforehand, with the conference devoted to analyzing information and developing follow-up action programs.

Joint Committee on Southern Asia. The American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council have established a Joint Committee on Southern Asia for the purpose of appraising American studies relating to India, Pakistan and Southeast Asia and making plans for their further development.

The new Joint Committee is a successor to the former Committee on Indic and Iranian Studies of the ACLS. At first primarily humanistic in its orientation, the Indic and Iranian Committee later broadened its scope and membership in response to increased wartime and postwar interest in social science studies relating to India and its neighboring countries. As emphasis on social science projects continued to develop, the Committee recommended that it be replaced by a new group representing the SSRC as well as the ACLS.

At its organization meeting in April, 1949, the Joint Committee defined its sphere of concern to include both the humanities and the social sciences. Its range of interest covers ancient and modern languages and literatures, art, archaeology, philosophy, history, political science, geography, economics, sociology and anthropology. Southern Asia is understood as the area from the Pamirs to the Pacific, comprising Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bhutan, Ceylon, Burma, Indo-China, Siam, Malaya, Indonesia, and the Philippines.

For its first project the Joint Committee has undertaken to survey the present status of Southern Asia studies in the United States in terms of immediate and future resources and needs. It will also consider proposals for improving methods of research and training in the field, opening up new lines of research, overcoming practical difficulties such as are encountered in obtaining and handling the necessary materials, facilitating exchange of academic personnel, etc.

Members of the Joint Committee for 1949-50 are W. Norman Brown, University of Pennsylvania, chairman; Kingsley Davis, Columbia University; Franklin Edgerton, Yale University; John F. Embree, Yale University; Holden Furber, University of Pennsylvania; David G. Mandelbaum, University of California, with Murray B. Emeneau as alternate; Horace I. Poleman, Library of Congress; and Lauriston Sharp, Cornell University, with Morris E. Opler as alternate. Scholars or other persons desiring to bring any matter to the attention of the Joint Committee may

address communications to Alice Thorner, Executive Secretary, Box 17, Bennett Hall, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia 4, Pennsylvania.

The National Council on Family Relations will hold its Annual Conference, December 20-31, at the Hotel Park Sheraton, 56th St. and 7th Ave., New York City. Dr. Earl Koos, department of sociology, University of Rochester is program chairman.

"The Unique Contributions of the Various Professions to Family Life" is the theme of the conference in three general sessions to cover (1) attention which is focussed on and the contributions made by the various disciplines on the family; (2) how the cleavage now existing between the various professional groups can be overcome in order to work harmoniously toward the common goal of better family life; and (3) what the disciplines get from one another that we can share.

The following professions will be represented on the panels for the general sessions: pediatrics, psychiatry, social work, law, religion, home economics, education, public health, anthropology and sociology. Trips and movies of special interest have been scheduled and a joint dinner session is planned with the American Sociological Society when the president, Talcott Parsons, and president of the National Council on Family Relations, Ernest Osborn, will give presidential addresses.

Registration fees are: Members \$3.00; non-members \$5.00; students \$1.50; single sessions \$1.00.

Alabama College, Montevallo. The History and Sociology Departments have been combined into a Social Science Division with Dr. Hallie Farmer, former head of the History Department, as Head of the Division. Two promotions were made within the Division: Sidney A. Forsythe and Murray C. Flynn were raised from the rank of instructor to that of assistant professor. Two people who have been on leave for the past year have returned to their positions: Mrs. Mary Whatley who has been at the University of North Carolina completing a master's degree and Miss Lucile D. Napier, who for the past fifteen months has studied abroad, chiefly in Scotland and England. Mrs. Sigrid Gould, a graduate student at Columbia University last year, has been added to the Division.

Cornell University. The Department of Sociology and Anthropology announces the availability of several research and teaching assistantships for graduate students during the academic year 1950-51. These assistantships pay up to \$1000 for the nine-month academic year and include free tuition. Ample time is allowed for work toward one's graduate degree.

In addition to regular course study, the department is currently conducting several large-scale research projects. One of these is concerned with the impact of Western science and technology upon non-industrial areas of the Far East, India, and Latin America. Others deal with a community

approach to the study of group conflict and an empirical investigation of cultural values. Further details concerning the program or assistantships can be obtained from Lauriston Sharp, Chairman, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Morrill Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York.

Iowa State College. New instructors and research associates and assistants on the staff include: John E. Bicknell, B.S.C. and B.E., University of Alberta, M. S. Iowa State College; Kathryn Christian Collier, B.S., Iowa State College; Robert M. Dimit, B.A. and M.S., Pennsylvania State College; Robert H. Hardt, B.A., New York State Teachers College; Mrs. James A. Lowrie, B.A. and M.L., University of Pittsburgh; Blaine M. Porter, B.S. and M.A., Brigham Young University; Albert J. Shafter, B.A. and M.A., Southern Illinois University.

Dr. David M. Fulcomer, now at Drew University, will join the staff in February and direct the work in the area of marriage and the family and family sociology.

Seven members of the sociology staff contributed to the Third Iowa Community Work Conference program held at Iowa State College on October 17-18. Sponsored by the Iowa Council for Better Education as an annual community development workshop, this event enlisted participation on the part of officials and delegates from 36 state organizations, departments and commissions, 8 colleges and universities and 17 local communities. Three objectives have been advanced: (1) to clarify community needs, (2) to strengthen community organization procedures, and (3) to develop "common ground" among community workers. Dr. W. H. Stacy, Extension Sociology, Iowa State College served as chairman of the program committee.

Kent State University. Dr. Kennett W. Yeager has resigned to become Assistant Professor of Sociology at George Washington University.

George Masterton, instructor in sociology, resigned at the end of the spring quarter to reside in Britain. He is now Assistant Lecturer in the Department of Adult Education at the University of Nottingham.

Dr. Paul M. Houser has been added to the staff as Associate Professor. He was formerly a member of the Department of Sociology at the University of Maryland.

Paul Oren, Jr., has been appointed Assistant Professor. Mr. Oren did his graduate work at Yale University.

Marvin Koller has been appointed instructor in sociology. He did his graduate work at the Ohio State University.

Oscar Ritchie, instructor in sociology, has returned to the campus after a year's leave of absence at the University of Wisconsin where he was a Rosenwald Fellow.

Mrs. Lessie T. Fleming was director of a workshop for visiting teachers at the University of Georgia during the summer. While there she read a paper entitled, "The Development of the Professional Self" at the annual meeting of the State Visiting Teachers Association.

Marshall College. Dr. J. T. Richardson, formerly Head of the Department of Sociology at Centre College, has been appointed Professor of Sociology and chairman of the Department, succeeding D. Augustus Hayes, the retiring Chairman. Other members of the staff include Harold M. Hayward (Ph.D., Clark), professor of sociology, Walter Corrie (M.A., Baylor), Norman Simpkins (M.A., Marshall), and Mrs. Frances Burdette (M.A., Ohio State), instructors in sociology.

The Department of Sociology will hold a two-day Conference on Old Age during the summer of 1950, sponsored by the administration and various civic groups in Huntington. It is hoped that the State Department of Public Welfare will take an active interest in the undertaking. The social, political, economic, and medical aspects of the aged will be discussed.

Plans are under way for organizing a Sociology Club and also a chapter of Alpha Kappa Delta. These groups will lend further interest to the work of the Department where enrollment on both the undergraduate and graduate levels is greater than ever before.

The Tri-State Public Welfare Conference instituted by Dr. Hayes in the 1930's and held regularly for a number of years until interrupted by World War II will be re-instituted under the direction of Dr. Harold M. Hayward in the near future. The Department will cooperate with the different public welfare agencies in this area in re-establishing the program.

Dr. Hayes was the guest of honor at a testimonial dinner in Huntington as he closed out his period of service with Marshall College and the Department of Sociology. Administrative officials of the college, faculty members, and prominent officials of the state and community met to pay their respects to one who had served his school and community so faithfully since 1927. Dr. Hayes is now associated with Illinois Wesleyan College, but his work, personality and imprint will be a permanent part of the college and the community where he gave so generously of his time and talents.

Michigan State College. John Useem, of the University of Wisconsin, joined the teaching and Experiment Station staff in September as Associate Professor, replacing Edgar Schuler. Useem is finishing up research started in the Far East while working with military government. His Experiment Station research will center largely in the field of communication. Edgar Schuler has accepted the position as Head of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Wayne University.

Raymond Scheele joined the staff in September, replacing Asael Hansen who has accepted a position at the University of Alabama. Scheele is completing research begun while directing the field work of the inter-disciplinary project carried on in Puerto Rico under the sponsorship of the Rockefeller Foundation, Columbia University, and the University of Puerto Rico.

David Steinicke joined the staff in July as Assistant Professor in Rural Sociology and Anthropology Extension. He will develop a program of rural health extension and assist Paul Miller on the study of community organization in medical care financed by the Farm Foundation.

Gregory Stone, of the University of Illinois, joined the teaching and Experiment Station staff as Assistant Professor. He will devote most of his research activity to an Agricultural Experiment Station project dealing with the social and cultural aspects of clothing and clothing marketing behavior which will be used as a Ph. D. thesis directed by Lloyd Warner of the University of Chicago.

Milton Rokeach of the Psychology Department of Michigan State College has joined the Department of Sociology and Anthropology part time where he will teach Social Psychology. He is also a member of the committee charged with the Minority Group Study carried on by the Social Research Service under contract with the American Jewish Committee and the Anti-Defamation League of the B'nai B'rith.

G. Gordon Brown, of the University of Toronto, taught courses in cultural anthropology in the Department during the past two summer sessions.

Delbert C. Miller, of the University of Washington, spent the summer collaborating with William Form on their forthcoming book, *Industrial Sociology*, to be published by Harper and Brothers in the spring of 1950.

The final report of the High School Work Attitude Committee of the Social Research Service entitled "Youth and the World of Work" is now available for distribution.

A three weeks' Seminar on the Development of Studies and Research in the Sociological and Anthropological Aspects of Clothing was held during August by the Department of Sociology and Anthropology and the Department of Textiles, Clothing, and Related Arts. Faculty members for the seminar were Wilbur Brookover, G. Gordon Brown, Asael Hansen, Duane Gibson, Paul Honigsheim, Charles Loomis, and Christopher Sower from the Department, Kimball Young, visiting lecturer from Northwestern University, Dean Marie Dye and Hazel Strahan of the School of Home Economics at Michigan State College, Margaret L. Brue and Mary C. Witlock of the United States Department of Agriculture. Among the students at the seminar were five heads of departments of textiles and clothing. Ten different states were represented. As a demonstration in research methods, participants conducted a study of the relationship between social participa-

tion and clothing behavior among the married students living in the Michigan State College housing units. Preliminary results from the new interdisciplinary Agricultural Experiment Station clothing project being carried on by the sponsoring departments under a \$12,000 annual budget, were presented.

Mississippi State College. Marion T. Loftin has accepted an assistant professorship in Sociology and Rural Life. He is completing his work for the Ph.D. at Vanderbilt University. He spent the past year in Brazil conducting research on his thesis project.

Harald A. Pedersen received his Ph.D. degree from the University of Wisconsin in June. Dorris W. Rivers, who has been promoted to assistant professor, will be on leave during the current academic year in order to complete the residence requirements for the doctorate at Duke University.

Robert E. Galloway of the Division of Farm Population and Rural Life of U. S. Department of Agriculture has been located here to assume leadership in a cooperative research project on the use of medical services and health facilities in rural Mississippi.

Dr. W. J. Hayes of Vanderbilt University was the principal speaker at a regional meeting in May of sociologists from Mississippi and Western Alabama. Approximately 30 persons from 12 different colleges were present.

Oberlin College. Mr. James B. McKee, formerly of the University of Wisconsin, joined the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Oberlin College as an instructor, beginning with the fall term of 1949-1950.

Prairie View A & M College. In September Dr. Dean S. Yarbrough became professor and head of the Departments of Sociology, Social Service and Research. Dr. Yarbrough comes from the College of Education and Industrial Arts, Wilberforce, Ohio, where he was formerly chairman of the Department of Sociology. At Prairie View he succeeds Dr. Henry A. Bullock who resigned to accept a similar position at Dillard University, New Orleans, Louisiana.

Rhode Island State College. The Department of Sociology is being reorganized. Two new members have been added to the staff: Professors Irving Spaulding and Robert V. Gardner. This makes a staff of four, including L. Guy Brown and Helen E. Carpenter. Courses are offered in General Sociology and Anthropology. There are two basic courses: Foundations of Sociology, a study of those facts that are universally true about any culture, and Foundations of Social Psychology, facts universally true about any person, normal or abnormal, in any culture. Either course may be taken first or the two may be taken at the same time.

St. Louis University. Dr. Clement S. Mihano-

vich, director of the department of Sociology, will soon have two books published: *Current Social Problems* and *Principles of Juvenile Delinquency*, both by Bruce Publishing Company.

Announcement has been made of the appointment of Joseph Mundi as Instructor of Sociology at St. Thomas College, St. Paul, Minn. Mr. Mundi received his M.A. degree in Sociology from St. Louis University last July.

Jack Curtis, a 1949 recipient of a B.A. degree in Sociology from St. Louis University and now studying at the University of New Mexico, received the highest score on the sociology entrance exam ever awarded at New Mexico.

The 1949-1950 enrollment in the sociology department of St. Louis University numbers 46 undergraduate majors and 36 graduate majors.

A course on the American Communist Movement and a study of Social Classes have been added to the sociology curriculum. The former, to be taught by the Rev. William A. Nolan, S. J., who received his doctorate from Fordham University, will consider the tactics used by the Communist Party in America, their effectiveness, and the motivations of the Party members. The Social Classes, taught by the Rev. John L. Thomas, S.J., who received his doctorate at the University of Chicago, is a study of modern social problems arising from the Industrial Revolution and the solving of the problems in the light of the encyclicals.

University of Illinois. J. W. Albig, Chairman of the Department, is on leave of absence for the present semester. He has gone to Washington, D.C., to do research and writing on two volumes he has in preparation. During his absence the affairs of the Department are in the hands of an administrative committee composed of D. R. Taft, F. Znaniecki, and B. F. Timmons.

Additions to the staff include: E. H. Shideler, Associate Professor, formerly of the now disbanded Galesburg Branch of the University of Illinois; F. W. Terrien, Lecturer, from Yale, who has a joint appointment with the Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations of the University; Helen Bond and Mildred L. Flebbe, as research assistants; and G. M. Epstein, Eleanor Godfrey, Robert E. Richards, and Arnold A. Sio, as teaching assistants.

Professor Oscar Lewis has returned from a summer of anthropological field work in Western Spain, and Professor John C. McGregor from a summer of archeological field work in Arizona.

Promotions in the Department include: J. E. Hulett, Jr., to Associate Professor; Margaret Chandler and Donald Wray to Assistant Professors.

Professor Richard Dewey is spending half-time with the University of Illinois Small Homes Council in research.

D. E. Lindstrom, Professor of Rural Sociology, is on leave during the current semester. He has gone to Sweden where he is studying the social policy relating to rural life.

University of Mississippi. Beginning with the Fall semester, the Sociology Department was reconstituted as a Department of Sociology and Anthropology. Dr. Morton B. King, Jr., Professor of Sociology, continues as Chairman. Dr. Julien R. Tatum became Associate Professor of Sociology and Anthropology, specializing in rural sociology and cultural anthropology. Dr. William G. Haag joined the staff in September from the University of Kentucky where he taught anthropology and was Curator of the Museum of Anthropology. As Associate Professor of Anthropology, he will offer courses in anthropology and archaeology and conduct research and field training in Amerindian archaeology. This work is in cooperation with Professor David M. Robinson of the Department of Classics. Dr. Alfred C. Schnur joined the department in June as Assistant Professor of Sociology. He will work entirely in the field of criminology and corrections, spending half of his time in campus teaching and half in research and consultative services. Graduate work is being offered in the above mentioned fields and fellowships are available to qualified candidates for the Master's degree. Regular meetings are held with the sociology staff at Mississippi State College looking toward the coordination of both teaching and research activities, especially in the rural field.

University of Missouri. Dr. Arthur S. Emig, Professor of Sociology at the University of Missouri, died suddenly on September 26th. Professor Emig had been a member of the staff since 1927. From 1931 to 1939 he served as chairman of the department. During recent years he offered courses in The Family and Sociological Theory. He will be sincerely missed both by students and his colleagues.

Warren A. Peterson, a candidate for the doctorate at the University of Chicago, has been appointed as instructor in the Department of Sociology.

University of North Carolina. Gordon W. Blackwell was visiting professor at Columbia University during the summer session.

Lee M. Brooks was elected President of the Southern Sociological Society at its annual meeting in April.

Gordon W. Blackwell, Lee M. Brooks, and S. H. Hobbs, Jr., are co-authors of *Church and Community in the South*, published by the John Knox Press.

Joffre Coe devoted a major part of the past summer to archeological researches in North Carolina.

Leo Crespi will join the Department of Sociology and Anthropology and the Department of Psychology as Professor of social psychology and research professor in the Institute for Research in Social Science in the spring. He has been teaching in Princeton University and is now completing a special European assignment in public opinion research for Military Government.

John Gillin has been reappointed to the National Research Council for 1949-1952, representing the American Anthropological Association. He is also serving as a member of the Research Advisory Committee of the U. S. Children's Bureau.

Harriet L. Herring is author of *Passing of the Mill Village: Revolution in a Southern Institution*, a publication of the University of North Carolina Press.

Reuben Hill joined the Department in September, resigning at Iowa State College. As professor of sociology and research professor in the Institute for Research in Social Science, he will give courses in marriage and family relationships and carry on research in these fields, continuing the work of the late Professor Ernest R. Groves. During the summer, Professor Hill participated in workshops on Education in Family Life at Columbia University and the University of West Virginia. His study, *Families Under Stress: Adjustment to the Crisis of War Separation and Reunion*, has just been published by Harper and Brothers.

Guy B. Johnson, continued, during the summer, his researches in Robeson County, North Carolina, where he is studying a tri-racial community.

Harold D. Meyer was the delegate from the United States to a special Conference of the Advisory Committee on Recreation of the International Labor Office of the United Nations held in Geneva, Switzerland, October 31 to November 3, 1949, which was attended by some 25 delegates appointed on a national basis. Professor Meyer is Director of the North Carolina Recreation Commission.

E. William Noland has come to the Department from the University of Iowa. He is professor of the newly created chair in Industrial Sociology and research professor in this field in the Institute for Research in Social Science. In addition to his teaching, Professor Noland has done considerable work in personnel and public relations in industry and is co-author with E. Wight Bakke of the recently released *Workers Wanted: A Study of Employers' Hiring Policies, Preferences, and Practices*, published by Harper and Brothers.

Howard W. Odum has received the Master Breeder Award of the American Jersey Cattle Club for his "outstanding accomplishments" and "notable contribution" in his genetic line-breeding experiments in developing the Royal Louisxords in which he followed balanced line breeding rather than overspecialization.

Daniel O. Price will be visiting lecturer at Harvard University in the spring term of the current academic year.

Rupert B. Vance has been appointed a consultant to the Committee on Demographic Studies of the United Nations to assist in the preparation of a report on prerequisites to international migration. Professor Vance continues his services as a member of the Technical Advisory Committee to the 1950 Census of Population.

University of South Dakota. Albert Blumenthal, former chairman of the department of sociology at the College of Puget Sound, joined the staff in September as Associate Professor of Sociology. Wesley R. Hurt, from the University of Michigan, in September assumed his duties as Director of the Over Museum and is teaching the anthropology courses in the department of Sociology. Dr. and Mrs. Forrest Weller are presenting a series of broadcasts over the local university station, on "Your Family" and topics related to home-building, as a means of reaching a larger audience than has been possible by weekend family institutes.

University of Utah. Dr. William M. McPhee, Assistant Professor of Sociology and Clinical Psychologist in the Bureau of Student Counsel, was an American delegate to the Second World Mental Health Assembly recently held in Geneva. He was appointed to serve on the committee dealing with mental health of the college student.

Dr. Kimball Young, professor and chairman of the Department of Sociology, Northwestern University, will conduct an Institute in Social Psychology at the University of Utah, February 23 to March 5, 1950.

Dr. Lowry Nelson, Professor of Sociology, University of Minnesota, will teach courses in rural social institutions and rural community organization during the Spring Quarter, 1950.

The Graduate School of Social Work has launched its second year of graduate training leading to the M.S.W. degree. Dr. Arthur L. Beeley is chairman of the Department of Sociology and Dean of the Graduate School of Social Work.

Vanderbilt University. Dr. Emílio Willems has assumed his duties as Visiting Professor of Anthropology in the Department of Sociology, and also is associated with the Institute for Brazilian Studies. He comes to Vanderbilt University from the University of São Paulo, Brazil. Editor (1939-1949) of *Sociologia*, his studies have concerned cultural change in immigrant and native peasant communities.

Dr. Olen E. Leonard, formerly of the University of Texas, has been appointed Professor of Sociology, and Mr. Roy A. Clifford, also of the University of Texas, has been appointed Assistant Professor. Professor Leonard is now finishing a manuscript on his studies in Bolivia.

Mr. Clark S. Knowlton, recipient of the Simon Bolivar Fellowship (1949-1950), will leave in January for field studies in Brazil.

Wayne University. Dr. Edgar A. Schuler, from Michigan State College, has been appointed Professor and Chairman of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology. He replaces Dr. H. Warren Dunham, who had been acting chairman since September, 1947 and who resigned from this position. Last April Dr. Dunham was elected president of the Ohio Valley Sociological Society.

The U. S. Public Health Service has awarded a grant of \$19,364 to Wayne University for a study under the direction of Dr. Joseph W. Eaton on "Cultural and Psychiatric Factors in the Mental Health of the Hutterites." Dr. Eaton will be assisted in this project by a psychiatrist and a psychologist. Dr. Eaton has also been appointed to the City of Detroit Common Council Grade Separation Committee. Dr. Edward Jandy has been appointed to the Michigan Governor's Advisory Committee on Corrections for a term expiring in 1954. Dr. Stephen W. Mamchur has been appointed Director of the Family Counseling Division of Relations Development Corporation. Dr. Mamchur is also national representative of Beta of Michigan, Alpha Kappa Delta, which was reactivated in June, 1949. Frank E. Hartung and Harold L. Sheppard have recently received their doctorates from the University of Michigan and the University of Wisconsin, respectively.

The Wayne University Sociological Society has completed its fourth, and most successful year, with a current contributing membership of over two hundred and an annual budget of \$500. During the year two issues of the Wayne University Sociologist were circulated. The mailing list consists of 1800 ex-majors and other sociologists and social workers. Ten programs were presented including lectures by Dr. George Friedman of the Sorbonne, Dr. Alfred Kraessel of the University of San Marcos, and a panel of German social democrats from Berlin. The new officers for the current year are Donald C. Marsh, president, Norman D. Humphrey, vice president, Gladys E. Naus, secretary, and Ester R. Semrau, treasurer.

New instructors in the Department include the following, each of whom is working towards the doctorate at the university mentioned: Peter M. Blau, Columbia University; James C. Brown, University of Minnesota; Bernice Kaplan, University of Chicago; Melvin J. Ravitz, University of Michigan; and George Vuckan, University of North Carolina.

The 1949 summer session staff included the following from outside the regular departmental staff: Dr. Melvin Tumin, Princeton University; Dr. Samuel M. Strong, Chairman of the Sociology Department at Carleton College; Charles LeBeaux, University of Arizona; and Melvin J. Ravitz, University of Michigan.

Washington University (St. Louis). The following persons joined the department staff in September: David B. Carpenter, recently Chief Statistician for MacArthur's Headquarters in Tokyo; Elizabeth E. Bacon, from the University of California in Los Angeles; and Lucian W. Pye, from Yale University.

West Virginia University. Miss Ann Garver, previously of the University of Minnesota, has been added to the Department of Sociology as Instructor.

OBITUARY

JOHN STEWART BURGESS, 1883-1949

It is both painful and difficult to compose a memorial testimonial to a friend and colleague of many years. It is difficult since many of the events in his life occurred before the friendship started and thus a sense of proportion is difficult of attainment. The writer, however, had the distinct privilege of knowing John Stewart Burgess for a period of fifteen years and was always proud to call him friend. His passing at Claremont, California on August 16, 1949, is regretted by all who knew him and particularly by the large circle of people who counted him as their friend and counsellor.

Stewart Burgess was born at Pennington, New Jersey on August 12, 1883. He was educated at Lawrenceville and Princeton, graduating from the latter institution in 1905, cum laude. He attended Oberlin College as a graduate student in 1907-08 and again later in 1915-16. He also studied at Union Theological Seminary. He received his Master's degree from Columbia in 1909 and his Doctor of Philosophy degree in 1928.

He began his professional work in Kyota, Japan as a teacher of commercial subjects and served as a volunteer in the Y.M.C.A. In 1909 he went to Peiping under the auspices of Princeton University and soon became metropolitan secretary for the Y.M.C.A. In that capacity he led in the establishment of modern social work and was instrumental in organizing a student social service club as well as a federation of community councils. He was also active in famine relief and established a maternity hospital.

In 1919 he was called to become chairman of the first department of sociology at Yenching University and in 1928 organized the university's College of Applied Sciences. His many years in China developed within him a great love for the Chinese people which he maintained throughout his later life. Hundreds of Chinese intellectuals have profound respect for his sympathetic warmth toward the struggling people of that great country.

The second episode in the professional career of Stewart Burgess began in 1930 when he went to Pomona College in California to accept an associate professorship in sociology. After three years at Pomona he was asked to go to Temple University to become chairman of the growing department of sociology in that large urban center. He remained there for fifteen years where, in addition to his teaching, he took an active and dynamic part in student-faculty relations and community activities. He saw the department grow in numbers, introduced one of the first courses in the country in Marriage and Family Relations, in which he wrote an excellent syllabus which became widely used, and interested himself in community councils and other urban activities.

For several summers Dr. Burgess was chairman of the faculty of the Wellesley Institute of Social Progress and, during the war, served as a consultant

in the Welfare Division of UNNRA and as a training officer for persons going to China with that organization.

It would be difficult to list his many other activities. He taught one year at Macalester College as visiting professor. He was a trustee of the Princeton-Yenching Foundation. He served on the boards of many welfare organizations in Philadelphia during his fifteen years' residence in that city.

But community activity was not Stewart Burgess' greatest contribution, important as it was. The inspiration of his teaching was one of his greatest assets. His students loved him as did all those closely associated with him professionally. His genial smile, his Socratic teaching technique, his sympathy for the overworked and harassed student, characterized his student relationships. We who worked closely with him through the years respected him as a scholar. But he always insisted that knowledge had a purpose, it must be put to use to make the world a better habitation by eliminating prejudice, intolerance and superstition. In the later years of his life he became intrigued with modern social movements and was busy writing a book in that area. He contributed many articles to the professional journals dealing with this subject. His many sociology courses in Class and Race, the Far East, Modern Social Movements, and the Sociology of Religion were stimulating and thought-provoking. He was, in truth, a student's teacher.

He retired from the chairmanship of the department at Temple in 1948, because of ill-health, but after resting for a semester, returned to his classes. In June of this year, at the age of 66, he thought it expedient to retire as emeritus although he could have remained on the staff for four more years had he so wished. In June he cleared up his private affairs and left for Claremont, California where he anticipated a quiet leisurely life in the atmosphere of that small college community. It is particularly poignant that his death occurred only two months after he left Philadelphia. He is survived by his widow, Stella C. Fisher Burgess and two sons, David and Vinton.

NEGLEY K. TEETERS

Temple University

JOHN MORRIS GILLETTE, 1866-1949

Dr. John Morris Gillette died in a Grand Forks, North Dakota hospital on September 24, 1949, at the age of 83. His death followed an illness of less than twelve hours. Dr. Gillette joined the faculty of the University of North Dakota at Grand Forks in 1907 and founded the Department of Sociology and Anthropology in that institution in 1908. He served as professor and chairman of the Department until 1948, when he relinquished the chairmanship of the Department and retired from active teaching in order to devote full time to writing and research.

Dr. Gillette was often referred to as the dean of rural sociology because of the formative influence that his pioneer works in the field had in this and

other countries. A review of college catalogue offerings in sociology for a considerable period following the appearance of his *Constructive Rural Sociology* in 1913, and the first edition of his *Rural Sociology* in 1922, reveals the preeminence of his position in this expanding field, over many years. His early works in rural sociology attracted wide attention throughout the world, and translations of his books were used in various European universities and in the Imperial University of Japan.

Dr. Gillette's intellectual interests ranged far and wide. In addition to his work in rural sociology, he wrote books in such related areas as general sociology, education, the family, and social problems. He also published numerous articles and pamphlets on a variety of subjects, including anthropology, regionalism, and weather. His intellectual activity and mental acuity showed no signs of impairment right up to the time of his death. His outstanding investigation showing a definite scientific relation between variable weather conditions and the economic status of a people, as well as a number of other researches, were done after his 80th year.

He was actively engaged during the last year of his life on several projects including a sociological interpretation of the life and times of the Great Plains during his 83 years. During the week of his death he had written me a letter about a forthcoming revision of our *Problems of a Changing Social Order*, to which he had been devoting considerable time and interest.

Dr. Gillette's scholarly achievements and remarkable personality brought him many honors at home and abroad. He had been First Vice President and President of the American Sociological Society, associate member of the International Institute of Sociology, and advisory member of the Academy of Agriculture of Czechoslovakia. He was awarded two honorary degrees—the Doctor of Laws by Park College and the Doctor of Humanities from the University of North Dakota, which he had served for forty-two years. Dr. Gillette's humanitarian interests brought him into numerous state and community activities. Among these were the Grand Forks City Council, the North Dakota State Welfare Committee, the advisory board of the National Child Labor Committee, and the advisory committee of the National Committee on Prisons and Prison Labor. He had served also as a member of the advisory committee on personnel of the North Dakota State Workmen's Compensation and Unemployment Insurance Division, and was for a time Vice President and then President of the Grand Forks Charity Organization Society.

Dr. Gillette received his Bachelor of Arts Degree from Park College in 1895. He received a Masters Degree from Princeton Theological Seminary in the same year, and for a while thereafter

preached in rural churches near Topeka, Kansas, and in the frontier town of Dodge City, where his sermons against saloons and gambling brought threats against his life. In 1899 he was granted a Ph.D. by the Chicago Theological Seminary; and in 1901 he received his Doctorate in Sociology from the University of Chicago. Between 1901 and 1907 he served as President of the Academy for Young Women at Jackson, Illinois, and later as professor of psychology and social sciences at the Valley State Teachers College in North Dakota.

His pen was never magniloquent, but it was never slumberous and never cold. Always he wrote with the painstaking resolution of a responsible scholar.

He was a great admirer of William James, and I think it was partly because he, like James, had a profound respect for the opinions of "ordinary" people. Once after he had been talking to a woodcutter, he said to me, "These 'ordinary' people wrestle with verities; we 'experts' manipulate variables." He could learn from his students too. Students fresh from farm and village always delighted him. I have seen his face light up with a sort of vigilant expectancy when some admiring student offered a contrary observation. This easy give-and-take was the very heart of the Gillette teaching technique. It never allowed his classroom manner to harden into "scientific" doctrine, or his doubts to become "neat expandable clarities." He never fell under the dominance of his own vocabulary as so often happens when academicians lose their zest and acquire academic prestige. This, I believe, is one reason why his graduate seminars were always a source of infectious satisfaction.

As may be guessed from what I have said, there was a certain tender greatness about the man, discerned imperfectly at best by those who never sat in his classroom and never knew him surrounded by his family and intimate friends. He recognized no "chosen" people and no "pagans," and he avoided identity with any sort of group that might set him apart from the whole "run" of mankind.

He loved nature, and the changing seasons were for him a source of endless delight. Wild ducks circling Lake Julia on a gray September dawn, the return of life to the little strip of woodland that skirted his home in Grand Forks, the north wind on his face in the dead of a North Dakota winter, were for him a part of man's great adventure on this globe. He belonged to the earth. He felt a kinship with the myriad forms of life that inhabit it, and he loved it.

Dr. Gillette is survived by his wife, Margaret Carolyn Morgan Gillette; a daughter, Margaret K. Rockwell; and a granddaughter, Margaret J. Rockwell, all of Grand Forks.

JAMES M. REINHARDT

University of Nebraska

BOOK REVIEWS



✓ *Democracy in Jonesville*. By W. LLOYD WARNER and Associates. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949. xiii, 313 pp. \$4.50.

In the methodological note to *Black Metropolis*, the senior author of *Democracy in Jonesville* indicated an intention of applying the comparative method of cultural anthropology to a European (in this case, American) society. This volume carries his aim forward by adding a case study of a midwestern town to his previous work on the South, New England, the northern Negro and the school system. Consequently the book holds no great surprises for the constant reader. The basic frame of reference is the role of social class in the community and the analysis is performed in the author's already familiar fashion.

Between the first chapter on historical backgrounds and the last on "social logics" are a series of chapters written by several members of the research team on various important areas of community life upon which social class impinges. These include materials on political, recreational, economic and religious organization as well as on social mobility, minority relations, problems of town and country, and community participation in World War II. The work is summarized in twenty-six statements which the author names "the social logics" of the community.

The chief function of the book appears to be the addition of still another case analysis to the "community reputational" approach to the study of the community. In this limited area little need be said about the work except to raise the familiar questions concerning the inability of the approach to answer any questions about the *system* within which people come to occupy the positions they do. That is, we again read that classes can be identified by their characteristics (in this volume, in fact, this is systematized into an Index of Status Characteristics) but still are uninformed as to whether these characteristics determine or are determined by class position.

Warner, however, does not restrict the significance of *Democracy in Jonesville* as narrowly as does the reviewer. In fact he extends its implications in three dimensions; temporal,

spatial, and theoretic. The book is subtitled "The rising tide of class distinction." This certainly warrants an expectation that trend data will be presented. The reader, however, will look in vain for systematic generational data, or for references to a fixed point of comparison in the way that 1890 was used by the Lynds in their studies of Middletown. To establish a base, the first chapter (twenty-one pages) sketches the history of the region from the days of the explorers, through the pioneer period, to modern industrialization. It is poor reasoning indeed to assume that the change from pioneer to urban life indicates a "rising tide of class distinction."

The spatial extension of the findings to "The Jonesvilles, Smithtowns, Greenfields . . . (and even) Dallas, Seattle, Indianapolis, Buffalo . . ." is an even more serious matter. An inherent difficulty in the application of the anthropological approach to urban society has apparently not yet been grasped by the author. His concept of American (also European?) society as a series of parallel communities, each a microcosm of the whole society, certainly does not reflect the findings with respect to regional specialization and variation. While it may be safe to assume that in a folk or peasant society the individual is born to a clan, a tribe, or a village, and does not depart therefrom, such an assumption about the modern United States is obviously ill-founded. Consequent upon the fact of ours being an urban and industrial society are two factors apparently not considered by Warner. First, "the five classes" (which the author assures us *were there* [italics added], and not brought by the researcher) would not be present in New York, New Orleans, or Seattle. Or should they be, their I.S.C. (Index of Status Characteristics) would be vastly different. By the book's definition, they would thus be different classes. Second, periods of great migration have had obvious and powerful effects upon vertical mobility. *Democracy in Jonesville* discusses mobility with no data, and indeed, with scarcely a reference to in- and out-migration. The only such reference, in fact, is to the point that some of the "old families" are "plagued" by the

departure of some "rappers" to California and Chicago, indicating again perhaps that the effect of these distant areas is present even in Jonesville. The major point, however, is that the book attempts to generalize about America from the cases of those who remained in a small midwestern city.

The third extension of the book, the theoretic, is accomplished by a two-page discussion of "collective representations" and "totemic symbols." This chapter seems tacked on, and the data from Jonesville cast as little light upon the concepts as the concepts do upon the data.

It is difficult to appraise the way the data are handled since in some places they are simply given *in toto*, and in others summarizing measures are used. One whole chapter, for example, is a semi-fictional account of a student whose school career was threatened by her class position, whereas another chapter is a crude sort of ecological analysis employing graphs, a map, double page tables, and a formula for computing the I.S.C. No doubt, in a work written by several authors such different approaches are as inevitable as is the existence of a wide range of skills. The chapter on "Status in the High School" is an example of the best presentation and analysis of data in the volume. The least adequate is the chapter on town and country, which presents a typology ("squire farmer," "old landowner," "dirt farmer," and "lower-lowers") which is totally incomprehensible in another part of the corn belt familiar to the reviewer. In addition, this chapter discusses farm mobility without reference to either the numbers of losses of farms in the depression or the frequency of farm purchase since 1938.

Space does not permit a detailed analysis of each section of the book, but these examples of the most and least adequate chapters may indicate the range to be found within the volume. Seen as a case study in the application of the comparative anthropological method to modern society, the book presents some useful materials; and it is, at any rate, "concrete and interesting."

PAUL K. HATT

Northwestern University

Unions and Capitalism. By CHARLES E. LINDBLOM. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949. xiv, 267 pp. \$3.75.

The thesis of this book is simple and revolutionary. "This is the great labor problem of our

time. Unionism is destroying the competitive price system." (p. 4)

Lindblom begins with the admission that he cannot prove his thesis in a statistical sense. He then proceeds to subject unionism as an institution to analytical treatment buttressed by occasional illustrations from the labor market place. Finding unionism a monopoly, the author suggests possible reforms which will save any price system from the destructive effects of union monopoly. He concludes, however, that "every proposed avenue of reform has brought us to a dead end." (p. 252) Marx insisted that capitalism contained the seeds of its own destruction. Lindblom sees the hardy growth of unionism, well rooted in a politically democratic capitalistic society, as the sweeping force which will administer the *coup de grâce*. Between the statement of the thesis and the economist's revolutionary conclusion lie interesting chapters of social science analysis in the sweeping manner of a Veblen.

The structure of Lindblom's argument can be briefly summarized. Unions are monopolies because their basic wage policies are designed to replace the criterion of consumer-satisfaction by producer-satisfaction for price setting in the product market. The political organization of unions enforces this trend because the policy-setting majority in the union can always shift with changes in employment. Union power in collective bargaining is based upon the ability to control employer decisions in the labor market (and not, as is usually assumed by economists, upon ability to control entry of workers into a labor market). Neither employer resistance nor inflation, unemployment or presently oriented governmental policy is capable of checking the growth of union monopoly. The net outcome from the standpoint of control of economic enterprises is syndicalism, with union and employer combining to enforce producer-oriented criteria in the product market in place of the traditional consumer-oriented criteria. This syndicalism is a direct product of the nature of union power and turns the union control over employer decisions into collaboration for mutual exploitation of consumers. The inevitable outcome of union monopoly or syndicalism is unemployment, inflation, or both. Thus the competitive price system is unstabilized, initially by union and management monopoly acting unilaterally, and ultimately by class collaboration through a syndicalistic control of industry.

Lindblom thus presents the policy makers

with one charmingly paradoxical alternative to class warfare as a basis for revolution: class collaboration can also provide it by destroying the competitive price system! This is an intriguing course of action, indeed, for the practicing revolutionary's consideration.

It is but fair to point out that Lindblom does not argue from an ideal model of economic organization—à la Hayek, for example. He accepts the values of American capitalistic society, but sees in their incompatibility with a competitive price system the chink in the armor through which union monopoly and industrial syndicalism can thrust the death dealing weapon. For instance, he concludes that one solution is destruction of unions, but cannot accept this as politically feasible for public policy. Implicit in the author's methodology is his conception of society as a complex of value systems and institutional forms which at any given time show various degrees of integration. The basic conflict in our society lies between the values of industrial democracy and dignity of labor on the one hand, and the institutional imperative that under a competitive price system labor must perforce be viewed only as one cost in production on the other. Our value system and institutional forms do not coincide. But the grotesque thing about it is the fact that the value systems and institutional forms are being driven further apart rather than coming into some kind of congruence with each other. There is here, implicitly, a theory of social change which gives small comfort to the proponents of cultural gradualism, those who make use of such concepts as assimilation and accommodation and cooperation to explain how the great society protects itself from revolution.

It is most refreshing to have a labor economist undertake an analysis of our total society and the implications for labor. Sumner Slichter, almost alone among present day students of labor, has tried such over-all analysis; and he has performed a signal service in popularizing the term "laboristic society" to contrast with capitalistic society. Too many of today's students in sociology, economics, and psychology have become mere personnel technicians and peddlers of "how to do it" techniques. Lindblom's book should force them to the recognition that scientists need to analyze processes before they try to write prescriptions.

Some will call this book anti-union, others anti-capital. It is neither. It analyzes a society and attempts to delineate some crucial processes

of social change occurring in it. Whether or not readers agree with the analysis, there should be consensus that it has opened a vital field for future study. For example, it should be read in conjunction with a book like Galenson's *Labor in Norway* and with studies of British and Russian trade union experiences. The problem in any kind of economic system is the same: trade unions as wage-fixing institutions. Perhaps Lindblom himself will undertake to extend his analysis to socialism and communism.

Even if there be scant agreement on Lindblom's total analysis, he has made a brilliant and lasting contribution in illuminating the character of union power. Gone forever should be the economist's analogical conclusion that union power is of a kind with the power of bargainers in a factor market. More realistic and powerful as an analytical tool is Lindblom's perception of union power as control over the employer's decisions with respect to the labor market. It makes sense and gives meaning to many collective bargaining practices that are often catalogued but seldom effectively interpreted.

ROBERT DUBIN

University of Illinois

The Negro in the United States. By E. FRANKLIN FRAZIER. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1949. xxxi, 767 pp. \$6.00.

Anticipating comparison with Myrdal's *An American Dilemma*, with which work the author of this volume was associated, Dr. Frazier notes that whereas Myrdal "was concerned with broad social policy in dealing with the Negro problem," he is concerned "with the emergence of the Negro as a minority group and his gradual integration into American life." Frazier is not concerned with the Negro as a social problem but as a sociological problem, the problem of understanding how the Negro is at once differentiated from, and integrated into, the American social order, and the changes that have occurred and are occurring in these relationships.

This purpose leads the author to sketch the African background of the Negro and to outline the evolution of domestic and industrial slavery in America within the context of the plantation system. The rise of the free Negro and the occurrence of a number of slave revolts signified important changes in the slave system and in race relations even before the Civil War.

But it was that war which set in operation a

long drawn out process of emancipation, a process not yet terminated, and which steadily has moved the Negro into new divisions of labor, disrupted old habits, and given him a new conception of himself. The wholesale migration of Negroes to cities, South as well as North, is a late phase of this process of emancipation. In the dynamics of American urban civilization the race problem has assumed a new form and attained a new significance. For one thing the Negro population is ceasing to be a caste-like rural folk and is becoming a vocal, highly race conscious minority group. This is reflected in the transformation of the old institutions of the Negro community and in the rise of new institutions. These institutions, separately and collectively, are discussed in Parts 3 and 4. The discussion of the Negro's problems of adjustment to the larger American society follows logically in Part 5. Here race prejudice and discrimination are treated along with health, family disorganization, crime, unemployment, and mental deficiency problems.

The story of the Negro, as Frazier tells it, is a veritable epic. In the long perspective of history we are led to view the transformation of diverse African tribesmen into a more or less homogenous Negro race vis-a-vis a white race. The traits which physical anthropologists characterize as negroid may have been bred into the black man by the African environment but, sociologically speaking, America and not Africa is the birthplace of the Negro race. Crèvecoeur's question, "What, then, is the American, this new man?" may be asked about the black American as well as the white.

In the final section of the book Frazier lists some of the gains made by the Negro in the process of integration into American society and concludes that it is not likely these gains will be lost. To retain and extend them is not only a democratic duty or a romantic ideal; it also is good national policy. Thus Frazier comes out about where Myrdal came out when he says, "The American nation is committed to certain principles, the most important of which are human freedom and human equality, and in its bid for the support of the colored majority in the world, the treatment of the Negro can become its greatest asset." No serious student of race relations in America is likely to conclude otherwise.

The work is referred to throughout as a "study," but, although it is a scholarly undertaking within a general sociological framework

and with many fresh insights, its comprehensive and survey character indicate that the author was concerned primarily to produce a textbook. The few existing textbooks in this field are entirely out of date and, in view of the fact that the number of college courses on the Negro and race relations have been multiplying rapidly during the past decade or so, a good textbook is needed. Some teachers might want questions and additional reading references following each chapter, but those who dislike such ready-made spoon-feeding will find Frazier's book an excellent textbook.

It is a curious thing in a field where the literature is so vast that there should be so few textbooks. In this respect the field of race relations contrasts sharply with a field like rural sociology where textbooks have multiplied. If Frazier's book is followed by other textbooks, as seems likely, the textbook era upon which we may be entering in the field of race relations may extend the area of formal knowledge about the Negro but reduce the amount of personal and human knowledge about him. Students of textbooks may learn a great deal more than they ever knew before about the Negro, but our white students, at least, may know much less about Negroes.

EDGAR T. THOMPSON

Duke University

The American Soldier: Combat and Its Aftermath (Studies in Social Psychology in World War II, Vol. II). By SAMUEL A. STOUFFER, ARTHUR A. LUMSDAINE, MARION HARPER LUMSDAINE, ROBIN M. WILLIAM, JR., M. BREWSTER SMITH, IRVING L. JANIS, SHIRLEY A. STAR, and LEONARD S. COTTRELL, JR. Princeton, N.J.; Princeton University Press, 1949. 657 pp. \$7.50.

Why is an anthropologist asked to review a book which lies completely outside his field? Obviously not to assess specific methods and conclusions in an area alien to his specialty, for this will naturally be done more competently in reviews in other journals and in those of other volumes of the same series in this one. Presumably it is hoped that he will examine the work from the broadest perspective of social science, just as he is professionally accustomed to view our own society from a cross-cultural orientation.

Assuming this to be our mission, we can dispose rapidly of specific content. Volume II of *The American Soldier* organizes an immense

body of data on attitudes and motivations in relation to combat performance, on the control of fear in battle, on the morale of aviation personnel, on the prediction of psychoneurotic disabilities, and on the problems of combat replacement, rotation, reassignment, demobilization, and readjustment to civilian status. The data are classified and presented in tabular and graphic form so as to bring out innumerable correlations and associations among them. The relationships established are in part purely empirical, as is inevitable in any pioneer work, but in considerable part they also reflect hypotheses at a fairly sophisticated level of theoretical abstraction. Always, however, the authors steer a judicious course between the Scylla and Charybdis of social science—elaboration of the trite to starboard and, on the port side, overrefinement of theory in relation to the factual material controlled. Theorists will doubtless take soundings in these waters for years to come, but the work itself is precisely what it ought to be, namely, an intelligent presentation of the immediate conclusions of the most ambitious program of applied research in the history of social science.

Genuine science always aims at the control of phenomena and not merely at their intellectual understanding—the more limited objective of, for example, history and philosophy. In accordance with this aim, the volume under consideration emphasizes relationships between antecedent operations and subsequent events by means of which a measure of control can be exerted over the latter. As examples we may instance the significant positive correlations established between:

1. Precombat attitudes of unwillingness or unreadiness for combat and subsequent nonbattle casualty rates by military units.
2. Favorable attitudes toward combat in training and subsequent individual performance under fire.
3. Refusal or hesitancy to make a mock parachute jump from a tower at the beginning of paratroop training and subsequent permanent disqualification.
4. Critical scores on neuropsychiatric screening tests and subsequent diagnosis of psychoneurosis.

It is perhaps no exaggeration to assert that a military establishment which fully accepted and acted upon the social science conclusions and implications of this and the companion volumes could double the effectiveness of its

armed forces—could literally fight another war as successfully with half the manpower plus social science as with double the manpower minus social science. If General Osborn deserves major credit for the Research Branch and its work, history may ultimately rank him among the outstanding military innovators of World War II.

In view of the epoch-making significance of *The American Soldier* it would be ungenerous to point to its occasional imperfections. It may not be amiss, however, to express the utopian wish that the data gathered and assessed had been as rich in other subjects of social science concern as in those pertinent specifically to social psychology. Would that we had been given, for example, a comparable body of information on such important cultural and societal factors as ethnic group and social class affiliations, as a basis for further statistical inductions. We are grateful, nevertheless, that social science has been advanced substantially on one front. In addition, Stouffer and his associates have contributed as much in actuality to the morale of their professional colleagues as they have potentially to that of their country's armed forces.

GEORGE PETER MURDOCK

Yale University

Removal and Return: The Socio-Economic Effects of the War on Japanese Americans.

By LEONARD BLOOM and RUTH RIEMER. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1949. x, 259 pp. \$3.75 (paper, \$2.75).

The evacuation of the Japanese minority from the Pacific Coast in 1942 and their problems of adjustment have already been the subject of a number of publications; but the present volume, the first systematic study of the evacuees since their return to the Pacific Coast, is unique in its attempt to assess the net effects of the evacuation by comparing the conditions in a single Japanese American community before and after the mass uprooting and return.

The study is limited generally to Los Angeles County, the major area of concentration of Japanese Americans, and also to a consideration mainly of the changes in the economy and occupational structure of this community. Within this scope, an interesting analysis is presented of (1) the changes in occupational status, (2) the institutional changes in three major in-

dustries, and (3) the evacuation losses of the Japanese minority.

In pre-war Los Angeles, as elsewhere on the Pacific Coast, the Japanese Americans were heavily engaged in private family enterprises, both farm and business. Bloom and Riemer show by tables and vivid graphic portrayal that the returned evacuees have, on the whole, failed to reestablish themselves in private enterprise; that they have rather been forced into wage working positions as craftsmen, operatives, and foremen, with a corresponding decline in status and economic stability. Other changes of occupational status are similarly depicted by tracing individual careers between 1941 and 1946, the predominant trend in which appears to be downward. Some striking differences of pattern are shown for those of different pre-war status, age-class, and sex.

The weakened position of the Japanese minority within the Los Angeles economy is made especially clear in the account of what has happened to its former dominance over local agriculture and the produce distribution system. Upon the basis of an early superiority gained in the production of certain truck crops, an elaborate system of wholesale and retail distribution of produce was evolved that strongly entrenched the group in the produce trade. The authors show that the destruction of this complex by the evacuation also destroyed the competitive advantages of the group, severely handicapping their return to this type of employment. The weakest chapters are those on the estimates of evacuation losses.

The chief criticism of this study touches on the fundamental question of its data. The important tables are based on a survey conducted at a trailer housing project in Long Beach where several hundred evacuee families settled at the time of their return to Los Angeles. The sample included schedules from 226 families, three quarters of the evacuee residents of the project at the time of the survey, and from 77 additional families outside the project who volunteered information. The authors' claims of the representativeness of this sample for the Japanese minority of Los Angeles County as a whole appear questionable, particularly because they indicate no systematic checks upon the representativeness of the sample.

Nevertheless, the study was conducted on a subject of importance for which good data were obviously difficult to get. The reviewer, from his familiarity with the situation, finds no

reason to question the general conclusions offered, and welcomes this carefully done contribution to the closing chapters of the evacuation story.

S. FRANK MIYAMOTO

University of Washington

The Structure of the Metropolitan Community: A Study of Dominance and Subdominance. By DON J. BOGUE. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1949. 210 pp. \$2.00.

Urban ecologists agree that the growth of the metropolis and the spread of its influence over a wide area are among the most important developments of our urban-industrial civilization. This study probably represents the most thorough investigation ever conducted in the United States of the relationship between the metropolis and its hinterlands. Started as a doctoral dissertation at the University of Michigan, the study was carried through to completion with assistance from the Scripps Foundation for Population Research. Using quantitative techniques of analysis, with basic data on population, industry, and trade drawn from the Bureau of the Census, the author presents a comprehensive statistical picture of 67 metropolitan communities (regions) in the United States.

The principal hypothesis of the research is that the metropolis is a "dominant," that the population of this country has distributed itself in such a form that several metropolitan dominant centers have emerged, that the United States may be divided up into a series of areas each of which is dominated by a metropolis, that within each of these areas (which the author terms a metropolitan community) is a number of cities and towns and open-country settlements having a definite relationship to each other and to the central metropolis, and that there has emerged, or is in the process of emerging, a "characteristic pattern of arrangement of local communities, population, and sustenance activities" which has become the distinguishing feature of the metropolitan community.

All of the types of settlements are subsumed under four categories in terms of degree of dominance; metropolitan centers, *dominants*; hinterland cities, *subdominants*; rural nonfarm populations, *influxants*; rural-farm populations, *subinfluxants*. For purposes of analysis the metropolitan communities and the hinterland cities were broken down into classes according to size. A still further step was to divide each metropolitan community into twelve sectors which

were classified as "intermetropolitan," "sub-dominant" and "local" according to their characteristic features. To test the hypothesis of metropolitan dominance, following the foregoing classificatory scheme, materials on population density, retail and wholesale trade, manufacturing, and service establishments were assembled and analyzed in terms of the central problem.

To summarize, even briefly, the factual evidence assembled in this exhaustive study is impossible in a short review. But his evidence is convincing. What he presents is a comprehensive picture of a society whose population distribution and major sustenance activities are patterned by the pervasive influences of the metropolitan centers.

Projected research on this problem includes similar studies based on 1930 and 1950 census data. Such a research program, when completed, should provide a valuable picture of the trends in metropolitan dominance over a period of two decades. It should also point more clearly to the future of our economy and the structure and functions of our communities.

Since the present study is a composite of 67 metropolitan communities, variations of individual communities are obscured in the overall picture. Hence the practical value of the findings for planning in specific communities and areas may be limited. It would seem to the reviewer that a "next step" in this research program should be an analysis of selected individual communities, following the procedure employed in the present study. Such a research would provide invaluable data for community and regional planning.

The method of delimiting the boundaries of metropolitan communities undoubtedly conceals some important features of these regional developments. Briefly, the method was to draw lines on a map from a given metropolis to each adjacent metropolis, bisect these lines, and at the midpoint of each line draw a boundary line at right angles to the original line. The author's method of reasoning was that each metropolitan center claims as hinterland "all of that area which lies closer to it than to any other metropolis." This, we believe, is a hazardous assumption. We know from general observation that these various metropolitan communities or regions overlap, that there is a kind of interstitial zone in which the influence of two or more central metropolises is about equal. We suspect also that metropolitan centers do not necessarily dominate, in every way, the area that is closest

to it, but that competing metropolises may penetrate the region well beyond the half-way point.

NOEL P. GIST

University of Missouri

America's Health: A Report to the Nation. Prepared by THE NATIONAL HEALTH ASSEMBLY. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949. xiv, 395 pp. \$4.50.

This is the official report of the National Health Assembly which was convened in May, 1948, at the request of the President to formulate a health program for the nation. Some eight hundred representatives of state and local governments, professional medical and health agencies, voluntary organizations, and the general public met for four days to balance existing health and medical facilities and personnel against the requirements for maintaining individual well-being at an optimum level and to map out a program whereby any inadequacies might be eliminated.

The work of the Assembly was carried on by means of panel discussions organized around fourteen principal topics: the need for health and medical personnel, hospital facilities, health centers and diagnostic clinics, local health units, medical care, research in medical and allied fields, problems of chronic disease, maternal and child health, mental and dental health, extension of services and facilities to persons in rural areas, rehabilitation, nutrition, environmental sanitation, and the planning and organization of community resources to further health activities.

The report presents a summary of the findings and discussion of each panel together with the recommendations for action upon which general agreement was reached. The participants in the Assembly were in agreement on every major issue except one, namely the method of financing medical care. With respect to this it was agreed that "the principle of contributory health insurance should be the basic method of financing medical care for a large majority of the American people, in order to remove the burden of unpredictable sickness costs, abolish the economic barrier to adequate medical service, and avoid the indignities of a 'means test'." However, disagreement existed concerning the manner in which prepaid medical care should be provided. Some advocated a national health insurance plan; others, just as vigorously, insisted that it be achieved through voluntary plans.

Although the report nowhere states the findings in these terms, the recommendations of the various panels lead to one conclusion—the maintenance of health is no longer an individual but a group problem. Individual actions which affect the health of other persons are increasingly being subjected to group control. Advances in medical knowledge and technology have reached the point where a single isolated physician no longer can provide his patients with the best of modern medical care. The individual citizen finds that the best medical care costs more than he can afford if paid for in a lump sum. The one issue on which the Assembly failed to reach agreement is in reality the main issue: How can the community provide the optimum health and medical facilities and services for its members?

HAROLD F. DORN

U. S. Public Health Service

American Social Insurance. By DOMENICO GAGLIARDO. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949. xxiii, 671 pp. \$5.00.

The American Social Security System. By EVELINE M. BURNS. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1949. xviii, 460 pp. \$4.50.

Professor Gagliardo achieves the well-nigh impossible in presenting a unified account of the extraordinarily complex field of social insurance. Competing Federal, state, and local governments, historical accidents, unexplained legislative irrationalities, conflicting economic groups, and deeply rooted special interests have produced unparalleled confusion in public opinion and hence in public policy and administrative procedures regarding security and how to insure it.

Command over such a complex volume of data is made possible by this author's skillful use of an historical approach and his continuously relating the legal, political, ideological, technological, social and economic forces to the current situation in modern society. Understanding of the near-chaos so frequently found in this field is only possible to the extent in which such data are integrated with the total picture of present day life. On the whole the author succeeds in this task, but occasionally he is forced to confess his failure (p. 619 ff.).

Our present difficulties in developing an adequate legal and social philosophy regarding security and its efficient administration are analyzed in terms of the nature of modern in-

dustrial technology, the influence of the common law, the historical effects of the poor law and early labor legislation, changing legal, political, and economic philosophies, conflicting economic and social classes, the nature of the democratic process and conflicting conceptions of the proper roles of individual and the state, the national and local governments, and the goals of organized society. Gagliardo accomplishes his purpose without pedantry or partisanship. He gives the reader all that is needed for intelligent independent judgment of the numerous controversial issues, particularly in the field of health insurance.

The volume by Eveline M. Burns, of the New York School of Social Work, attempts no such broad objectives. She confines herself almost entirely to the national plans initiated in 1935, and the state and local developments resulting therefrom. She has excellent command of the data, which are presented in a more or less standardized form for each kind of insurance: eligibility, benefits, financing, and administration. Present policies and procedures are evaluated in terms of the author's professional social work philosophy, a philosophy representative of those in that field whenever their thinking is integrated. This means that in many instances she does not regard present policies and procedures as the legitimate offspring of a functional democratic American matrix with clear goals and purposes. Rather are the several insurances, to her, largely fortuitous and adventitious growths which stand in need of corrections and extensions to make them "better" experiments—experiments less cluttered by the hesitations and compromises that characterize a working democracy.

By coincidence the content of these two books would be more accurately indicated had the authors exchanged titles.

ERLE FISKE YOUNG

The University of Southern California

↓ *Report of the Royal Commission on Population.* London: His Majesty's Stationary Office (Cmd. 7695) 1949. xii, 259 pp. 4s. 6d.

Great Britain shared with other industrial nations a period of rapid population increase early in the industrial revolution, followed by a slower increase which reached a low point in the 1930s and shows some recovery in the post war years. It was the realization that population trends are fundamental factors in long range economic and social change that led most

European countries to seek a "population policy" and caused the war-time appointment in Great Britain of the Royal Commission on Population. This body included some of the outstanding scholars of the country and their deliberations covered five years.

The first part of the Report traces the history of these movements and their causes. Students familiar with European literature will find little new in this section. The analysis of the apparent post-war change implicit in the large increase in the number of births in the late 1930s and 1940s leads to the conclusion that the phenomenon is largely the result of earlier marriages; and there is no way to judge whether the declining trend has been reversed until these post war couples have completed their child bearing experience. But according to present indications the general level of marital fertility was only a little higher in 1939-1948 than just before the war. Whelpton's recent analysis, based on the order of birth of children, indicates that the data for the United States are similarly inconclusive.

The British have access to more complete marriage statistics than are available in this country, and hence have developed marriage specific fertility rates and rates of birth by duration of marriage. These measures throw light on the changes in British family size which must be less precisely measured in the United States on the basis of the census enumerations of the number of children ever born or indirectly on the basis of the annual registry of births by order of birth.

This availability of marriage data led the Commission to rely heavily on marital rates as the measure of population "replacement," whereas the currently used gross reproduction rate measures the number of children born to a total generation of women between the ages of 15 and 45. The birth rates by duration of marriage indicate the fertility of couples who have been married for varying lengths of time. The number of children born to marriages of 21 years duration represents the theoretical completed marital fertility of the family. The British Report does a service in pointing out some of the weakness of the net reproduction rate as a measure of replacement. (It discusses the uses of marital rates and develops the method of calculating them in a technical appendix.)

The Report concludes that the present size of the British family is roughly six per cent

below the long run requirement for population replacement. England's decline in natural increase began earlier and has proceeded farther than that of the United States. This is indicated by the fact that even the post war recovery leaves England six per cent below replacement, whereas this country never fell below that during the depression and since 1944 has been far above the replacement level. It is probably this lag in the population trend of the United States which is responsible for our relative lack of concern about population policies.

Two chapters are devoted to population projections by methods similar to those of Thompson and Whelpton. Reasoning based upon projections of the birth, death, and marriage rates leads to conclusions concerning the future course of development of the English population generally similar to those indicated by the projections of American analysis, i.e. that natural increase will provide a slow growth for a few years with the decline setting in within twenty-five to thirty years. The proportion of youth will shrink and the proportion of the aged will increase.

In assessing this trend the case for positive action is based on the argument that the "optimum" British population is not mainly a question of total numbers, but should be examined in the light of the premise that over a long period of time parents having families too small to replace themselves will cause the nation to stagnate and eventually disappear.

To avoid this situation, in a society where birth control is generally accepted and widely practiced, the problem becomes one of increasing the number of children who are wanted. In this respect the Report points out that developments of the past seventy or eighty years have tended to accentuate the relative economic and social handicaps of parenthood and that, until recently, the family has been overlooked or accorded a minor place in social policy.

The positive action or policy recommended by the Commission consists of quite detailed program proposals. Unlike the earlier continental programs which relied mainly on financial assistance to families with children, the Royal Commission recommends both cash allowances and special services for large families. They advocate moderate increases in income tax exemptions and family allowances, but place considerable emphasis on such family services as nurseries and nursery schools, housekeeping

aids, health services, and housing subsidies.

The report concludes with short sections on public opinion and the family and recommendations for strengthening population research. This report is a summary of a number of more technical documents, some of which will be published later.

The document is a valuable addition to population literature, both in content and method. Concise summaries and conclusions at the end of each section are very useful in following the argument, and the general style is as simple and straightforward as is consistent with precision in presenting such a complex subject. It deserves to rank with the Swedish report and portrays many situations which have close parallels in the United States.

T. J. WOOFER

Federal Security Agency

Yearbook on Human Rights for 1947. Lake Success, New York: United Nations (Columbia University Press, distributors), 1949. xiv, 581 pp. \$6.00.

This second *Yearbook on Human Rights*, prepared under the auspices of the U.N. Economic and Social Council, like its predecessor contains valuable materials. In it are found all constitutional and legislative enactments regarding civil rights promulgated during 1947 in all countries of the world; statements on human rights in India and the Union of South Africa (lacking in the first *Yearbook*); provisions of treaties and international agreements made in 1947 concerning human rights; similar provisions in trusteeship agreements concluded up to the end of 1947; and chapters on human rights under the U.N. charter, U.N. organs concerned with human rights, the work of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, and the International Bill of Human Rights. A Documentary Index reproduces the important texts.

The sections devoted to the United States contain a note on the effects of the Taft-Hartley Act on American labor law, prepared by the United States Government. Since this memorandum is for outside, rather than domestic, consumption, nothing is said about the act being, as the administration claims, "a slave labor law"; on the contrary, the note states that the 1947 act "preserved to workers and labor organizations most of the guarantees heretofore provided" in the Wagner Act.

The volume also provides summaries of the fair employment practices acts of Connecticut

and Oregon, adopted in 1947, and reproduces the sections of the new constitution of New Jersey that deal with human rights.

As long as the reports will be drafted by the governments themselves, rather than by experts answerable to the United Nations, the *Yearbooks* will be chiefly valuable for the texts reproduced. It will not be possible to rely heavily on the official memoranda for a total, objective view; witness the memorandum on human rights in the Union of South Africa, prepared by South African officials, which can scarcely be relied on as a report on race relations in that part of the world.

MILTON R. KONVITZ

Cornell University

Encyclopedia of Criminology. Edited by VERNON C. BRANHAM and SAMUEL B. KUTASH. New York: Philosophical Library, 1949. xxxvii, 527 pp. \$12.00.

The word encyclopedia suggests a work which digests and presents in an authoritative manner the knowledge extant at the time of its publication. The reader of such a work has the right to assume that he will find the quintessence of learning within its covers.

The book here scrutinized meets no such expectations. It is a symposium of 131 articles, varying in length from a couple of inches to 25 pages, prepared by 61 different authors and printed in alphabetical order of topics. The shortest articles number 43 and are merely definitions of the same number of offenses taken from the criminal code of the state of New York. The longest article, 25 pages, is a good survey of criminal law and procedure. A few of the articles, notably those dealing with various aspects of police science and penal systems, have an international flavor, but on the whole the authors have ignored foreign contributions to "criminology."

Some of the leading articles are truly encyclopedic in character and have been prepared by authoritative writers. Others suffer from various defects. An encyclopedia is surely no place for articles which present only the author's own researches or points of view, regardless of their merit; nor should it offer an opportunity to an author to make a special plea of 5 pages for the adoption of his own neologism ("criminoses").

One of the most difficult problems in editing an encyclopedia is the assignment of space so that an equitable balance will be achieved. Ex-

amination of this book with that problem in mind reveals some curious facts. About 27 per cent of the text is devoted to criminal law and procedure; 25 per cent to punishments and their administration; 8 per cent to police administration and science; and 9 per cent to what might be called penal therapy and crime prevention. About 23 per cent of the text is devoted to discussion of psychological and psychiatric (mainly the latter) aspects of the causation of crime, while sociological aspects have been assigned about 9 per cent of the space. This indicates rather clearly that here we are observing the effect of the scientific bias of the editors, one of whom is a psychiatrist and the other a psychologist. For instance, one looks in vain for special sociological articles on the family, the play group, and other social institutions and phenomena, while "sexual perversion," "homosexuality," "psychoanalysis and criminology," and "frustration and aggression" are treated in articles of from 4 to 10 pages in length. The whole topic of "social disorganization and crime" receives but 5 pages, while "fingerprints" and "forensic ballistics" receive a total of 14 pages.

The book is not without merit as a symposium, even though it falls far short of being an encyclopedia.

THORSTEN SELLIN

University of Pennsylvania

Max Weber on the Methodology of the Social Sciences. Translated and Edited by EDWARD A. SHILS and HENRY A. FINCH. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1949. xvii, 188 pp. \$3.50.

The three essays in this scholarly translation of an extremely difficult German text need the support of Weber's other writings. The reasons for this are many, but it is important to note that although Max Weber was primarily a political economist he was caught in the prevailing struggle of his time over philosophical method.

Space does not permit a discussion of those basic trends in German cultural sciences which were issues in the controversies between representatives of the *Geisteswissenschaften* (Wilhelm Dilthey), *Kulturwissenschaften* (Windelband-Rickert), and the natural sciences. This struggle over method was in reality a bitter conflict over status and hierarchy. The social philosophers feared a total mechanization and materialization of man; above all, they feared that the natural sciences might displace German philosophy from its ruling position.

Weber's polemics were aimed particularly at the representatives of historicism such as Ranke, Treitschke, Schmoller, Kries, Vierkandt, and partly (even though he made extensive use of their terminology) at Dilthey and Rickert. Weber maintained that historicism and the whole school of *Geisteswissenschaften* erred in the belief that raw data received through empathy (*Einfühlung*) constituted valid cognition. In order to achieve the required objectivity in social research all undefined data must be submitted to logical scrutiny; and no investigation of social problems was possible without a valid frame of reference established through empirical research. Weber claimed that only from natural science findings can man establish general, binding laws, and that these laws are valid for all human beings "because nature knows neither national nor cultural boundaries." From this it follows that natural laws are value-free. Thus the natural scientist establishes laws based upon rigidly controlled methodology suited to the investigation of natural phenomena; the social scientist can only show principles of human action based upon *adequate causation*.

Weber stated repeatedly that the social "truth" achieved by the socio-cultural sciences is always based upon subjective experience: (1) the belief in the value of scientific truth as a product of a particular culture, and (2) the belief of the scientist in the importance of cultural goods. Thus Weber meant by subjectivity that "truth" found through empathy in the historical individual will be nothing but subjective data. To be objective, then, implies that one must be able to admit that that which is valid for subjective experience may become true or valid for others, only provided one is able to develop a method by which others will arrive at the same result.

Weber argued fiercely with proponents of a single system of cultural science; for him no such system could demonstrate the development of all cultures. Hence his demand that any scientist who employs a method adequate for his own research must refrain from claiming that method absolute for all scientific research. He stressed the point that methodology was not interested in the "growth" of scientific knowledge, but only in the general categories and the formal structure of those techniques and concepts which science uses to acquire valid data. No methodology, according to Weber, can set the goal of cognition for science; nor can any methodology discover new methods and forms

of thought not derived from science itself.

In the end, Weber emphasized that the scientific interest aroused by a *factum* is always identical with the question of whether or not it is *relevant to value*. Without the objective principle of relevance to value and the concept of adequate causation, an historical or sociological understanding and interpretation of socio-cultural events is impossible. Consequently, *Wertbeziehung* (relevance to value) is merely a logical interpretation of that specific scientific interest which determines the selection of problems for research. The unit of the value-relevant, of the qualitative multiplicity of the "unique" parts of social reality, is the historical individual. For if it is the individual who gives value to material, then it seemed only logical for Weber to focus his interest upon the overt action of man. Thus by limiting his observations to intentional actions, Weber assumed that he had found the basis for his methodology.

One may state that Weber's influence on German social sciences, although of short duration, has been a clarifying excitation. His stress on value-free research must be understood historically; he opposed men like Treitschke, Ranke, Kries, and all professors who, in his opinion, used university chairs for the propagation of their private opinions, their "bouquets of cultural ideals," and their *Weltanschauung*.

For students of methodology and social theory, these scholarly translations are a valuable addition to the translations and interpretations of Weber's works by Talcott Parsons, and H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills.

RICHARD O. NAHRENDORF

Drake University

Human Behavior and the Principle of Least Effort: An Introduction to Human Ecology.
By GEORGE KINGSLEY ZIPF. Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Press, Inc., 1949. 573 pp. \$6.50.

This is a singularly challenging book for all social scientists because of its serious "scientific" attempt to establish the validity of one cosmic principle governing all action in the "life process" of individuals, groups, societies, and cultures. Its subject matter cuts across anthropology, demography, economics, geography, history, linguistics, political science, psychology, semantics, and sociology—to mention only the primary fields of interest to social scientists. Final evaluation should properly be undertaken by a panel of experts. From its title sociologists may legitimately expect to find here a systematic

treatment of human behavior in terms of its ecological relationships. This expectation will not be realized. Zipf ignores the work of sociologists in this field during the last quarter of a century; only occasionally is the subject mentioned; and the sub-title is grossly misleading.

If the reader is equipped with formal logic, mathematics, and statistics, however, and if he has the fortitude and patience to thread his way through pages of turgid and often irrelevant argument, he can judge Zipf's grandiose claim to the discovery of a unifying principle underlying all living existences, individual and social. Zipf's argument is built upon a series of five hypothetical assumptions, each of which stems logically from the preceding one, resting ultimately on the postulate that all events in time-space are governed by the same laws of nature.

The formulation of a series of hypothetical postulates as a guide to explanation of events in time-space is one kind of activity; the empirical demonstration of their validity is another. In the development of science one necessarily complements the other. But before hypotheses can be elevated to the status of theories, they must be objectively verified. Thus the crucial issue in Zipf's work turns on the question: Has he demonstrated the validity of the Principle of Least Effort? An answer to this question demands consideration of the "tool" he has used, the way in which he uses it, and its implications.

Zipf postulates that all "living process," either individual or collective, is subject to opposite forces of Diversification and Unification. Thus the study of the action and reaction of the two forces in a time-space field is one of dynamics. These two forces operate, the author assumes, in a rectilinear plane. Postulate 4—the "Singleness of the Superlative"—tells us that in a problem of dynamics there can be but one superlative. Therefore he focuses attention upon discovery of a single principle which will explain the effects on events of the Force of Unification *versus* the Force of Diversification. The fruit of this search is the Principle of Least Effort, which is defined to mean that "each individual will adopt a course of action that will involve the expenditure of the probably least average of his work." (By definition, "least effort." p. 543)

Zipf argues that the Force of Unification acts in the direction of decreasing all possible events in time-space to one, and that the Force of Diversification acts to increase the number of

possible events in time-space while decreasing their frequency toward one. This being the case, he believes that number and frequency will be parameters of events in time-space of any instance of "life process" selected for study. Thus study of the "life process" reduces itself to analysis of rank-frequency distributions which uncover the balance between the forces of Unification and Diversification—the Principle of Least Effort. Do the empirical data presented support his argument? In a few cases, they do; in most cases they do not.

During the last twenty years Zipf has made strenuous attempts to convince his colleagues in linguistics of the reality of the rabbits he pulls from his hat. Some among them have accepted his prestidigitations at face value, but others have looked more closely and perceived that, like the best magicians, he brings forth from the hat only what he himself has placed therein before beginning his act. The argument in this book is the sleekest and plumpest stage rabbit yet produced, and the effort quite obviously was enormous. Could it be that in trying so hard he does violence to his own cosmic principle?

AUGUST B. HOLLINGSHEAD

Yale University

Social Class in America: A Manual of Procedure for the Measurement of Social Status. by W. LLOYD WARNER, MARCHIA MEEKER, and KENNETH EELS. Chicago: Science Research Associates, 1949. xiv, 274 pp. \$4.25.

This book is an addition to the techniques of research in stratification. It is not a study of the nature or functioning of social class. Beginning with a popular summary of some studies of class structure, the book moves to a description of two related methods for rating the class position of individuals in the United States and for stratifying a community according to its class structure. The description of these methods is the heart of the book.

The first method stratifies communities and gives individual class ratings through "Evaluated Participation" (E. P.). The method is based on the knowledge that an individual's prestige position limits his participation in some areas of the community and permits or coerces his participation in other areas. It represents a composite of six techniques. These, in turn, are procedures for using interview and group membership data in stratification.

The discussion of E. P. is most helpful in its

exploration of some problems connected with the use of each subsidiary technique. It does not present, however, a clean, operational description of how to use these techniques without involving the imponderables of "artistic" judgment.

It is relevant to compare the E. P. method of stratification here presented with that described by Hollingshead in *Elmtown's Youth*. (It appears that the data in both books are derived from the same community, and that the present authors have made extensive use of Hollingshead's interview material.) There are striking similarities between Hollingshead's ranking techniques and those of Warner and his colleagues. Hollingshead has pushed further toward a clear, step-by-step account of one of the procedures; the Warner group is more comprehensive, but less precise.

Perhaps the major contribution of the present book is the Index of Status Characteristics (I. S. C.). In its revised form, the I. S. C. is an index consisting of the sum of weighted sub-indices of occupation, house-type, dwelling area, and source of income. The authors find that it represents a considerable improvement over class stratification through simple occupational ranking; that it correlates at .972 with class rankings based on E. P. results for 303 families in a small, mid-Western community. As the writers warn, it appears likely that the sub-indices on which the I. S. C. is based will have to be re-validated for each new community in which it is used if a high degree of accuracy is desired. Re-validation is no simple matter, for it involves specialized methods and skilled judgments. This probably will limit the immediate, valid use of the I. S. C. by school principals, businessmen, personnel managers, and others to whom the book commends it.

The scoring of the I. S. C., once established, is adequately covered. The uses to which E. P. and I. S. C. may be put in social science and public affairs, and the problems of stratifying a community, of sampling to get potential E. P. rating judges, and of establishing the basic indices on which the I. S. C. depends are handled in a less satisfactory way.

It seems proper to remark here that this is another recent book supporting the argument for a well-edited, social science monograph series which would make available to the profession longer contributions at a reasonable cost.

G. E. SWANSON

University of Michigan

BOOK NOTES

Length of Life: A Study of the Life Table (Revised Edition). By LOUIS I. DUBLIN, ALFRED J. LOTKA, and MORTIMER SPIEGELMAN. New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1949. xxv, 379 pp. \$7.00.

This thorough revision of the two senior author's unique and invaluable book of 1936 has freshness, vigor, and a polished maturity that is too seldom found in similar re-appraisals. Dublin and Lotka's basic view of the life table as a "human document" is maintained, thus insuring the same judicious balance between its technical treatment and a comprehensive discussion of the biological and social circumstances which determine the course and duration of human longevity. Covering the same ground as the earlier volume, the new edition draws upon the much wider body of evidence which recent improvements in vital statistics have made available. Two new chapters—"Biological Factors Influencing Longevity and Mortality," and "Forecasts of Mortality and Longevity"—have been added; and 32 charts and 94 tables (most of them new) carry the record of improvement in health and longevity well into the 1940's. The great majority of bibliographic references post-date the earlier edition; and an appendix lists what is probably the most complete series of life table summaries ever published for the United States and foreign countries.

Society: An Introductory Analysis (Revised Edition). By R. M. MACIVER and CHARLES H. PAGE. New York: Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1949. xvii, 697 pp. \$5.00.

Although unchanged in orientation and organization from MacIver's earlier text, *Society: A Textbook of Sociology* (1937), this revision is enriched by the addition of recent theoretical and factual materials. New sections on Culture and Personality, the Statistical Study of Attitudes, Regionalism, Class in the United States, Ethnic and Racial Groups, and Mass Communications have been skillfully incorporated into the old framework. Page's contributions are so effectively blended as to produce a seamless fabric of exposition. Book I (6 chapters) discusses basic sociological concepts and the nature of society and environment; Book II (15 chapters) deals with "The Social Structure"; and Book III (8 chapters) considers "Social Change." The section devoted to "Questions and Exercises" at the end of the earlier text has

been omitted in the present edition, providing considerable space for expansion of the bibliographic material in "Notes on Further Reading." (May this indicate greater maturity among students of sociology, or their instructors?) Those who appreciate an evocative and high level approach to the subject, and lucid exposition, will find this new edition to their liking.

Sociology: A Study of Society and Culture (Second Edition). By KIMBALL YOUNG. New York: American Book Company, 1949. viii, 638 pp. \$5.00.

Thinner by virtue of bi-columnar pages and smaller type, the new edition of this standard text is actually a larger monument to the author's voracious eclecticism than was the fat blue volume of 1942. Although Young believes that sociology has not yet produced a cohesive core of theory, he orients his work around what he regards as the three basic variables of the science, i.e. society, culture, and personality. He again uses an impressive array of familiar concepts—opposition, accommodation, socialization, isolation, cultural lag; and adds other newer ones which are more or less theoretical in nature. Nevertheless the book remains a compendium of rather disparate materials, comprehensive beyond cavil but somewhat bewilderingly impartial. While the success of the earlier edition augurs well for this, one still may wonder how a text of this kind affects beginning students. For advanced students and teachers, however, this will undoubtedly prove a convenient reference. It leaves few fields unexplored, provides competent summaries of many, and is generously provided with bibliographical notes.

T. V. A. and the Grass Roots: A Study in the Sociology of Formal Organization. By PHILIP SELZENICK. Berkeley and Los Angeles: The University of California Press, 1949. ix, 274 pp. \$3.75.

As the title indicates, this is concerned with the relationships between government control and democracy, a concept which here means recognition of the rights of local groups to participate in enterprises such as those of the Tennessee Valley Authority. The book transcends mere descriptive analysis of a specific development, however, and undertakes to contribute to theories of social organization. In so doing it draws upon theoretical and conceptual

tools of the science. If this occasionally results in obscurity rather than enlightenment, it is nevertheless a worthwhile effort. Among other things, it demonstrates that sociology has more to offer than the sometimes confusing translation of old knowledge into new jargon, a result which all too often mars the work in industrial sociology and other fields. Due consideration is given to both formal and informal organizational structures, to the functional aspects of activity, and to the "unanticipated consequences" which frequently ensue from all planned endeavors.

Regional Research Co-operation: A Statement of Regional Research Procedures as Developed by the Regional Land Tenure Research Project. By HAROLD HOFFSOMMER. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1949. ix, 136 pp. \$2.50.

In a time when the individual researcher looks upon anything which purports to be co-operative research with something akin to hopeful awe, this book is likely to find a mixed reception. To those seeking results of research, or even proof that cooperative research can contribute to the general body of social science theory, it will be disappointing. This disappointment, moreover, will be the more acute because work designed to produce "by-products" of wider theoretical relevance was explicitly eliminated from the objectives of this project. On the other hand, anyone interested in planning a project which will draw its personnel from several institutions (although not cross-cutting a wide range of scientific disciplines) will doubtless find it useful. The region in question consists of Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi—or, more specifically, certain farming areas in these states. The research aimed to present solutions for specific problems of land tenure. The cooperation—here meaning integrated rather than coordinated work—was among personnel drawn from several state and Federal bureaus concerned with agriculture and from five state university departments of rural sociology. Problems of sampling, setting up interview schedules, processing data, and reconciling diverse interests are discussed in detail.

Children of Brasstown. By CELIA BURNS STENDER. Urbana, Ill.: The Bureau of the College of Education, University of Illinois, 1949. 103 pp.

This is a small but solid contribution to

the literature on stratification in American society based on data collected in a New England industrial city of 15,000 population. The research focused on three problems: (1) the class structure of Brasstown; (2) Brasstown children's awareness of this class structure; and (3) "what symbols they are conscious of when they are conscious of class." Children in the first, fourth, sixth, and eighth grades were studied, and the methodological procedures are described in detail.

The report documents the growing child's increasing awareness of social class symbols throughout the elementary school years. A typical eighth grader has become so indoctrinated with the symbols and patterns of class behavior that he is not conscious of class, but it is so internalized as to be a part of his basic personality. This is a sound study; it adds not only to our knowledge of class but to understanding of how class symbols develop in the individual in his early years.

The Family in a Democratic Society: Anniversary Papers of the Community Service Society of New York. New York: Columbia University Press, 1949. viii, 287 pp. \$3.75.

Papers originally prepared for delivery before a mixed public audience do not frequently read well when they appear later in book form. So it is with these addresses, given on the occasion of the one hundredth anniversary of the Community Service Society of New York. Some of them have a high level of generality; others represent brief accounts of current researches better reported elsewhere; all authors are undoubtedly better represented in their other written works. Nevertheless, because the papers cover such a wide range of topics, any reader will find at least several of them instructive. This reviewer liked especially the papers on adolescence by Jones and Ackerman, and Dollard's negative answer to the question: "Do We Have a Science of Child Rearing?"

Protestant Churches and Industrial America. By HENRY F. MAY. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949. x, 297 pp. \$3.50.

Widely acclaimed by students of American church history, this study of the opinions of nineteenth century "old line" American Protestant groups toward the problems of the industrial laboring classes, and especially the nascent labor movement, may be regarded as definitive. Its value for sociologists lies essentially in its marshalling of data on changes

in social thought and the sociology of religion in general. Professor May's interpretations, though suggestive, are often debatable and sometimes dubious. Much of the reason for this stricture lies in the inadequate treatment of theological positions and trends during the period.

Three basic conclusions, however, may be taken as valid: (1) the association of social protest with anti-clericalism and radical theology inhibited the rise of the social gospel; (2) groups whose theology tended to emphasize the church as a means toward grace were more receptive to the social gospel than were those which stressed individual conversion experience; and (3) acceptance of the social gospel was primarily conditioned by bloody social crises such as the Haymarket riots, the Pullman strike, etc., which jarred churches into a re-examination of some of their hitherto unquestioned social norms and values. These conclusions should help to modify that hoary commonplace which says the direction of American Protestant social thought has derived solely from the over-representation of upper classes in Protestant churches.

Gregorio, *The Hand-Trembler: A Psychobiological Personality Study of a Navaho Indian*. By ALEXANDER H. LEIGHTON and DOROTHEA C. LEIGHTON with the assistance of CATHERINE OPLER. Cambridge, Mass.: Peabody Museum of American Archaeology and Ethnology (Papers of the Peabody Museum of American Archaeology and Ethnology, Vol. XL, No. 1) 1949. xiv, 177 pp. \$2.50.

This psychobiological personality study of a Navaho Indian is the first report of the Ramah Project. It contains the autobiography of a Ramah native as dictated through an interpreter and further annotated with considerable additional information from other Navahos, professional field workers, and local white residents. On the whole it makes rather dull and repetitious reading, but it does provide some excellent insights into the practical problems of making extensive case-history studies. It also demonstrates, in much detail, some very useful techniques both in field work and in the handling or processing of raw data. In fact the document's utility as a model work manual tends to overshadow its demonstration of a life history.

Personal Adjustment in Old Age. By RUTH SHONLE CAVAN, ERNEST W. BURGESS, ROBERT

J. HAVIGHURST, and HERBERT GOLDHAMER. Chicago: Science Research Associates, Inc., 1949. xiii, 204 pp. \$2.95.

Here is a general, rather prosaic, but suggestive portrayal of typical problems involved in the personal adjustments of older people in contemporary American society. It is based on data gathered from approximately three thousand individuals who responded to questionnaires on their personal activities and attitudes. A conceptualized scheme of cultural patterns to which individuals adjust is outlined in some detail; many brief case-record sketches are included; and two inventories, on activities and attitudes of aging persons, are described and strongly recommended as research tools in this field. The book will be of primary interest to those who plan similar research projects.

Mass Communications: A Book of Readings Selected and Edited for the Institute of Communications Research in the University of Illinois. Edited by WILBUR SCHRAMM. Urbana, Ill.: The University of Illinois Press, 1949. 552 pp. \$4.50.

This second symposium to be published in two years by the Illinois Institute contains forty articles ranging from straight historical reporting to examples of rigorous systematic analysis and classified under such headings as Development, Control and Support, Audiences, and Effects. Prefaces to each section indicate the content and offer suggestions for further reading. Most of the articles are written by well-known figures in the field; and all of them have appeared previously in generally accessible publications, about one third, in fact, in other recent symposia. Considerations of purpose, value, and principle of selection apart, one wonders what audience the editor intends to reach with this collection. The book will be old hat to advanced students. If beginners or "interested persons" constitute the intended audience, wouldn't a well-integrated volume be preferable to such a variety of data, opinion, and interpretation as is found in this collection? An appendix of facts and figures presents what is probably the most irrelevant set of statistics ever tacked onto a work of social science in our time.

Urban Geography: A Study of Site, Evolution, Pattern and Classification in Villages, Towns and Cities. By GRIFFITH TAYLOR. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1949. xv, 439 pp. \$7.50.

In this volume the prolific British writer on geography and related subjects has turned his attention primarily to questions of the site and evolution of the city. He concerns himself largely with problems of environmental control, of functional patterns, and of distribution in general, rather than with sociological or architectural aspects of city life. As an avowed geographical determinist, he devotes most attention to "the dominant feature of the environment" as the key to the city. His classification of cities is by site: towns in plains, river towns, seaports and lake ports, mountain towns, mining towns, religious centers and resort towns. The material used is world wide and generally includes places which the author himself has visited. There are 300 plans and diagrams. The treatment is not very systematic, and the theoretical aspects are meager. The impression made on the reader is that of flitting from illustration to illustration.

The Concept of Colonization. By S. HERBERT FRANKEL. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949. 24 pp. 2s.

Colonial development acts in Britain, a "bold new program" in the U.S., and problems of venture capital and trusteeship around the world represent areas of action and theory where sociologists and economists can, and indeed must, meet on terms of mutual interest and effective cooperation. Such a thought is implied, if not expressly stated, in this inaugural lecture by the Professor of Colonial Economic Affairs in Oxford; for the scope of his fresh re-appraisal and dynamic view can scarcely be contained by economics alone. Professor Frankel stresses the need for more intensive comparative analysis of factors influencing the successful (and unsuccessful) integration of metropolitan societies within the larger economies to which they give birth. Previous concepts of colonization, he believes, have not dealt adequately with the economic roots of the matter. For him colonization is "the process by which such new [economic and social] structures are evolved. It implies the withdrawal of individuals from established structural patterns to found a new colony of endeavour within, and in relation to, the changing natural or human surround." This is a working hypothesis which should prove valuable in sociological no less than economic research.

Population Trends and Policies: A Study in Australian and World Demography. By W. D.

BORRIE. Sydney: The Australasian Publishing Company, 1948. xx, 263 pp. 21s.

This general text by a senior lecturer in the Department of Social Studies, University of Sydney, provides a useful summary of material on the Australian population set against the better known framework of international demographic trends. Major emphasis is placed on Australia's chief "internal" problem of its (white) population: the familiar Western one of levels of reproduction insufficient to prevent population decline. "Even the maintenance of fertility at replacement level, and the influence of [acceptable] immigrants at the rate of 40,000 a year, will not provide Australia with more than half of the twenty million which national leaders now appear to have accepted as the minimum commensurate with security" (p. 231). The "external" problems—relative exhaustion of earlier sources of preferred immigrants, and the rising clamor of earth-hungry Asiatics for a share of "empty spaces"—are discussed more briefly. (Readers are referred to Forsyth's excellent *The Myth of Open Spaces*, Melbourne 1942, for these topics.) Borrie rightly calls for re-thinking of current ideas on Australian population in terms of demographic changes in East and West, and recommends an internal policy based essentially on that of Sweden. External policy must adapt to the maintenance of quality at home, assistance to peoples in areas of heavy growth toward checking their potentials, and implementation of the concept of moving resources to people rather than the reverse.

Japan Since Perry. By CHITOSHI YANAGA. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1949. viii, 723 pp. \$6.00.

In this work Japan's development during the past hundred years is broadly and soundly viewed as "an integral and inseparable part of world history," during which she was influenced, or at least touched, by the major currents of thought and fashion, as well as by political and economic developments. Its special contribution is the inclusion of chapters, replete with data drawn largely from Japanese sources, to document the cultural impact of the West on Japan. Despite the zealous efforts of many groups in Japan to adopt the prevailing doctrines and fashions abroad, it is clear that material techniques and concepts found a more hospitable reception than did the spiritual and cultural values of the West.

The development of modern Japan has been narrated here with a wealth of detail and attention to the role of individuals; it should find a place not only as a text, for which it is designed, but also as a work of reference. A full index (27 pages) and an extensive bibliography of Japanese works (23 pages), following a brief bibliography of Western sources, enhances its usefulness for the student in his first serious approach to modern Japan.

Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction.

By JEROME B. COHEN. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1949. xix, 545 pp. \$7.50.

At every step this first major post war study of Japan's economy in war and defeat (1937-1949) makes clear the violence of the economic mobilization, change, and collapse on Japanese society. Buttressed by detailed documentation, first-hand post war investigation, and as reliable and complete statistical materials (82 tables and 17 charts) as are available, the author has produced a substantial and valuable work. Excellent descriptions and analyses of the effect of manpower mobilization (chap. 5), shortages of civilian goods (chap. 6), and post war political and economic engineering (chap. 7) on Japan's economy are particularly revealing. Many of these data will serve those who are primarily interested in such problems as social change, social control, and the social consequences of war on the economic level.

L'Année Sociologique (Troisième Série: 1940-1948; Tome second). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1949. pp. 497-927. 800 fr.

The first volume in this new series was noted in the preceding issue of this journal. Part I of this second volume contains two original articles: "Art et sociologie" by Pierre Francastel (pp. 491-527), an erudite but diffuse discussion; and a more systematic and suggestive paper by Georges Friedmann entitled "De

quelques incidences psychologique, sociales et morales dans l'évolution contemporaine des métiers industriels" (pp. 528-577). Part II, "Analyses," concludes the arduous task of reviewing sociological literature of the 1940-48 period, though the majority of the nearly 300 works treated center on the years 1946 and 1947. Reviews in this volume are grouped under the following main headings: "Sociologie morale et juridique," "Sociologie économique," "Technologie," "Linguistique," and "Esthétique." The analytical table of contents and indexes by author and subject cover the material of both volumes. Now that *L'Année* has caught up, so to speak, we salute its rebirth and hope for no further interruption in its annual appearance.

Yearbook of the United Nations, 1947-48. Lake Success, N.Y.: Department of Public Information of the United Nations (Columbia University Press, distributor) 1949. xix, 1126 pp. \$12.50.

For all who seek information on the problems and recent activities of the United Nations and each of its special agencies, here is God's plenty. Covering the period from 1 July 1947 to 21 September 1948, this second issue of the official yearbook describes in concise but copiously annotated detail the work of each of the six principal organs and of the ten established (and three yet to be established) specialized agencies. This volume improves on its predecessor by containing full references to the original documents; it also includes many organization charts, maps, a 40-page selected bibliography, a "who's who" of UN personnel, and pertinent documentary annexes. It is hard to conceive of a more comprehensive annual of world affairs than this authoritative publication. The compilers (who remain anonymous) deserve high praise for the meticulous skill with which they have discharged an enormous editorial task.

PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED

(Listing of a publication below does not preclude its subsequent review)

- ALLAN, W., MAX GLUCKMAN, D. U. PETERS, and C. G. TRAPNELL. *Land Holding and Land Usage among the Plateau Tonga of Mazabuka District: A Reconnaissance Survey, 1945*. Livingstone, Northern Rhodesia: The Rhodes-Livingstone Institute [The Rhodes-Livingstone Papers, No. 14] (Oxford University Press, distributors), 1948. vii, 192 pp. 8s 6d.
- ALTSCHUL, FRANK. *Toward Building a Better America*. Washington: National Planning Association (Planning Pamphlets No. 69), 1949. iv, 19 pp. No price indicated.
- ANDERSON, W. A. *A Study of Values in Rural Living: The Opinions of Youth and Adults* (Part II, Memoir 286). Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Agricultural Experiment Station, 1949. 109 pp. No price indicated.
- L'Année Sociologique (Troisième Série: 1940-1948; Tome Second). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1949. pp. 491-923. 800 fr.
- BARONTE, GERVÉE. *Twilight in India*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1949. xix, 382 pp. \$3.75.
- BARRINGER, PAUL B. *The Natural Bent: The Memoirs of Dr. Paul B. Barringer*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1949. viii, 280 pp. \$3.50.
- BECKER, CARL. *Progress and Power* (Second Printing). New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1949. xli, 116 pp. \$2.50 (Text edition, \$1.85).
- BERTOCCI, PETER A. *The Human Venture in Sex, Love, and Marriage*. New York: Association Press, 1949. 143 pp. \$2.50.
- BORRIE, W. D. *Population Trends and Policies: A Study in Australian and World Demography*. Sydney, Australia: The Australasian Publishing Company, 1948. xx, 263 pp. 21s.
- [BRASIL. INSTITUTO DE ECONOMIA]. *Pesquisa Sobre O Padrão de Vida do Comerciante no Distrito Federal: Bases Metodológicas Coleta de Dados Análise dos Resultados*. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Instituto de Economia, 1949. 239 pp. No price indicated.
- [CITIZENS' COMMITTEE ON CHILDREN OF NEW YORK CITY]. *Children Absent from School: A Report and a Program*. New York: Citizens' Committee on Children of New York City, Inc., 1949. 116 pp. No price indicated.
- COLLIER, JOHN, JR. and ANÍBAL BUTTRÓN. *The Awakening Valley*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949. 199 pp. \$6.00.
- COUTU, WALTER. *Emergent Human Nature: A Symbolic Field Interpretation*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1949. xv, 432, xii pp. \$5.00 (Text edition, \$3.75).
- DALE, EDWARD EVERETT. *The Indians of the Southwest: A Century of Development in the United States*. Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1949. xvi, 283 pp. \$4.00.
- DAVIE, MAURICE R. *Negroes in American Society*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1949. ix, 542 pp. \$6.00 (Text edition, \$4.50).
- DAVIS, KINGSLEY. *Human Society*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949. xiv, 655 pp. \$4.25.
- DEARING, CHARLES L. and WILFRED OWEN. *National Transportation Policy*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1949. xiii, 459 pp. \$4.00.
- DICKINSON, ROBERT LATOU, and LURA BEAM. *A Thousand Marriages: A Medical Study of Sex Adjustment* (Second Printing). Baltimore: The Williams & Wilkins Company, 1949. xxv, 482 pp. \$4.00.
- DICKINSON, ROBERT LATOU and LURA BEAM. *The Single Woman: A Medical Study in Sex Education* (Second Printing). Baltimore: The Williams & Wilkins Company, 1949. xix, 469 pp. \$4.00.
- DIMOCK, HEDLEY S. and HARLEIGH B. TRECKER. *The Supervision of Group Work and Recreation*. New York: Association Press, 1949. xv, 280 pp. \$4.50.
- DUBLIN, LOUIS I., ALFRED J. LOTKA and MORTIMER SPIEGELMAN. *Length of Life: A Study of the Life Table* (Revised Edition). New York: The Ronald Press, 1949. xxv, 379 pp. \$7.00.
- EPSTEIN, ISRAEL. *Notes on Labor Problems in Nationalist China*. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1949. vi, 159 pp. \$2.25.
- EWING, OSCAR R. and GEORGE F. LULL. *How Shall We Pay for Health Care?* New York: Public Affairs Committee, Inc. (Public Affairs Pamphlet No. 152), 1949. 32 pp. 20 cents.
- FINK, ARTHUR E. *The Field of Social Work* (Revised Edition). New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1949. xiv, 577 pp. \$3.75.
- [FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS]. *Training Rural Leaders: Shantan Bailie School, Kansu Province, China*. Washington, D.C.: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1949. vi, 136 pp. \$1.50.
- FOX, ANNETTE BAKER. *Freedom and Welfare in the Caribbean: A Colonial Dilemma*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1949. x, 272 pp. \$3.50.
- FRANKEL, S. HERBERT. *The Concept of Colonization*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949. 24 pp. 2s.
- GORDON, ALBERT I. *Jews in Transition*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1949. xvii, 331 pp. \$4.00.
- HARAP, LOUIS. *Social Roots of the Arts*. New York: International Publishers, 1949. 192 pp. \$2.50.
- HERREMANS, MAURICE-PIERRE. *La Question*

- Flamande: Collection Des Études Politique & Sociales.* Bruxelles: Editions Marie-Julienne 1948. 205 pp. 80 fr. Belg.
- HERREMANS, MAURICE-PIERRE. *Personnes Déplacées: (Rapatriés, Disparus, Réfugiés).* Bruxelles: Editions Marie-Julienne, 1948. 317 pp. 100 fr. Belg.
- HILLPERN, ELSE P., EDMUND P. HILLPERN, and IRVING A. SPAULDING. *Bristow Rogers: American Negro* (A Psychoanalytical Case History). New York: Hermitage House, Inc., 1949. 184 pp. \$3.00.
- HOLLAND, L. M. *The Direct Primary in Georgia.* Urbana, Ill.: The University of Illinois Press (Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, Vol. XXX, No. 4), 1949. 125 pp. No price indicated.
- HOWE, IRVING and B. J. WIDICK. *The U. A. W. and Walter Reuther.* New York: Random House, 1949. x, 309 pp. \$3.00.
- [INSTITUTE OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA]. *Collective Bargaining and Arbitration* (A Conference Conducted in San Francisco and Los Angeles, March 3-5, 1949). Berkeley, Cal.: Institute of Industrial Relations and University Extension 1949. 38 pp. No price indicated.
- [ISRAEL, CENTRAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS]. *Statistical Bulletin of Israel*, Vol. I, No. 2, August, 1949. Jerusalem: The Government Printer 1949. xxv-1, 162-103 pp., and Hebrew Appendix. 500 mls.
- IYV, A. C. and IRWIN ROSS. *Religion and Race: Barriers to College?* New York: Public Affairs Committee, Inc., (Public Affairs Pamphlet No. 153) 1949. 32 pp. 20 cents.
- KNOX, JOHN BALLANGER. *The People of Tennessee: A Study of Population Trends.* Knoxville, Tenn.: University of Tennessee Press, 1949. xvi, 191 pp. \$3.00.
- KOHN, HANS. *The Twentieth Century: A Mid-way Account of the Western World.* New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949. ix, 242 pp. \$2.00.
- LANE, HOMER. *Talks to Parents and Teachers: Insight into the Problems of Childhood.* New York: Hermitage Press, Inc., 1949. 217 pp. \$2.75.
- LEPAWSKY, ALBERT. *State Planning and Economic Development in the South.* Washington: National Planning Association (NPA Committee of the South Report No. 4) 1949. xvi, 193 pp. \$3.00.
- McKELEY, BLAKE. *Rochester: The Flower City, 1855-1890.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1949. xvii, 407 pp. \$5.00.
- McWILLIAMS, CAREY and ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN. *In the Supreme Court of the United States: Brief of Alexander Meiklejohn, of Cultural Workers in Motion Pictures and Other Arts, and of Members of the Professions and Amici Curiae.* Los Angeles: Parker & Company, Law Printers, 1949. 36 pp. No price indicated.
- MAQUET, JACQUES J. *Sociologie de la Connaissance: Sa structure et ses rapports avec la philosophie de la connaissance; Étude critique des systèmes de Karl Mannheim et de Pitirim A. Sorokin.* Louvain: Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales, 1949. 360 pp. 175 frs. Belg.
- MEAD, MARGARET. *Male and Female: A Study of the Sexes in a Changing World.* New Yorker: William Morrow & Co., 1949. xii, 477 pp. \$5.00.
- MEIER, NORMAN C. and HAROLD W. SAUNDERS (Editors). *The Polls and Public Opinion: Iowa Conference and Opinion Research Sponsored by the State University of Iowa, Iowa City.* New York: Henry Holt Co., 1949. x, 355 pp. \$2.50.
- MERRILL, FRANCES E. *Courtship and Marriage: A Study in Social Relationships.* New York: William Sloane Associates, Inc., 1949. x, 360 pp. Text edition, \$2.85.
- MERTON, ROBERT K. *Social Theory and Social Structure: Toward the Codification of Theory and Research.* Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1949. 423 pp. \$5.00.
- MILES, ARTHUR P. *An Introduction to Public Welfare.* Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1949. 450 pp. \$4.00.
- MOSTELLER, FREDERICK, et al. *The Pre-Election Polls of 1948: Report to the Committee on Analysis of Pre-election Polls and Forecasts.* New York: Social Science Research Council (Bulletin 60), 1949. xx, 396 pp. \$3.00 (paper \$2.50).
- MUKERJEE, RADHAKAMAL. *The Social Structure of Values.* London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. [1949]. xx, 418 pp. 18s.
- MUNSON, HENRY LEE. *European Beliefs Regarding the United States.* New York: Common Council for American Unity, 1949. 134 pp. \$2.00.
- [NATIONAL RECREATION ASSOCIATION] *Community Sports and Athletics: Organization—Administration—Program.* New York: A. S. Barnes and Company, 1949. ix, 500 pp. \$4.00.
- PALMER, GLADYS L. and ANN RATNER. *Industrial and Occupational Trends in National Employment: 1910-1940, 1910-1948.* Philadelphia: Industrial Research Department. University of Pennsylvania (Research Report No. 11) 1949. x, 26 pp. Appendix 68 pp. \$1.00.
- PLANCK, MAX. *Scientific Autobiography and Other Papers.* (Translated by Frank Gaynor) New York: Philosophical Library, 1949. 192 pp. \$3.75.
- [POPULATION INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE and THE SCOTTISH COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN EDUCATION (SPONSORS)] *The Trend of Scottish Intelligence: A Comparison of the 1947 and 1932 Surveys of the Intelligence of Eleven-Year-Old Pupils.* London: University of London Press, Ltd. (Publication of the Scottish Council for Research in Education, XXX), 1949. xxviii, 151 pp. 7s. 6d.
- POUND, ROSCOE. *The Rise of the Service State and its Consequences.* New Wilmington, Pa.: The Economic and Business Foundation, 1949. 34 pp. 75 cents.
- RIDENOUR, NINA and ISABEL JOHNSON. *Some Special Problems of Children: Aged 2-5 Years* (Second Edition). Philadelphia: National Mental

- Health Foundation, Inc., and New York Committee on Mental Hygiene State Charities Aid Association, 1949. 72 pp. No price indicated.
- ROSE, ARNOLD M. *The Negro's Morale: Group Identification and Protest*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1949. ix, 153 pp. \$2.50.
- RUNES, DAGOBERT D. *Letters to My Son*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1949. 92 pp. \$2.75.
- RUSSELL, BERTRAND. *Authority and the Individual*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1949. 79 pp. \$2.00.
- SARGENT, S. STANSFELD and MARIAN W. SMITH (Editors). *Culture and Personality: Proceedings of an Interdisciplinary Conference held under the auspices of the Viking Fund, November 7 and 8, 1947*. New York: Viking Fund, Inc., 1949. vi, 219 pp. \$1.50.
- SCHRAMM, WILBUR (Editor). *Mass Communications: A Book of Readings Selected and Edited for the Institute of Communications Research in the University of Illinois by the Director of the Institute, Wilbur Schramm, 1949*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1949. xi, 552 pp. \$4.50.
- SIMKHOVITCH, MARY KINGSBURY. *Here is God's Plenty: Reflections on American Social Advance*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949. 184 pp. \$2.50.
- SMITH, MARIAN W. (Editor). *Indians of the Urban Northwest*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1949. xix, 370 pp. \$6.00.
- STOKES, ANSON PHELPS, et al. *Negro Status and Race Relations in the United States, 1911-1946: The Thirty-Five Year Report of the Phelps-Stokes Fund*. New York: Phelps-Stokes Fund, 1949. 219 pp. \$1.50 (paper, \$1.00).
- SZAJKOWSKI, Z. *Anti-Semitism in the French Labor Movement: From the Fourierist Movement until the Closing of the Dreyfus Case, 1845-1906*. (English Summary). New York: Litho House, 1948. iv, 156 pp. No price indicated.
- TAYLOR, GRIFFITH. *Urban Geography: A Study of Site, Evolution, Pattern and Classification in Villages, Towns and Cities*. New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1949. xv, 439 pp. \$7.50.
- TEETERS, NEBLEY K. *Deliberation of the International Penal and Penitentiary Congresses: Questions and Answers, 1872-1935*. Philadelphia: Temple University Book Store, 1949. 198 pp. \$4.00.
- TMASHEFF, NICHOLAS S. and PAUL W. FACEY. *Sociology: An Introduction to Sociological Analysis*. Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1949. xiv, 399 pp. \$3.25.
- [UNESCO] *Report to the United Nations: 1948-1949*. Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (Columbia University Press, distributors) 1949. 176 pp. 80 cents.
- [UNITED NATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION] *Yearbook of the United Nations: 1947-1948*. Lake Success, New York: United Nations, Department of Public Information (Columbia University Press, distributors) 1949. xix, 1126 pp. \$12.50.
- [UNITED NATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION] *Building for Peace: The Story of the First Four Years of the United Nations, 1945-1949*. New York: United Nations (Columbia University Press, distributors), 1949. 36 pp. 25 cents.
- [UNITED STATES, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS] *Bureau of the Census Manual of Tabular Presentation: An Outline of Theory and Practice in the Presentation of Statistical Data in Tables for Publication*. By BRUCE L. JENKINSON. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1949. xiii, 265 pp. \$1.50.
- [UNITED STATES, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE] *The Chicago-Cook County Health Survey*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1949. xxxviii, 1317 pp. \$15.00.
- UTLEY, FRED. *The High Cost of Vengeance*. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1949. 310 pp. \$3.50.
- [WASHINGTON PUBLIC OPINION LABORATORY] *Polling Religious Instruction on Washington State Campuses: Interviewing in October and November, 1948*. Seattle and Pullman: University of Washington and State College of Washington (Bulletin No. 5A) 1949. 14 pp. Gratis.
- WILSON, GERTRUDE and GLADYS RYLAND. *Social Group Work Practice: The Creative Use of the Social Process*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1949. xii, 687 pp. \$5.00.
- WITNEY, FRED. *War-time Experiences of the National Labor Relations Board: 1941-1945*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press (Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, Vol. XXX, Nos. 2-3) 1949. 309 pp. \$2.50.
- YANAGA, CHITOSHI. *Japan Since Perry*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1949. x, 723 pp. \$6.00.
- ZEMANS, EUGENE S. *Held Without Bail: Physical Aspects of the Police Lockups of the City of Chicago, 1947-1948*. Chicago: John Howard Association, 1949. vii, 65 pp. and Appendix. \$1.50.

Widely Adopted

LINDESMITH-STRAUSS
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

A THOROUGHLY INTEGRATED TEXT
THAT CHALLENGES STUDENTS



"Excellent use of language, free from gobbledygook usually found in social science texts. Apt case studies. Organization and inclusion of discussion suggestions make it a text for undergraduates—a very welcome innovation in the field."—*John G. Kenyon, Kansas State College*

"This is, I think, a new type of book in the field. A healthy departure from the encyclopedic character of early texts. A good approach organized around Mead and Cooley's basic ideas."—*Robert C. Stone, Stanford University*

"Extremely readable—an almost perfect balance of general statement and specific example."—*Hunter Mead, California Institute of Technology*

"It is authoritative, interesting, and up-to-date. The style and format are captivating. Students and teachers will find the subject-matter presented in an unusually clear and stimulating manner. I find the book difficult to lay aside when I begin to read different chapters." — *Edward A. Huth, University of Dayton*

550 pp., illustrated, \$4.50 list

Send for your examination copy

SUTHERLAND: *White Collar Crime*

A long-awaited work of recognized significance

\$3.00 list

NEWCOMB: *Social Psychology*


A new textbook scheduled for April 1950

\$4.50 tentative

THE DRYDEN PRESS • NEW YORK

386 FOURTH AVENUE

When writing advertisers please mention the AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW



JAN 5 1950

Cuphd.

PERIODICAL ROOM
GENERAL LIBRARY
UNIV. OF MICH.

American SOCIOLOGICAL Review


•

December
1949

Official Journal of the
American Sociological Society

Volume 14

Number 6



Recent and forthcoming texts

Atteberry—Auble—Hunt—Masiko:

INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL SCIENCE

Revised Edition. Volume I. This book, in combination with Volume II, is designed for a two-semester general course in the social sciences. It provides an introduction at the college level to the fields of sociology, economics and political science. The problems approach is emphasized throughout. *To be published in early spring.*

Arthur Hillman:

COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION AND PLANNING

This new text for upperclassmen brings together and systematically presents the best current thought and evidence of achievements in community organization and planning. Emphasis is placed on the methods by which communities deliberately change their structure and way of life. *To be published in December.*

James S. Slotkin:

SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY

This new book is a systematic treatise on society and culture which attempts to show, by generalizations, the relations between them. In an unusual and thoughtful treatment that surveys human society and culture both geographically and chronologically, the author makes clear the familiar institutions and cultural traits common to all people. *To be published in the spring.*

Kingsley Davis:

HUMAN SOCIETY

The focus of this new text is on factors explaining the organization and disorganization of society as a whole. In approach it does not represent any single point of view in sociology, but attempts to combine the various schools into one general approach. *Published in September. \$4.25*

— The Macmillan Co., 60 Fifth Ave., New York 11

When writing advertisers please mention the AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

